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DIALECTIC AND SOCIOLOGY: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF DIALECTICAL THOUGHT IN WESTERN SOCIOLOGY



by

DAMIR MIRKOVIĆ

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Dialectic and Sociology: A Critical Examination of Dialectical Thought in Western Sociology" submitted by Damir Mirkovic in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

ABSTRACT

The central concern of this thesis is the influence of European dialectic (Hegel and Marx) on western sociology, with particular reference to the schools which emerged in American sociology. This study, therefore, is essentially an exploration into the history of sociological thought, which endeavours to trace the path of dialectic from Europe (Hegel, Marx, Simmel, Gurvitch) to American sociology.

Basically a philosophical method, the dialectic is most conspicuously present in the sociological conceptions of Karl Marx. Among European sociologists it is clearly present in G. Simmel and G. Gurvitch. Against this background the elements of dialectic are traced in American sociology, and they are notably found in the conceptions of the Chicago sociologists, as well as in the historical sociology of Pitirim A. Sorokin.

Three types of dialectic found in sociology are thus formulated as: formal-heuristic (Simmel, Gurvitch), practico-empirical (the Chicago School), and the dialectic of historical sociology (Sorokin).

Among the most common categories of any dialectic proper, the dialectical conceptions of contradiction and of totality are discussed. It is in terms of these two major categories that the author traces, and critically examines, the elements of dialectic present in the sociology of Simmel, Gurvitch, Sorokin and the Chicago scholars. In this, the thesis stresses the important difference between sociological holism and the philosophical category of dialectical totality, as two different ways of looking at the world and society.

A widely spread belief that the dialectic consists mainly in a formulation of two contrary theses and their subsequent unification in a higher

synthesis (dialectical triad), is challenged. In the same way the conception of mutual interrelatedness or dialectical reciprocity of perspectives, taken widely today as distinctly dialectical, is treated as only one important element of the dialectic, not to be identified, however, with the whole dialectical paradigm. In other words, the dialectical method or paradigm is seen as far more complex than is usually deemed by sociologists.

One of the objectives of the research behind this thesis was to bring to the fore the presence of the dialectical elements in the thought of selected scholars who were generally not recognized as dialecticians. This has been done in the emphasis on the dialectical ideas of G. Simmel, G. Gurvitch, A. W. Small, R. E. Park, R. Redfield, P. A. Sorokin, B. Moore, Jr. and E. H. Carr.

A general conclusion of this survey is one of gradual attrition of the dialectical perspective in American sociology, when viewed in historical perspective, and especially when compared with the dialectical conceptions of Karl Marx.

The method of participant observation, which is discussed with respect to the methodology of the Chicago School, is here interpreted as a dialectical process. With reference to the recently growing interest in dialectical method in Canada and the United States, the thought is expressed that this phenomenon is not just a fad, but a response to the growing crisis in western social science, and indeed - primarily - in western capitalism.

Among other things the concluding chapter points to the close relationship between structural functionalism, symbolic interactionism and

pragmatism. The tentative comparison of dialectic and pragmatism indicates the vistas and directions for possible and needed research.

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Author

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INTRODUCTION

To ask whether the social sciences ought to be dialectical or not means purely and simply to ask if they ought to understand reality or to distort and obscure it: in spite of its different and, apparently even contrary, aspect, it is the same battle which, in the seventeenth century, the physicists fought against the particular interests of forces bound to the past and to the Church, the struggle against particular ideologies for a free, objective and human knowledge.

(Lucien Goldman)¹

Dialectic and sociology are the two poles representing the central theme of this work. In the course of the past two centuries, the dialectical perspective on man and society, and the sociological viewpoint have emerged and gained considerable popularity in western social thought. If one starts from the present, and from the North American perspective, one cannot help noticing a growing interest in dialectics among Canadian and American sociologists, particularly during the past decade. The writings of G. Lenski, C. H. Heller, Pierre van den Berghe, Llewellyn Gross, Arthur K. Davis, Peter Blau, Philip Bosserman, Robert Murphy, Louis Schneider, Robert W. Friedrichs, clearly support the above position.

On the one hand, the dominating structural-functional school, as a type of "order theory" in American sociology during the past two decades, today shows definite signs of decline. Some even prefer to say that the functionalism of the Parsonian variety has become discredited (Szymanski, 1973: 25), while others write openly of "the growing crisis of western sociology" (Gouldner, 1970).

Thus, in these turbulent days of unfolding world history and of modern western social science, the dialectic has become once again a

popular expression, a catchword for the radically oriented; and on the other hand a mystical, obscure, ideologically coloured term for the many who fail to grasp its real meaning. While a handful of reputable scholars make use of the dialectical perspective in their research and writings, others, less responsible, tend to use the term loosely and often quite arbitrarily. The following paragraph from a recent introductory reader in sociology is instructive.

While competition is controlled antagonism within the institutions of society, conflict is struggle against and outside the social structure. The conflict model stresses the notion of two opposing dialectical forces bent upon mutual destruction. The end result of this confrontation is a winner and a loser. The basic tenets involved here range from the Synthesis, which emerges after Thesis and Antithesis have done battle, to the notion of "zero-sum" popular in simulated war games. This position assumes that existence evolves around inequality and the means of survival. Karl Marx and Herbert Spencer, of course, are the major advocates of this paradigm, although the latter has not infrequently been quoted to refute Marx and to legitimize "the white man's burden," the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, and the economic privilege of the "super-rich."

(Denisoff, 1972: 3)

Besides the lack of precision, and obvious confusion, the above paragraph shows an almost total lack of understanding of the dialectic. Not much better fares the paper by a Soviet author, H. N. Momdzhyan, presented recently at the Eighth World Congress of Sociology in Toronto (1974).

Similarly the terms "dialectic" and "dialectical" have too often become synonymous with "mutual interrelatedness" or with "reciprocity," which are only partial elements of a much more complex dialectical perspective. The whole is thus identified with one or two of its parts, and the end result is an impoverished and crippled conception of dialectic.

This oversimplification and lack of understanding would in itself be sufficient reason for the present research into dialectics. For

ignorance which figures as scholarship is out of place in academia, and an academia which turns to business enterprise, should be stripped of its title.

The present work is essentially a study in the history of sociological thought. It endeavours to trace the path of dialectic from Hegel and Marx via the European sociology of G. Simmel and G. Gurvitch, down to certain schools of sociology which developed on North American soil in this century. More specifically, the schools of sociology where the elements of dialectic can be fairly well traced, are the Chicago School and the historical sociology of P. A. Sorokin and B. Moore, Jr.

Generally speaking, the historical study of social thought shows that the sociological tradition is rich with dialectical views. Therefore our objective could be best formulated as an investigation into the influence of European dialectics upon American sociology.

The rationale for doing this can first of all be found in the recently growing interest in dialectic in Canada and the U.S.A. Second, it can be found in the absence of a stronger dialectical tradition on this continent, as well as in the accompanying lack of adequate understanding of dialectic, both on the part of those who use the term dialectic one-sidedly, and of those who nourish mistrust toward dialectical perspective as "metaphysical" and "non-scientific".

Thirdly, we want to emphasize the presence of dialectical elements in the works of scholars who are generally not considered as dialecticians.

And finally, the following analysis will provide us with an opportunity to examine critically the conceptions of the selected scholars, as well as their works, from a dialectical aspect.

The limitations of this study are already implicit in the above rationale. First, the essential and, at the same time, the most common traits of dialectic need to be delineated. For that purpose, an historical background with an exposition of differing interpretations of dialectic is necessary. This is the function of Chapter Two.

This is followed by two chapters devoted to what the present writer considers the most essential constituent parts of every genuine dialectic - the dialectical contradiction and the dialectical category of totality (Chapters Three and Four). Both these major aspects of dialectic are always inextricably related to each other, and it is only for the purpose of their analytical exposition that their treatment is systematically separated in two chapters.

It should be emphasized at the beginning that in this work, these major aspects of dialectic (contradiction and totality) are quite broadly conceived, and as the relevant chapters show, they cover a number of component dialectical traits.

The second and major part of this thesis deals entirely with selected segments of western sociology, and with specific schools and scholars, whose works, in the opinion of the present writer, possess distinct elements of dialectical conception.

The dialectical conceptions of Georg Simmel are first stressed, and this type of dialectic, together with its more contemporary version in the works of Georges Gurvitch, is called formal-heuristic.

From Simmel the influence of dialectic is traced in the works of certain prominent members of the Chicago School (A. W. Small, R. E. Park, G. H. Mead, R. Redfield), and this type of dialectic is called practico-empirical.

Still another school of American sociology - the historical sociology of P. A. Sorokin and Barrington Moore Jr. - which brings us right to the present, is also analysed in terms of the dialectical elements which it contains. This is the dialectic of historical sociology - the third type of dialectic present in western sociology, and which is analysed within the framework of this thesis.

To sum up, our analysis endeavours to show the path and the metamorphoses of the dialectic from Hegel and Marx to contemporary schools and followers of this perspective in American sociology.

It should be stressed that this is not a study in Marxism, nor a study of dialectical materialism, but rather a study of the most general features of dialectical thought in the western sociology.

This study is also limited to dialectical thought, reasoning, or thinking (the so-called 'subject dialectic' in Marxism), while the so-called 'object dialectic', or the dialectic of reality remains more or less in the background. Despite this priority and emphasis on dialectical thought, the dialectic of social reality cannot be simply dismissed or bypassed in the discussion which follows. Properly speaking, it could be done only at the risk of a complete surrender to metaphysical speculations, and this would be naturally inconsistent with the whole theme of this thesis.

Having in mind the above limitations, and in spite of them, it will be impossible, for quite understandable reasons, to ignore dialectical materialism (Marxist philosophy), as well as historical materialism (Marx's theory of society), in a thesis of this type. However, as was stated above, neither of these will be the central focus of our attention.

In very general terms, dialectical thought could be described tentatively as a mode of viewing historical reality in its totality, in terms of change, and in terms of its imminent contradictions or oppositions.

As a mode of thought in terms of change through internal contradictions, dialectics originated in ancient Greek philosophy. This tradition was carried on through medieval times and beyond, to the sophistication of the work of Hegel and Marx. Since Marx's time the tradition has been carried on by and large by his ideological followers, but most often in a dogmatic and apologetic manner.

Nowadays, the revival of dialectics in social science is obvious. This could be attributed in part to the fluctuations of human thought and ideas in terms of challenge and response. However, we are not so sure that the challenge-response hypothesis can sufficiently explain the contemporary revival of dialectics.

At the same time the cybernetic model of society and general systems theory are gaining in popularity. Now, even a casual look at both (dialectics and general systems theory) discloses a certain number of similarities. The following examples may suffice for this introduction. The general perspective of the 19th Century dialectics (for example, as formulated by Engels, "... a science of the most general laws of motion ...") coincides with Ludwig von Bertalanffy's formulation of general systems theory as "the formulation and derivation of those principles which are valid for 'systems' in general" (Bertalanffy, 1968: 32). This similarity was noticed also by Karel Kosik (1969: 14), and can be detected in the comments by K. M. Khailov and V. I. Kremyanskiy (Buckley, 1968: 46, 78). It can also easily be seen that general systems theory incorporates to

some extent a part of the dialectical viewpoint: change and internal conflict, together with maintenance and preservation of the system.

Furthermore, the whole emphasis on a system of elements in mutual interaction, as well as the notion of feedback mechanism, is definitely dialectical. It suffices to recall Marx's conceptualization of subject and object relation in his theses on Feuerbach; or, simply the notion of mutual interaction between the economic basis and the social and ideological superstructure, shared by many Marxists.

Dynamic orientation, which focusses on the processes by which systems come into being, and succeed, and mature through change and development, is again dialectical. And so is "... a basic principle that the persistence and/or development of the complex socio-cultural system depends upon structuring, destructuring, and restructuring processes" (Buckley, 1968: 494).

* * *

In his recent book, A. W. Gouldner argues forcefully that Western sociology approaches a state of crisis (1970). The book actually seems to prove that this crisis is already upon us. Gouldner is not, however, the first to point to this state of affairs. It was done much earlier within the profession by P. A. Sorokin in his own way (1956) and again somewhat later by C. W. Mills (1959). Even earlier, Western social thought received much stronger criticism from a more radical standpoint in the works of Karl Marx and Georg Lukács. Marx in 1867 launched a radical critique of political economy, it being the most advanced social science in the capitalist society of his time. Lukács, in 1923, attacked the reification of bourgeois social thought in general. Gouldner's 'coming crisis', then, seems to have been with us for approximately a century.

Both Marx and Lukács were dialectical thinkers, educated as philosophers in the Hegelian tradition. Nowadays, we witness a growing interest in dialectics in the U.S.A. and Canada, almost to the point of dialectics becoming a fad. Although the dialectical tradition has not been strong among American social scientists in the past, some contemporary sociologists and anthropologists in Canada and the United States hope to find in it a way out of crisis. One simply cannot help feeling that this interest in dialectics among North American scholars is related to the crisis Gouldner talks about.

Although scholars such as Durkheim, Gurvitch, and others, tried to separate sociology from philosophy, the fact remains that the sociology of the founding fathers (Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel) had solid philosophical foundations. As we are becoming aware that a value-neutral science of society is impossible, the need for a philosophically grounded sociology seems to be increasing every day. Dialectic is essentially a philosophical method, dating in its primitive forms back to ancient Greek philosophy, and developed later in the most sophisticated manner by Hegel and Marx. Consequently, by disclosing their interest in dialectics, sociologists are, consciously or unconsciously, showing their interest in a specific philosophical method.

Both S. T. Bruyn and R. F. Murphy in their recent works made interesting statements concerning the dialectical perspective in social science. Bruyn noticed the predominance through history of an intellectual tendency to look for opposites. Thus he wonders "whether this is not one of the major strategems underlying all social thought" (1966: 52). And Murphy expresses the voice of some anthropologists who hold that "dialectical reasoning is a basic property of all human mental process" (1971: 86-87).

Furthermore, Ludwig von Bertalanffy states that our thinking is essentially in terms of opposites (1968: 247). Also, the Swiss thinker Fredrich Gonseth asserts the dialectical character of human thought (1948). Opinions such as these, especially when held by influential scholars, provide challenging leads for further research. To this should be added the fact that some of the most influential minds in the social science of the present century, such as Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, and Claude Lévi-Strauss have been dialectical thinkers.²

Elements of dialectical thought are clearly present in the works of Georg Simmel, Sigmund Freud, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Jean Piaget, and can be traced as well in the writings of K. Mannheim, R. Redfield, A. L. Kroeber, G. H. Mead, G. Sjoberg, A. W. Small, A. Toynbee, E. H. Carr, P. A. Sorokin, and B. Moore, Jr. However, none of these scholars is recognized as a thoroughgoing, self-conscious dialectician. It is therefore reasonable to expect that an investigation of western social thought would yield a host of dialectical elements in the conflict, in the holistic, and in the functionalist conceptions, although such elements may not be referred to as dialectical. On the contrary, very often, for what was called 'dialectical' by the 19th Century science, and even by contemporary philosophers and Marxists, modern science may simply use a different term meaning a parallel or somewhat modified conception or idea.

* * *

This recently increasing interest in dialectics in North American social science could be called neo-dialectical. It can be clearly illustrated by two papers which appeared in two leading American journals of sociology in the early 1960's (Gross, 1961; Van den Berghe, 1963).³ Another illustration can be found in the books of Peter Blau, Exchange

and Power in Social Life (1964), and of Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege (1966). While Blau endeavoured to explore the problems of social change in terms of a dialectical paradigm, Lenski was more radical in his quite open invitation to use dialectic and the Hegelian synthesis in understanding and reconciling the two opposing traditions in the theorizing on social stratification: functionalism ("conservative thesis"), and conflict theory ("radical antithesis").

With a distinctly historical approach Lenski's book, as well as the subsequent introductory text Human Societies (1970), by the same author, pave a solid road to dialectical reasoning in sociology, because dialectic itself is historical and evolutionary.

Another author, Celia S. Heller, in her book Structured Social Inequality (1969), commenting on the voices raised about the need for the synthesis of functionalist and conflict theories, concludes, "These voices reflect explicit or implicit adherence to the Hegelian dialectic, to the principle of the struggle of opposites (thesis and antithesis) and their continual resolution (synthesis)" (Heller, 1969: 3). The same author expresses also her conviction in the dialectical principle in intellectual development - where ideas give rise to opposite ideas and the struggle between them results in an eventual synthesis.

In view of the fact that Georges Gurvitch's discourse on dialectic Dialectique et sociologie (1962) still awaits translation, Philip Bosserman's book Dialectical Sociology (1968), devoted to the analysis and evaluation of Gurvitch's sociological system, has partially filled the void.

The 1970's have brought even wider interest in dialectic on this continent. R. W. Friedrichs in his book, A Sociology of Sociology (1970),

has devoted considerable space to the dialectical paradigm, while in an article dealing with dialectical sociology (1972) Friedrichs has made a strong appeal for the acceptance of the dialectical paradigm.

The dialectical perspective undoubtedly looms large in the recent works of Arthur K. Davis who has called for a dialectical and historical perspective in understanding the most essential contradictions of the contemporary Canadian society in terms of conflicts of interest between metropolis and hinterland (Davis, 1970a; 1970b; 1971; 1972).⁴

Recent translations into English of important dialectical works is another source of dialectical thought, as well as an indication of a growing interest in dialectical perspective. The translated dialectical literature includes in the first place the works of Marx, Lukács, Mao Tse-Tung, Adorno, Goldmann, Althusser, Korsh, Gramsci, Marcuse, Piaget.⁵

In addition to published books and articles, a number of papers dealing directly or indirectly with dialectical method or perspective, have been given at most of the recent sociological conventions in North America. Thus, for instance, at the 1974 World Congress of Sociology held in Toronto, dialectical papers were presented by American, Canadian, and Soviet authors.

Last but not least, several graduate student groups in United States universities, rejecting the received wisdom and orientations of their faculty advisers, have in recent years, begun to publish Marxian and dialectically oriented periodicals. These range from The Human Factor, a journal in its twelfth year at Columbia University, to more widely known publications like Catalyst (Trent University, Peterborough), Telos (Washington University, St. Louis), and The Insurgent Sociologist (University of Oregon, Eugene).

These dialectically oriented publications are paralleled by "radical caucuses" that now are an integral part of the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association and the American Sociological Association.

Therefore it may not be too brave an exaggeration to conclude that this growing interest in dialectical perspective in Canada and the United States suggests a fundamental change of paradigm, and consequently a possible scientific revolution in social science. It also suggests the possibility of an approaching social revolution. For it is an undeniable fact that all major social and political revolutions (the French of 1789, the Russian of 1917, and the Chinese of 1949), were preceded by intellectual upheavals, and by radical criticisms of the existing social order.

Every dialectic is not necessarily critical and revolutionary. Simmel's, for example, was neither, but the one that was among the most sophisticated, however, - the dialectic of Karl Marx - was certainly both.

FOOTNOTES (Introduction)

1. Goldmann, Lucien, The Human Sciences and Philosophy, London, Jonathan Cape, 1969, p. 84.
2. For dialectical conceptions of Freud and Levi-Strauss, see Robert F. Murphy, The Dialectics of Social Life, New York, 1971. For the dialectics of Piaget, see Lucien Goldmann, Recherches Dialectiques, Paris, 1959.
3. See Pierre van den Berghe, "Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis", American Sociological Review, Vol. 28 (October), 1963. Despite the fact that it has broken the ice, is often quoted and praised, this work has serious shortcomings, one of the major being the lack of understanding of dialectic on the part of the author.

Still another recent work of similar nature is the article by Louis Schneider "Dialectic in Sociology", American Sociological Review, 36 (August): 667-678. See the criticism of the same in Robert S. Broadhead, "Dialectic in Sociology", The Insurgent Sociologist, Vol. III, No. 4 (Summer), 1973: 40-47.

4. See in particular A. K. Davis, "Some Failings of Anglophone Sociology in Canada" in Jan J. Loubser (ed.): The Future of Sociology in Canada, Montreal, Canadian Association of Sociology and Anthropology, 1970; A. K. Davis, "Canadian Society and History as Hinterland Versus Metropolis", in Ossenberg, Richard J., ed.: Canadian Society: Pluralism, Change and Conflict, Scarborough, Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1971; A. K. Davis, "A New Sociology", Canadian Dimension, No. VIII, 1972, pp. 36-38.

Other modern sources of dialectical thought in sociology, anthropology and philosophy include: Robert F. Murphy, The Dialectics of Social Life, New York, Basic Books, 1971; Louis Schneider, "Dialectic in Sociology", American Sociological Review, 1971, Vol. 36 (August): 667-678; Andre Gunder Frank, "Functionalism and Dialectics", in William J. Chamblis (ed.): Sociological Readings in the Conflict Perspective, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1973; Paul Laszarsfeld, "Critical Theory and Dialectics", in Laszarsfeld, Paul, Qualitative Analysis Historical and Critical Essays, Boston, Allyn and Beacon, 1972; Ten Houten Warren D. and Kaplan Charles D., "Dialectical Basis of Inquiry", in Ten Houten Warren D. and Kaplan Charles D., Science and Its Mirror Image, New York, Harper and Row, 1973; István Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, London, Merlin Press, 1970; Richard J. Ossenberg, Canadian Society: Pluralism, Change and Conflict, Scarborough, Ontario, Prentice-Hall, 1971; Dick Howard, The Development of Marxian Dialectic, Southern Illinois University Press, 1972; István Mészáros, Lukács' Concept of Dialectic, London, Merlin Press, 1972; Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (A History of

the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950), Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1973; Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Boston, Beacon Press, 1964.

To the above should be added selected sources by British authors and editors, such as, David Cooper (ed.), The Dialectics of Liberation, Penguin Books, 1968; David McLellan, Marx before Marxism, Penguin Books, 1970; David McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx, Macmillan, 1971; Robin Blackburn (ed.): Ideology in Social Science (readings in critical social theory), Fontana, 1972. Finally, H. Marcuse's Reason and Revolution, Boston, Beacon Press, 1960, is a modern unprecedented classic in dialectical thought.

5. The most important translations in this group are Marx's Grundrisse from 1857-8, in translation of Martin Nicolaus, 1973; Four Essays in Philosophy by Mao Tse-Tung, 1966; and History and Class Consciousness, by Georg Lukács, 1971.

PART ONE

DIALECTICAL CATEGORIES IN WESTERN SOCIAL THOUGHT

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL SURVEY AND DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DIALECTIC

The history of ideas and of social thought abounds with different conceptions and interpretations of dialectic. This applies to the past, but equally well to the present situation. Despite the obvious fact that this perspective was in the most sophisticated manner developed by Hegel and Marx, to ignore the history of dialectic would lead only to a superficial acquaintance with this methodological perspective.

The dialectical perspective, in its rudimentary form, originated in Ancient Greek philosophy, although its earliest elements could be traced outside of western culture to old Chinese philosophy. The basic developmental pattern was then the classical German idealism (Kant, Hegel) and later Marx, western European philosophy and sociology (Simmel, Lukács, Gurvitch, Sartre, Goldmann, and the Frankfurt School), dialectical materialism (Engels, Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung), and so to the renewed development of dialectic in North American sociology and anthropology.

As is the case with other abstract concepts of philosophy and social science, the meaning of dialectic was not the same in all historical epochs or in all schools of thought. In other words, the meaning of dialectic has not been static, but on the contrary changing. Therefore, it is possible to speak of the naive dialectic of Ancient Greek philosophers, whose conception of dialectic was not the same, let us say, to

that of German idealists like Kant and Hegel.

Nevertheless, in this discontinuity there was also a continuity, as will be evident from the following survey. Even the term "Hegelian-Marxian dialectic", used often nowadays, has been proven inappropriate, since these two dialectics were not the same. Already with Engels the dialectic assumes a somewhat different tinge from that of his close friend Marx. In fact, this type of dialectic was the beginning of the cannonization of an otherwise fluid, dynamic, and virulent dialectic into dialectical materialism as a world outlook. Equally distinctive are the dialectics of Lukács, Gurvitch, Sartre, and Marcuse.

A logical question can be raised. Are we justified in speaking of dialectic in general when what existed and still exists are only particular concrete instances of dialectic? However, we know that any general exists only in particular, and that it could not be otherwise. Thus every generalization is a product of scientific abstraction, and as such is indispensable in science. By the way of generalization, we can therefore talk of dialectic in general terms. That is, we can focus on the most common elements of dialectic, but only providing that we are aware of the most typical forms, schools, or interpretations of dialectic. Such a generalization will be made in the latter part of this work. Presently it is necessary to delineate briefly the historical background of dialectic as well as some of the major and diversified interpretations of it.

Dialectic has had its vicissitudes. Once a reputable skill in confrontation of ideas in Greek philosophy, it became the supreme method in the objective idealism of Hegel, and in turn a revolutionary and critical method of Marx's analysis of capitalism.

Subsequently, with the spread of empiricism and the growth of positivism, dialectic came to be regarded among the latter-day positivistically oriented scholars as a metaphysical (even mystical) scholastic speculation. One particular brand, Diamat (dialectical materialism) has become transformed into an official ideology and a universal 'world outlook' (Marcuse), a general theory and method of science. This has converted dialectic to teleology, and the dialectic of Diamat has become dogmatic and apologetic.

On the other hand, live dialectical thought has been carried on by such revolutionary, radically oriented scholars as Lukács, Gramsci, Korsh, Sartre, Marcuse, Mészáros to the present day.

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In its original meaning among Greek philosophers, dialectic was the term applied to the art of conversation, discussion, dialogue and reasoning. As G. E. Mueller has pointed out, the Greek expression 'd i a l e g o m a i' means "to speak something through", while the philosophical equivalent of dialectic in Latin is "reflection" or "discourse" (Mueller, 1959-60: 235). Dialectic is also in the most general terms described as a method of seeking and arriving at truth by reasoning (Hall, 1967: 385). Indeed, in classical Greek philosophy, the approach to discovery and all intellectual advancement was through discussion and dialogue, i.e., through dialectic (Durbin, 1968: 30). This indicates that dialectic as a philosophical method was performing the role of epistemology. Both Plato and Aristotle have developed dialectic within the framework of logic and in particular the dialectical syllogism - that is the syllogism that develops in conversation.

Generally, among the ancients Plato is considered the inventor of dialectic. However, the rudimentary elements of dialectical reasoning can be traced even to the pre-Socratic philosophers of the Milesian School (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes), to Pythagorus and his group (emphasized by Hegel and later by Lenin); and of course to Heraclitus from Efes, who is often considered as one of the founders of the "spontaneous dialectic of ancient Greek philosophy" (Aleksandrov, 1948: 51).

Such well-known phrases as - "Everything is a flow", and "It is impossible to step into the same river twice" - are attributed to Heraclitus. In his conception the emphasis is definitely on ubiquitous change, on the processes of becoming and dissolution, endless interconnection and mutual interaction. For Heraclitus everything is and is not at the same time, precisely because everything is in a flow, change, becoming and disappearing. In the Heraclitus' cosmogony, the cosmos consists of continuous change of the material primordial cause - fire. "The Sun", says Heraclitus "is not only every day new, but is eternally and ceaselessly new" (ibid., 59). Already here, in the ideas of Heraclitus, one can clearly detect the beginning of a dialectical conception of contradictions, so typical for most of the later dialectical perspectives. In Marx's words, "Heraclitus wants ... to explain the turn (Umschlagen) of all things to their opposites" (ibid., 60).¹

The very basic ontological statement of dialectic, that change occurs as a result of endogenous opposing forces or tendencies is already contained in Heraclitus' doctrine of logos, which term he uses in the sense of a general "law". Logos is related to internally contradictory development. To know logos, for Heraclitus, is to know nature and society in conflict and harmony of their contradictions. Heraclitus was also

critical of what he called "multiknowledge", which "does not teach any wisdom".² This "multiknowledge" is contrasted to real knowledge, i.e., the knowing of being in its totality and contradictions (ibid., 61).

Zeno of Eleja had already clearly perceived real contradictions in natural processes, also the contradictions in movements, time and space, which are exemplified in his famous paradoxes known as "aporia". These contain distinct "examples of dialectic in the sense of refutations of the hypotheses of opponents by drawing unacceptable consequences from the hypotheses" (Hall, 1967: 386).

Socrates used dialectic in a typical classical manner, - as an art of discussion, as a search for truth by question and answer. In contradistinction to Heraclitus, whose interest was largely in the dialectics of reality, Socrates was primarily interested in epistemological aspects of dialectic (dialectical thought).

With Plato, dialectic has distinct epistemological connotations. It is regarded as a supreme philosophical method of cognition, as well as an educational method for his 'philosopher-kings'.³

In its epistemological meaning, the dialectic of Plato is the skill in dialogue and 'discovery-through-discussion' (Durbin, 1968: 30), or some sort of theory of logic. In a series of his dialogues (Parmenid, Sophist, Cratylus), - Plato explains his understanding of dialectic or dialectical method. In solving a philosophical problem, one must start from two contradictory theses which mutually exclude each other. By their dichotomous separation, the two posits are extracted and become the starting points for further joining or separation of concepts in the same dichotomous manner. When P. Durbin, characterizing the ancient dialectic of Plato and Aristotle says: "Here 'dialectic' means discussion,

the clash of opinions, and more particularly the method of resolving such conflict" (ibid.), he portrays well the essence of Plato's dialectic.

Another valuable comment by the same author is of interest here. Durbin points out significantly that logic had an entirely different meaning in the Greek tradition and in the modern tradition. In the Greek tradition, "logic was inconceivable apart from conversation and public discourse", while in the modern tradition (Descartes and after) the emphasis has been placed on individual thinking. This position is also corroborated by E. Kapp (Durbin, 1968, 31; Kapp, 1942, 86-7).

One more aspect of Plato's idealistic dialectic deserves our attention. It is his doctrine of unity of Being and Nothing, put forward particularly in the dialogues Sophist and Parmenid. By a series of examples, Plato endeavoured to show that something exists and does not exist at the same time, and therefore that one and the same idea unites contradictory categories. It is not difficult to see that this aspect of Plato leads directly to Hegel's doctrine of Being. And so does Plato's conception of dialectic as a philosophical method for reaching the essential reality through the discourse of reason.

So here, the summit of the intelligible world is reached in philosophic discussion by one who aspires, through the discourse of reason unaided by any of the senses, to make his way in every case to the essential reality and perseveres until he has grasped by pure intelligence the very nature of Goodness itself. This journey is what we call Dialectic (Plato, 1970: 252).

As mentioned above, both Plato and Aristotle developed dialectics within the framework of logic. Aristotle, however, tended to differ from his teacher Plato with respect to identification of thought and speech. For him, dialectic, in the sense of discussion and dialogue, should not

be identified with an investigation of one's own mind - that is, with the processes of thought which are not carried by means of words. Aristotle therefore assigned less importance to dialectic as the art of creating knowledge by means of conversation.

Nevertheless, dialectic is present in Aristotle's works, and in particular in his Physics, Metaphysics and Topics. The dialectical conception of development and change is clearly present in the philosopher's doctrine of the categories of being. Natural processes cannot be studied without the study of movement, since nature itself is the principle of movement and change, reasoned Aristotle. Movement is considered as eternal and nonexistent outside of things.

What is more significant, Aristotle allows for the spontaneity of movement. This movement is internal, inherent movement from within, or self-movement. Although in ultima analysis this self-movement of things is attributed to an eternal, unchanging 'the Prime Mover, or God', Aristotle is here nevertheless close to a dialectical conception of change. Aristotle also allows the possibility of conversion or turn to the opposite, the idea found later with Hegel, Marx, and Simmel.

Although not assigning to dialectic such a significant place as his teacher Plato did, Aristotle defines dialectic as a special auxiliary means of scientific cognition. "Dialectic, being a process of criticism, contains the path to the principles of all enquiries", says the philosopher in Topics. The critical aspects of dialectic were, of course, most pronounced in the works, and activity of Karl Marx, although we find the same idea later in the work of the French sociologist, Gurvitch, who also advocated the dialectical method.

Among the medieval and early modern thinkers, dialectical elements are traceable in the thought of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406), Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1464), Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), René Descartes (1596-1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).

The most sociological, the least philosophical, yet at the same time sufficiently dialectical were the views of the 14th century Arabian thinker and historian, Ibn Khaldūn. The elements of dialectic can be traced in his cyclical theory of social change as well as in his conception of cultural integration.

The permanency of social change through conflicts is an inherent part of the dialectical perspective, and Ibn Khaldūn's cyclical theory of change through conflicts of dynasties abounds with such views. The mere idea that the rise of a dynasty or tribe contains in itself the elements of decay, is eminently dialectical. That numerous aspects of social life and social institutions are interconnected and interdependent is a commonplace nowadays, and Ibn Khaldūn was among the first to perceive this fact of cultural integration.⁴ Also in his basic typology of sedentary people and the nomads, Ibn Khaldūn laid great stress on the role of occupations as a determining factor of Man's character and way of life. That making a living is of crucial importance for the social and cultural life of man is also one of the basic tenets of the so-called historical materialism of Karl Marx, whose doctrine is recognized as thoroughly dialectical.⁵

II. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DIALECTIC

The following survey has only one purpose. It is to emphasize the most significant aspects of dialectical thought, and the differences

in emphasis among various thinkers, in order to set the ground for further discussion. Thus it cannot, nor is it meant to be an exhaustive and detailed scrutiny of dialectical conceptions of each particular theorist.

Dialectical Method: Hegel and Marx

One can safely say that the dialectical method begins really with Hegel, and for Marx, that he was the last great dialectician.

The expression 'Hegelian-Marxian dialectic' is often heard, and was already mentioned earlier as inadequate, since there is no real justification for such an equalization.⁶ Marx began his intellectual career as a Young Hegelian, but soon broke with this group. In the famous Afterword to the second German edition of Das Kapital, Marx briefly explained the basic difference between his and Hegel's dialectic. Too often we read how Marx critically incorporated the Hegelian dialectical method in his materialistic conceptions of society. Undoubtedly, Marx admitted his debt to the 'mighty thinker'. But the question clearly remains whether Marx's dialectic is not an entirely new creation. This idea is especially put forward by the French Marxist philosopher, Louis Althusser (1969: 1971).

Neither Hegel nor Marx wrote any treatise or discourse on dialectic, but the dialectical thought or perspective is clearly present in all their major works. Too often, Hegel's dialectic is popularly and superficially explained as a triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which is supposed to reflect the essence of the philosopher's method. Nowadays, this oversimplification and identification of dialectic with the Hegelian triad is entirely out of place, as any familiarity with Hegel's work would show (Kaufman, 1965: 154; Hall, 1967: 387; Murphy, 1971: 89).⁷ The truth is, on the contrary, that it was Kant who had set out 'the antinomies of pure reason' as four sets of thesis and antithesis. In his dialectical

conceptions he was followed by J. G. Fichte and F. W. Schelling. The former formulated the famous triad, by which dialectic is often identified, and which is frequently attributed to Hegel.

With more justification, one could speak of triad in the case of treatment of the three basic concepts in his Logic: namely, Being, Nothing, and Becoming.⁸ Rather than follow Hegel's reasoning in his concise exposition of the first two categories, it is more relevant to point to the dialectical quality of this type of reasoning in the treatment of the two categories, Being and Nothing, in the third and unifying category of Becoming. Having reached the conclusion that pure Being and pure Nothing are the same, Hegel shows, although in his abstract level of reasoning, that Being and Nothing pass over into each other "and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite". "Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself" (Hegel, 1969: 83).

This style of reasoning is a distinct example of dialectical treatment of change. Further reading of the Science of Logic only enforces this conviction. Hegel credits Heraclitus in particular for his deep thinking, and for bringing forward "the higher total concept of becoming." For when Heraclitus posits ubiquity and permanence of change ('all flows'), in Hegel's language this is spelled 'all is becoming'.⁹ Arguing against the absolute separation of being and nothing Hegel has this to say:

This style of reasoning which makes and clings to the false presupposition of the absolute separateness of being and non-being is to be named not dialectic but sophistry. For sophistry is an argument proceeding from a baseless presupposition which is uncritically and unthinkingly adopted; but we call dialectic the higher movement of reason in which such seemingly utterly separate

terms pass over into each other spontaneously, through that which they are, a movement in which the presupposition sublates itself. It is the dialectical immanent nature of being and nothing themselves to manifest their unity, that is, becoming, as their truth.

(Hegel, 1969: 105)

There is no need to try to prove the obvious, namely, that Hegel's thought was dialectical. On the contrary, the following discussion is meant to show the roots of Marx's dialectic. For this purpose, the philosophical problem of the relation of subject and object is very essential for any proper understanding of dialectic. Here again Hegel's treatment of the relationship of master and slave are very illustrative.

In his Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel treats the relationship between reality and consciousness, and calls his work a description of the stages of consciousness. In his view there is continuous interaction between consciousness (mind) and reality. While reality is self-identical and termed 'substance', the consciousness is never fully self-identical but always active, reflective, in a process of becoming. The result of this interaction (viewed as struggle) is a change. Reality is no longer substance, and mind is no more subject. Both change into the other, substance into subject, and subject into substance. This identification process is attained through Spirit (Geist) or Absolute (Dupré, 1966: 26-7). Or, stated differently, "... whenever subject and object stand in the relation which constitutes experience, the unifying principle is that of thought" (Baillie, 1949: 38).¹⁰

The dialectic of subject and object is also well expressed in Hegel's treatment of the relationship of Master and Slave as an example of opposition between life and consciousness. Consciousness develops 'self-consciousness' (the consciousness of freedom). This self-

consciousness or identity with itself is being developed by the subject's identity with its object. It is acquired and expressed in desire, through the object of its desire. Out of the confrontation of one consciousness (subject) with another consciousness (object) the self-consciousness develops. It is affirmed in desire which tends to annihilate its object, to use it, to consume it, to destroy. Thus a life-and-death struggle is the prospect.

Now to prevent complete destruction, one of the two sides must submit, must recognize the other. The other wants recognition and self-affirmation. The former becomes the Slave, the latter becomes the Master. Each now depends upon the other for its existence. To maintain his self-consciousness, the Master needs the mediation of the Slave. But the change is imminent. The Master soon finds himself dependent on the Slave. His position deteriorates, while the Slave's position improves. The Slave achieves his independence in 'thinghood' (he lives in and through things). The Slave has also reached the stage of self-consciousness, i.e. free consciousness, and the original opposition between life and consciousness disappears (Hegel, 1949: 229-240; Dupré, 1966: 29-32).

It is not difficult to recognize in this type of dialectical reasoning the later thought of Karl Marx, with respect to the development of proletarian consciousness and the transformation from Klasse an sich to Klasse für sich.

In this conception of the great philosopher, dialectic is then conceived as the self-development of thought and of reality.¹¹

In viewing movement and change as resulting from contradictions, Hegel is again eminently dialectical. Here the idea of passing of

thoughts or concepts into their opposites, and the subsequent achievement of higher unity, is of relevance. Significantly, the higher truth, in the form of unity, is arrived at through contradictions. In R. Hall's words, this 'passing over into the opposite' was seen as a natural consequence of the limited or finite nature of a concept or thing (Hall, 1967: 388). Everything existing is limited (Omnis determinatio est negatio), says Spinoza. And because it is limited, reasoned Hegel, it is subject to change. It is in the nature of everything existing to supersede itself and to become something else (to pass into its opposite).¹²

This superseding of phenomena (things or notions) takes the form of dialectical negation. Here, of crucial significance is Hegel's term aufheben, which is sometimes translated "to sublate", and in German means both to abolish and to preserve. Thus, the dialectical negation is not a simple act of destruction, but in the first place of superseding the initial opposition between the thesis and antithesis and preserving their difference in the new category or synthesis. In the new category the former differences are merged. It is not a simple identity, but the identity of differences or as it is more commonly called the identity of opposites.

Contradictions, of course, were regarded by Hegel as a deeper and more essential entity than identity. Contradiction is also in the root of every movement and life. Only in so far as something has contradiction in itself, does it have impulse and activity.¹³

The philosophical distinction between essence and appearance, which is given extensive treatment in The Science of Logic, is also of importance for grasping dialectic as a philosophical method. It is also

indispensable for the understanding of Marx's dialectic.

The theory of essence, in H. Marcuse's words, has critical impulses.¹⁴ The concept of essence was taken up by the materialist theory, from where philosophy last treated it as a dialectical concept - Hegel's Logic (Marcuse, 1969: 67). In Hegel's Logic we read: "Absolute is the Essence" and in his Science of Logic is an elaboration (1969: 389), and comments which could be set as a syllogism:

Premise a) The truth of being is essence

Premise b) Absolute is being

Conclusion: Absolute is essence

The return to The Science of Logic further discloses Hegel's reasoning: The existence is appearance, and actuality is unity of essence and existence.

Further, we read that "things really are not what they immediately show themselves" (Hegel, 1892: 208). Hegel even used to say that nature likes to hide itself. Philosophy wants to know the object, not in its immediacy, but as derivative or mediated. In other words, "things, instead of being left in their immediacy, must be shown to be mediated by, or based upon, something else" (ibid.). Therefore, concluded the philosopher, "there is permanent in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their essence" (ibid., 208-9).

It is somewhat difficult to accept that Hegel, the supreme master of dialectic, considers the category of essence to be based on permanency. However, for Hegel, the two modes of being are essence and appearance which stand in reciprocal relation to one another; they mutually condition each other, and are thus in dialectical relationship. "Essence,

accordingly, is not something beyond or behind appearance, but just because it is the essence which exists - the existence is appearance", says Hegel (*ibid.*, 239), and the same sentence is quoted by Marcuse.

Marcuse's helpful comments point to Hegel's essence as a process with history, as something which "has become", as a "result", and which enters into relation with appearance (Illusion, inessential) (Marcuse, 1969:68). In summary, all things have an essence, that is, "their immediate existence does not correspond to what they are in themselves" (*ibid.*).

Finally, another essential category of dialectic is that of totality. Although it is not always understood, the Hegelian category of totality is different from Marx's concept of totality. For Hegel the totality is the Idea, Absolute, or abstract totality, the essence behind the multitude of its phenomena. Marx's totality is the concrete totality of man's social life, as the following chapter will show.

Marx did not write much on dialectic by itself. However, the dialectical method was always present in most of his works. Moreover, there is sufficient ground for the contention that he really created an original dialectical method, for the Hegelian dialectic was too abstract and mystifying - that is - it applied mainly, although not exclusively, to the ideas and the Absolute. Marx was the first to make, so to speak, 'secular' and therefore scientific use of the method initiated by Hegel. But this dialectic was now applied to concrete social reality, and therefore quite sociologically. Only on a few occasions did Marx really comment on the dialectic. First of all, Marx points out the radical difference between his and Hegel's dialectic in terms of the basic philosophical orientation. In an often quoted paragraph he says:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and transformed into forms of thought.

(Marx, 1957: xxx)

This passage reflects the basic difference between the Hegelian idealism and Marx's materialist position. It, however, does not exhaust all the difference between these two major versions of the dialectic. In the same place Marx goes on to comment on "the mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands", on the 'mystical shell' which contains 'the rational kernel' (ibid.). And, of course, Marx talks about 'turning right side up' the Hegelian dialectic, which he considered to be his own task.

In his Poverty of Philosophy, criticizing Proudhon's method, Marx explains concisely Hegel's dialectic in terms of confrontation of the categories of mind through thesis, antithesis, synthesis. It is clear from this exposition that Hegel's dialectical categories reflect the happenings of his own thought. To this Marx contrasts his own position by stating that the economic categories are only a theoretical expression of the social relations of production.

Here we find an interesting and very relevant thought. "What constitutes dialectical movement is the coexistence of two contradictory sides, their conflict and their fusion into a new category" (Marx, 1963: 112).

On a different occasion Marx expressed his desire to explain dialectic in an understandable way, but he never managed to do it.¹⁵ It is not known whether he never found time to do it, or perhaps he considered abstract dialecticizing as a useless task.

It was suggested by Louis Althusser that Marx's dialectical method was an original invention of which perhaps the author himself was not aware, and on the contrary tended to think that he had taken it from Hegel. The fact remains that Marx was familiar with Hegel's works and influenced by him. But Althusser's analysis suggests that Marx's dialectic method is perhaps more an original scientific invention than is usually thought.¹⁶

Numerous comments have been made on Marx's method of analysis of the so-called contradictions in the capitalist mode of production, and also on his 'mode of exposition' and dialectical reasoning in Capital. The number of published volumes on Marx's theory of alienation is still growing, but almost never has his theory of alienation been related to the dialectical thought of its author. Our position is that this theory is thoroughly dialectical, and can be used well to illustrate Marx's dialectical reasoning.

A great deal has been written lately on alienation and on Marx's contribution to this theory. What follows, therefore, is a summary with a specific emphasis on the dialectical elements of the theory as advanced by Marx.

Marx's conception of man is an inherent part of his theory of alienation. For years social scientists have been engaged in an almost endless debate on what constitutes the basic difference between man and animals. Earlier views had emphasized the qualities of reason, consciousness, man's religiosity, sense of justice and ethics, tool-making and work, man's possession of culture, etc. So man was conceived as zoon politicon, homo economicus, homo faber, homo sapiens, animal rationale. Lately, anthropologists and sociologists have emphasized the symbolic nature of human interaction (as based on symbols), which lies at the root of culture. So man is no longer viewed as animal rationale or a

tool-maker, but rather from a modern perspective, and due to his quality and capability for 'extrinsic symbolization,' as animal symbolicum (Cassirer, 1944).

Marx discusses man in his Paris manuscripts from 1844. Quite often Marxist literature tends to quote Marx's words from the first volume of Capital where the author cites B. Franklin's definition of man as a 'tool-making animal'. However, the superficial commentators have often overlooked the fact that in Capital Marx quotes Franklin to illustrate a typically American point of view, and in no way to support his own conception of man. Therefore any construction imputing to Marx an agreement with Franklin's definition of man as a tool-maker is definitely erroneous.

Assuming the continuity of Marx's thought with respect to his views on alienation, we shall rely on Marx's early manuscripts where Marx describes man's generic nature as a "being of praxis." It is absolutely essential for understanding Marx's concept of praxis to realize that in this conception man cannot be identified with any of his traits or characteristics, no matter how significant it is in distinction from other beings of nature. Thus man is not merely homo sapiens, homo faber, or animal rationale. By the same token he could not be primarily animal symbolicum either.

Moreover, man is not a collection of these traits either, and no single science can answer the question as to what is man as a whole human being. Undoubtedly, man possesses a number of characteristics which distinctly differentiate him from nature. But a search of any single, however distinct, trait by which man is distinguished from animals, means to follow a wrong path.

Marx's position, particularly in his early works, was of course

that of a philosopher. As G. Petrović points out, when Marx asks what is man, he has in mind man's essence, i.e., that which differentiated man from everything else (Petrović, 1967: 67-89). For Marx, man simply cannot be identified with any partial activity. Man definitely is a producer, but animals also produce, says Marx. "It [Animal] produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom" (Marx, 1972: 62).

However, from Marx's point of view, what makes man is the general manner of his existence, his specific relation to nature through work, his relationship toward the world and himself. This specific generic feature of man, this manner of existence pertaining only to man, and expressed through his relationship to nature, the world and himself, Marx calls p r a x i s. Man is therefore a 'being of praxis'. This notion covers in the first place the dialectical relation between man and nature, but also any other creative activity of man in his world. Thus we can conclude with G. Petrović that praxis is "... a universal self-creative activity by which man transforms and creates his world and himself" (Petrović, 1967: 78-9).

Hegel already realized the important role of labor in man's self-creation, and perceived also human history as the history of man's progressive self-alienation. Marx, the philosopher and the revolutionary, followed in this respect the revolutionary kernel of Hegel's heritage. E. Fromm relates the concept of alienation to the Hegelian distinction between essence and existence (Fromm, 1961). And H. Marcuse, in his essay on historical materialism says of man: "Essence and existence separate in him: his existence is a 'means' to the realization of his

essence, or - in estrangement - his essence is a means to his mere physical existence" (Marcuse, 1972: 29).

While Feuerbach saw in religion the source of man's alienation, with Marx alienation is examined as a social phenomenon characterizing class societies. In his Paris manuscripts of 1844, under the title Die Entfremdete Arbeit (Alienated Labour) Marx delineates four types of alienation. First, there is the alienation of the products of man's work. Second, man's productive activity is alienated itself. Third, by alienating himself from his own activity, man alienates from himself his own essence. And fourth, as a consequence of self-alienation man becomes alienated from other men.

In Marx's own words, labour is external to the worker, he does not fulfil himself in his work but denies himself, it is not a voluntary work, but forced labour.

All these consequences are contained in the definition that the worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object. For on this premise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the alien objective world becomes which he creates over-against himself, the poorer he himself -- his inner world -- becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. ... The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him and that it becomes a power of its own confronting him; it means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien (Marx, 1972: 58).

Thus man's own deeds, his own creations or products in the form of religion, capital, state, or material products tend to dominate man the creator. The idol dominates his own creator. We could say that in terms of technology we live in humanized nature and among dehumanized men. Marx said it somewhat differently: "With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world

of men" (Marx, 1972: 57). Or stating differently the same ideas as Marcuse, Prof. G. Petrović says, "Transforming his generic essence into a means for the maintenance of his individual existence, man alienates himself from his humanity; he ceases to be man" (Petrović, 1967: 83).

The philosophical concept of alienation has gained wide popularity in recent sociological writings, but at the same time has lost any precision and most of its original meaning contained in entfremdung and entausserung. As M. Seeman has shown, the concept has been used in the sense of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement (Seeman, 1959).

It is not difficult to see that many of the current usages of the term convey the meaning of an individual state of mind, as a subjective feeling and the whole concept becomes heavily psychological. The same is the case with the otherwise excellent essay by E. Fromm on Marx's concept of man. Fromm says that "man does not experience himself as the acting agent in his grasp of the world", or "Alienation is essentially experiencing the world and oneself passively, receptively, as the subject separated from the object" (Fromm, 1963: 44). This socio-psychological conception neglects one important aspect of alienation which stems from the insight provided by Marx. In this perspective alienation is an objective state of society, a condition that results from the form that human activity takes under given historical and social circumstances. In other words, alienation is one way in which men make their social world, and its ultimate cause lies in the commodity mode of production.

Marx's theory of alienation is not complete without his idea of de-alienation through socialism. We have seen that behind the concept of alienation is a definite philosophical conception of man's essence,

as well as the philosophical differentiation between 'is' and 'ought', or in E. Fromm's words, that "man is not what he ought to be and that he ought to be that which he could potentially be" (ibid.). From this stems the logical demand for socialism and in the modern world the demand for participatory democracy through people's or workers' self-management. This radical change in human relationships presupposes, in Marx's view, the abolition of private property over the basic means of production, and in itself would constitute the "positive transcendence of labour's self-alienation" (Mészáros), or, "the leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom" (Marx).

The above brief summary of Marx's theory of alienation points to the dialectical elements contained in the theory. First of all, in its basic meaning Entfremdung (estrangement) denotes that man is devoid of his real essence, has become a means for his existence instead of vice-versa. Therefore we are here in the presence of a dialectical turn into an opposite. Secondly, at the root of his concept of alienation is the idea of dialectical contradiction between essence (the essence of man as a "species being"), and appearance of phenomenon (estrangement of labor, products, relationships). This dialectical turn into the opposite is well illustrated in the general statement "... a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.", or in the phrase "... material relations between persons and social relations between things" (Marx, 1957: 43, 44).

This theory of alienation simply abounds in and is charged with dialectic. The dialectical paradoxes, negation, and swing unto the opposite are often to be found in Marx's thought, and in his theory of alienation in particular. Even the simple statements such as "The worker

becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and range. ... With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of men." (Marx, *ibid.*), are quite telling.

In his book on Marx's theory of alienation, Mészáros has perceived this relationship of dialectic and alienation in Marx very well. He calls Marx's grasp of the concept of "labour's self-alienation" the crucial element, the "Archimedean point" of his great synthesis. The elaboration of the categories of dialectic was particularly required as a prerequisite intellectual tool, for the adequate philosophical grasp of the mystifying phenomena of alienation, according to Mészáros (1972: 76). The dialectical contradiction and the swing into the opposite is even better expressed by Mészáros in the following paragraph:

The original interrelationship of man with nature is transformed into the relationship between wage labour and capital, and as far as the individual worker is concerned, the aim of his activity is necessarily confined to his self-reproduction as a mere individual, in his physical being. Thus means becomes ultimate ends while human ends are turned into mere means subordinated to the reified ends of this institutionalized system of second-order mediations. (1972:83)

In general terms, Marx's dialectic could be summarily characterized as historical, critical, revolutionary and activistic.¹⁷ The conception of history as the self-creation of man was taken from Hegel, and so is the idea that "the prime motive force of the historical process is human labor, or the practical activity of men in society" (Lichtheim, 1968: 343). Present social phenomena are in Marx's analysis viewed as historical or transitory - that is - from the perspective of the past and with a view toward future change. Besides, Marx was above all interested to discover the laws of change, transformation, and development of one social

form or type of relationships to another. To him, every historical period has its own laws.

In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time, also, the recognition of the negative of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary." (Marx, 1957: xxx-xxxi).

The activistic and revolutionary orientation of this dialectic is obvious. It wants to change the world radically. The emphasis on praxis and the 11th thesis on Feuerbach "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it," suffice to make this point convincing.

Dialectic in Marx is most pronounced in his view of the historical development of social institutions which takes place through the struggle of opposites. This idea, known as the Hegelian legacy, emphasizing the dialectical movement, occupies with Marx a prominent place, particularly in his theory of class struggle.

Marx's dialectical thought is also most pronounced in his conception of concrete totality, as well as in his analysis of contradictions (oppositions in society and essence - appearance contradictions), both of which will be discussed separately as the most distinct aspects of dialectical thought.

It should be stated openly that western social science has not learned enough from Marx, whose substantive thought as well as methodology has been by and large, ignored for political and other reasons. The whole series of recent discoveries, or better to say re-discoveries,

such as the realization that social reality is pre-selected and constructed by men; the emergency of self from group and society; the significance of the so-called latent functions; seeing through the facades of the everyday and obvious to the hidden structures; the debunking tendency of sociological thought, were almost all left to us by Marx, although seldom properly understood and appreciated. Examples of this lack of understanding are recent emphases on his concept of man as a being of praxis, and on his dialectical method.

Dialectical Materialism: Engels, Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung

As dialecticians, both Engels and Lenin were less original compared to more powerful thinkers such as Hegel and Marx. Therefore considerably less space will be devoted to their dialectical conceptions in this survey.

As a close collaborator of Marx and also co-author of numerous works, Engels mainly interpreted, popularized, and certainly elaborated upon the original ideas of the seminal thinker - K. Marx. His discussions of dialectic in separate works such as Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, and Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science are mainly successful interpretations of Marx's views. The dialectical thought is certainly present in Engel's evolutionary essay The Origin of Family, State and Private Property. With respect to dialectic his major effort seems to have been directed to his unfinished work, in the effort to search for dialectical patterns in nature.

Engels marks the beginning of dialectical materialism, and Lenin can be placed in the same tradition. This tradition interprets dialectic in a somewhat different way from the dialectic of the great masters.

The characteristics of this dialectic could be summarized under the common name, "post-Marxian dialectic with dogmatic traits." Dialectic was now codified in the so-called "laws of dialectic."

F. Engels was the first who formulated these "laws" in unpublished manuscripts. These notes were posthumously published under the title Dialectics of Nature. According to Engels, these laws of dialectic are abstracted from the history of nature and human society, for they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself. Engels has in mind his well known formulations such as the law of interpenetration or struggle of opposites, the law of transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, the law of the negation of the negation. Engels has also formulated a concise definition of dialectic as a science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought (Engels, 1966: 155).

The "laws" referred to by Engels have been incorporated in the kind of Marxism (Diamat or dialectical materialism), which predominates in the Soviet Union. According to the standard interpretations, the first of these laws is meant to provide the answer to the question as to why things and phenomena in general undergo change. The second law attempts to explain in what manner the change occurs.¹⁸

With Engels we find recurrent emphasis on dialectical perspective of mutual interrelationship and connection, on ceaseless change, on becoming and passing away, as well as the view of the world as a complex of processes.¹⁹

Professor Marcuse is certainly right in his assessment of Soviet dialectic of Diamat type. But this should not be understood to mean that Engels is blamed for the Soviet development. For it is clearly

stated, that he did not publish his notes; they were published posthumously and have provided only the skeleton for the subsequent codification. The truth of the matter is that even the expression "dialectical materialism" was coined not by Engels, but by Plekhanov, and that a number of lazy and incompetent dogmatists did really stick to Engels whose writings were within reach of their understanding, as opposed to the more difficult works of Hegel and Marx.²⁰

When attention is paid to the published works of Engels during his life, one could with difficulty conclude on any "codification" of dialectic. Besides, the laws of dialectic had been already formulated by Hegel, as the laws of thought, which fact Engels mentions immediately after the formulation of these laws.

Two of these laws (dialectical change of quantity into quality, and negation of the negation) were discussed extensively in his polemical essay against Dühring. These discussions, as well as his formulation of dialectical laws in Dialectics of Nature, have become the real foundation of dogmatic tradition of Diamat. From the same source (Dialectics of Nature), the dialectical materialism has taken the distinction between the so-called "objective dialectic" and "subjective dialectic". For when Engel says: "... objective dialectic rules in the whole nature, and the so-called subjective dialectic, dialectical thinking, is only a reflection of general movement in nature through oppositions" (Engels, 1970: 239), this indicates that his dialectic is both ontological and epistemological.²¹

Engels' conception of dialectic is nowadays primarily of interest with respect to his influence on Diamat. The same could be said of Lenin's interpretation of dialectic.²² Among his works the so-called

Philosophical Notebooks (dated from 1914-1915, and also published posthumously), are of interest here. Lenin's emphasis is on the doctrine of the unity of opposites as the core of dialectical thought. "In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites" (Lenin, 1961: 223). Or, on another occasion: "Dialectic in the proper sense is the study of contradictions in the very essence of object" (ibid., 253-4).²³

It is quite clear, dialectic for Lenin has primarily an ontological meaning. The sixteen points on dialectic in Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks were written under the immediate impact of Hegel's Science of Logic. Lenin calls them "elements of dialectic". Besides the emphasis on evolution, it seems that Lenin emphasized the significance of totality ("the entire totality of the manifold relations of this thing to other") (point 2; Lenin, ibid., 221).

Points four and five emphasize what Lenin called "the internally contradictory tendencies" and "the thing (phenomenon) as the sum and unity of opposites". Point nine stresses "the transitions of every determination quality, feature, side, property into every other (into its opposite)", (ibid., 222) which in itself is a significant dialectical postulate.

Finally, the similarity to Engels is obvious in the elements of dialectic listed under points 14 and 16. These are negation of the negation, and the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa.

In the tradition of dialectical materialism are also the philosophical works of Mao Tse-Tung, who, in his emphasis on contradictions, basically follows Lenin. However, his treatment of dialectical contradictions is quite successful in this tradition, and one could say that Mao Tse-Tung has definitely raised himself above the dogmatic trend of orthodox Diamat.

Generally speaking, Mao Tse-Tung is emphasizing the dialectical relationship between theory and practice. He also stresses Lenin's dictum, "concrete analysis of concrete conditions" (emphasized also by Lukács), as indispensable to dialectical analysis. It is this emphasis on praxis and totality that chiefly differentiates Mao Tse-Tung from the main tradition of Diamat.

The uneven character of development is another idea taken over from Lenin, and built into the explanation of "principal contradictions", as distinct from "secondary contradictions". In this Mao Tse-Tung's conceptions follow Marx and Lenin, but this is done with a considerable degree of originality. The principal contradictions in any concrete social situation, according to Mao Tse-Tung, would be the essential, "playing the leading and decisive role" (Mao Tse-Tung, 1966: 53), such as for instance the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as the two major forces in contradiction in capitalist society. Due to the unevenness of development within any contradiction, Mao Tse-Tung differentiates one aspect as principal (playing the leading role), from the other (secondary aspect). The most telling is the following paragraph:

As we have said, one must not treat all the contradictions in a process as being equal but must distinguish between the principal and the secondary contradictions, and pay special attention to grasping the principal one. But, in any given contradiction whether principal or secondary, should the two contradictory aspects be treated as equal? Again, no. In any contradiction the development of the contradictory aspects is uneven. Sometimes they seem to be in equilibrium, which is however only temporary and relative, while unevenness is basic. Of the two contradictory aspects, one must be principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction. The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position.

(Mao Tse-Tung, 1966: 54)

Differing Emphases: G. Lukács, H. Marcuse

Georg Lukács, the controversial Marxist philosopher from Hungary, occupied a very significant place in the 20th-century intellectual life of Europe. His collection of essays on Marxist dialectic published in German in 1923 under the title, History and Class Consciousness, was praised by some as the only serious work of Marxist philosophy after Marx, while at the same time it was denounced by dogmatics as revisionism and Hegelian deviation. Lucien Goldmann has praised Lukács as the originator of existentialist philosophy, also as the first who developed the structuralist analysis of cultural creations, and for effecting a decisive change in philosophy, and particularly in Marxist theory (Goldmann, 1971b: 65).

Lukács' dialectic above all emphasizes the category of totality and the subject-object relationship. This emphasis clearly reveals the Hegelian influence, for Lukács had started his career as an Hegelian who subsequently accepted the Marxian orientation. Lukács' position was that the essence of dialectical method was in the grasp of the whole totality.²⁴

Particularly dialectical is Lukács' discussion of reification. In the context of Marx's description of the fetishism of commodities, the Hegelian expression Verdinglichung would denote a social relation between men appearing in the form of a relation between things and acquiring a phantom objectivity, or simply meaning the transformation of all activities and products into commodities - that is into exchange values. Thus the reality of human relationships in the capitalist world is concealed by the fetishistic illusions of all phenomena which appear to us as eternal immortal relations of things, instead of transitory, ephemeral relations of men. It is precisely the role of the dialectical method,

according to Lukács, to destroy this fictitious immortality and the reified character of bourgeois social thought.²⁵ Lukács found this reification not only in bourgeois social thought, but in dogmatic Marxism as well, and in particular in Pavlov's theory of reflection.

While writing his essays in Marxist dialectics (sometime between 1918 and 1920), Lukács felt that one particular and significant aspect of dialectic was neglected in all the interpretations of historical materialism after Marx, and that was the relationship between subject and object in historical happenings.

While dialectical method is limited to the realms of history and society, it was Engels who - following Hegel's mistaken lead - extended the method to nature, reasoned Lukács. "However, the crucial determinants of dialectics - the interaction of subject and object, the unity of theory and practice, the historical changes in the reality underlying the categories as the root cause of changes in thought, etc. - are absent from our knowledge of nature" (Lukács, 1971a: 24). Lukács was searching for a subject-object of this historical dialectic, and following Marx found it in the social class of the proletariat. According to Lukács, to understand the social reality dialectically means to grasp it in its totality, and this can be accomplished only by a subject which is itself totality. This cannot be an individual but only a social class, and such a social class in the modern world is the proletariat, as an ascending and progressive subject.²⁶

Still differently is the dialectic interpreted in the major works of Herbert Marcuse. To him the Hegelian dialectic is "the power of negative thinking"; "dialectical logic is critical logic" as a mode of

thought for comprehending reality which is essentially negative in character. This reality is contradictory in itself, and thus dialectic as negative thinking is "a tool for analysing the world of facts in terms of its internal inadequacy Thought 'corresponds' to reality only as it transforms reality by comprehending its contradictory structure." Being essentially "negative thinking", "a critique of a given state of affairs", the negation which dialectic applies to the very processes of reality, is contrasted with "scientific reason" and "common sense", which are both positive in character. In contrast to dialectical thought, "conformistic logic denies the reality of contradictions," says Marcuse (Marcuse, 1964: vii-xiv).

The Hegelian influence is obvious in this conception, as in the case of Lukács, but the presence of Marx is noticeable as well. Both scholars are considered as Hegelian Marxists. Their interpretations of dialectic are of relevance for the explanation of the elements of dialectic which follows in the next two chapters.

FOOTNOTES (Chapter II)

1. "In Plato's Symposium Heraclitus's principle of dialectic as the unity of all opposites is quoted: 'The one differentiates itself from itself and thus unites itself with itself, like the harmony of the bow and the lyre.' Harmony in general presupposes dissonances, disagreements out of which their reconciliation arises" (Mueller, 1959: 10-11).
2. In contemporary terminology this 'multiknowledge' corresponds to sociography, empiricism, facticity, etc.
3. In his Republic, Plato speaks very highly of dialectic. In the educational scheme he was proposing, the philosophers from age 30-35 are to be exercised in Dialectic (See especially Chapter XXVII).
4. On this particular point, sociological functionalism was quite close to the dialectical viewpoint. We shall see later that P. Sorokin was particularly concerned in developing this perspective in his concept of 'logico-meaningful integration of culture'.
5. A similar comparison could be drawn between Khaldūn's view on the role of the individual in history and the much later dialectical doctrine of historical materialism of Marx and Plekhanov.
6. Where such equality is justified, it is in the indisputable fact that both scholars were extremely powerful thinkers. This valuable quality of their thought has significantly contributed to their capacity to refine the dialectical perspective within the framework of their philosophical systems.
7. In his interpretation of Hegel's triad and with reference to popular misrepresentations, Walter Kaufman uses the expressions 'shallowness of the traditional misrepresentation' and 'the legend of thesis, antithesis, synthesis' (Kaufman, 1965: 198).
8. The term triad is also justified with reference to the division of Hegel's system into Logical Idea, Nature, and Spirit. It is also the case with respect to logical doctrine, which, according to Hegel, "has three sides (a) the Abstract side, or that of understanding; (b) the Dialectical, or that of negative reason; (c) the Speculative, or that of positive reason" (Hegel, 1892: 145).
9. P. A. Sorokin was among the first to point that the classical Chinese thought contained the elements of dialectic in the conceptions of Yin and Yang (Sorokin, 1941: 624). Only recently the idea was expressed that even Hegel, by far the greatest dialectician in western classical philosophy, was much influenced by Taoism and the ancient Chinese conception of dialectic (Ten Houten and Kaplan, 1972: 219). Hegel, was, namely, lecturing to his students at Heidelberg in 1816, on Taoism and Confucianism.

10. Commenting on Hegel's viewpoint Baillie says: "We cannot say that the subject dominates the object any more than the object directs the activity of the subject: they are inseparable elements and develop pari passu" (Baillie, 1949: 39).
11. "The evolutionary process itself by which consciousness develops from an initial opposition between consciousness and reality to an absolute consciousness in which the ideal world of consciousness coincides with the real, is called "dialectic". The dialectic, then, is not just one philosophical method among others: it is the self-development of thought, and of reality" (Dupré, 1966: 27).
12. "Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite. ... All things, we say, - that is, the finite world as such, - are doomed; and in saying so, we have a vision of Dialectic as the universal and irresistible power before which nothing can stay, however secure and stable it may deem itself" (Hegel, 1892: 150).
13. In his Science of Logic, Hegel declares "everything is inherently contradictory" and with this enunciates "the law of contradiction". He goes on to say: "But it is one of the fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking, that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a determination as identity; but in fact, if it were a question of grading the two determinations and they had to be kept separate, than contradictions would have to be taken as the profounder determination and more characteristic of essence. For as against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity" (Hegel, 1969: 439).
14. "The critical impulses in the theory of essence, abandoned by eidetics as well as positivism, have been incorporated into materialist theory. Here, however, the concept of essence takes on a new form. This theory conceived concern with the essence of man as the task of a rational organization of society, to be achieved through practice that alters its present form. Materialist theory thus transcends the given state of fact and moves toward a different potentiality, proceeding from immediate appearance to the essence that appears in it. But here appearance and essence become members of a real anti-thesis arising from the particular historical structure of the social process of life." (Marcuse, 1973: 66-67).
15. In a letter to Engels of January 14, 1858, Marx speaks of the desire to explain in brief "what is rational in the method that Hegel discovered and mystified at the same time."

16. "We have been able to establish with enough proof to state it, that Marx's discourse is in principle foreign to Hegel's, that his dialectic is quite different from the Hegelian dialectic, then that is all we have done. We have not gone to see whence Marx took this method of analysis which he presents as if it were pre-existent - we have not posed the question as to whether Marx, far from borrowing it, did not himself invent this method of analysis which he thought he was merely applying, as he really did invent the dialectic which he tells us he took from Hegel, in certain well-known passages which are too often re-hashed by hurried interpreters" (Althusser, 1970: 50).
17. Barrington Moore, Jr. has indirectly underscored these advantages of Marx's method when he described the prevailing strategy in social science as ahistorical, abstract, formal and lacking in critical spirit (Moore, 1965: 123).
18. Professor H. Marcuse has a very interesting opinion on this point. He thinks that the dialectic in Soviet Marxism has been transformed from a mode of critical thought into a universal "world outlook" and universal method with rigidly fixed rules and regulations. In his words, "... the movement of dialectical thought is codified into a philosophical system." Thus dialectic itself becomes formal logic, "... and this transformation destroys the dialectic more thoroughly than any revision ... but the very essence of dialectics rebels against such codification ... for neither Hegel nor Marx developed dialectic as a general methodological scheme. The first step in this direction was made by Engels in his Dialectics of Nature (which he did not publish), and his notes have provided the skeleton for the Soviet Marxist codification" (Marcuse, 1961: 122-123).

In his critique of contemporary Marxism and of Diamat, Jean-Paul Sartre uses expressions such as 'dialectic without men,' 'Stalinist Marxism' and also 'frozen Marxism' (Sartre, 1968).

19. "Just as the bourgeoisie by large-scale industry, competition, and the world market dissolves in practice all stable time-honored institutions, so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of absolute state of humanity corresponding to it. For it (dialectical philosophy) nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain" (Engels, 1959: 199-200).

"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things, apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all

seeming accidentality and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end - this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted" (ibid., 226-227).

20. In the same dogmatic tradition are the writings of J. V. Stalin. Since he was neither a scholar nor an intellectual, his views will be disregarded in this survey.
21. Engel's search for dialectic in nature has provoked another controversy over the problem of subject-object relationship. This dispute involved the Hungarian Marxist philosopher Georg Lukács and will be touched upon in the section dealing with Lukács' concept of dialectic.
22. Lenin's essay "The Teaching of Karl Marx" originally written in 1914 for the Russian Encyclopedia, stands clearly in Engels' tradition, whose excerpts from Anti-Dühring and Ludwig Feuerbach Lenin quoted several times (Lenin, 1931).
23. French Marxist M. Godelier recently reflected on these definitions. He finds that Lenin was confusing identity with opposites, or "proposing false equivalence between these two definitions. Godelier thinks that Mao Tse-Tung is making the same fallacy. (Godelier, 1972: 335-368).
24. In 1923 Lukács said: "It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of totality. The category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts is the essence of the method which Marx took over from Hegel and brilliantly transformed into the foundations of a wholly new science" (Lukács, 1971a: 27).
25. "The fetishistic illusions enveloping all phenomena in capitalist society succeed in concealing reality, but more is concealed than the historical, i.e., transitory, ephemeral nature of phenomena. This concealment is made possible by the fact that in capitalist society man's environment, and especially the categories of economics, appear to him immediately and necessarily in the forms of objectivity, which conceal the fact that they are the categories of the relations of men with each other. Instead they appear as things and the relations of things with each other. Therefore, when the dialectical method destroys the fiction of the immortality of the categories it also destroys their reified character and clears the way to a knowledge of reality" (Lukács, 1971a: 14).
26. Lukács is pointing to the problem of separation of subject and object in the theory of knowledge (epistemology) of bourgeois philosophy. He thinks this can be solved when an historical being appears which is at the same time both subject and object; which expresses in thought (as subject) its own historical practice (as object). This subject-object is proletariat in capitalism.

CHAPTER III

DIALECTICAL CONTRADICTION

The preceding survey has shown the scope of different emphases. Undoubtedly dialectic has not meant the same thing to different thinkers, many of whom have given somewhat different emphases to it. While Hegel and Marx stressed primarily change, contradiction, and negativity, Engels emphasized the ontological universality of laws of motion. With Lenin the emphasis was on the doctrine of unity of opposites; with Lukács it was totality; and with Marcuse it is "negative thinking". More recently Gurvitch developed his "empirico-realistic dialectic" in a critical effort to integrate the dialectical perspective and modern sociology.

There is little doubt that in the history of ideas the dialectical tradition occupies a significant place. From Hegel via Marx and Engels, Lenin, Lukács, Gurvitch, Goldmann, Sartre, Marcuse, down to Mészáros, the tradition can be clearly detected in spite of differences in emphasis of different protagonists of this conception.

Therefore, it appears legitimate to try to extract certain significant elements or traits of dialectical perspective. The two most common and at the same time the most pronounced elements are dialectical totality and dialectical contradiction. In themselves, these two elements include a number of additional traits of dialectics such as change, interrelatedness, opposition, negation, etc. These two major elements are again closely interrelated. As K. Kosik has emphasized,

The problem is not whether to recognize the primacy of totality with respect to the contradictions or vice-versa, since such a separation eliminates both the totality and the dialectical contradictions: totality without contradictions is empty and dead, while contradictions outside of the totality are formal and arbitrary (Kosik, 1969: 51).

In contradistinction to Marxists, who stress the primacy either of totality or of contradictions, Kosik underlines the dialectical relationship between these two major elements of dialectical conception as inseparable. The present research on dialectics leads to the conclusion that most of the elements of dialectic can be subsumed under two major headings - dialectical contradiction and dialectical totality. Therefore, a separate treatment of each merits our task. This separation, however, is an artificial one, and is made only for the purpose of exposition, because any dialectical mode of analysis cannot afford to separate the two aspects.

Like a red thread the idea of contradiction (oppositeness), runs through the writings of Hegel, Marx, and Lenin. Other radical thinkers, Engels, Lukács, Marcuse, operate within the same conceptual framework. Hegel, as we have seen, pointed out the ontological universality of contradictions in the universe. For Marx, contradictions exist primarily as realities inherent in modern social formation - capitalism; and Lenin defines dialectic as "the study of contradictions in the very essence of objects" (Lenin, 1961: 253-4).

I. POLARITY, OPPOSITENESS, AND CONTRADICTIONS

Both "contradiction" and "opposite" are seldom precisely defined terms and are consequently criticized on the grounds of being ambiguous, vague, and obscure. The language of dialectic is clearly derived from Logic. The expressions such as "negation", "contradiction", "opposites", "thesis", "antithesis", "unity (or identity) of opposites", etc., are indicative. Marxists, following Hegel, often refer to dialectic as a system of logic. Logic, as we know, is most often described as a set of rules by which we control the correctness of our conclusions and thinking.


However, when dialectic is defined in terms of logic, we must keep in mind that in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition both terms have clearly ontological implications.

Numerous examples of ontological statements can be found in the works of writers who professed to take a dialectical position. For the purpose of illustration the following examples will suffice. "Dialectics explains the genesis of movement by the struggle between the internal opposites proper to all things and phenomena." Or, "Dialectics asserts objective character of contradictions" (Schaff, 1960: 241-242).

In order to provide some explanation for these and similar ontological statements, it seems necessary to consider the two crucial terms - "opposites" and "contradictions". What really are opposites? Extensive dialectical literature is almost silent on the precise meaning of this concept. Thus A. Meyer may be right in his conclusion that this term remains vague and undefined (Meyer, 1963: 36). In fact dialectic is sometimes labeled as "mysticism" and "scholasticism", and criticized precisely because these central concepts remain unclear. A number of the related concepts of dialectic imported from logic have, in this branch of philosophy, clear and precise meaning. However, once they are applied to the real world (nature and society) their meaning tends to lose precision, and we begin to question their applicability to this new realm.

Following the elements of logic, as well as B. J. Archie, we can say that the concept of polarity involves three general categories: oppositeness, complementarity, and tension (Archie, 1970: 5). Oppositeness is a broader category than contradiction, and the latter is in the square of oppositions of any elementary logic, a type of opposition between two propositions (e.g. A - O, or I - E).

Square of Oppositions



Propositions

A = universal-affirmative
 E = universal-negative
 I = particular-affirmative
 O = particular-negative

Thus, in terms of the scope of the three logical categories they could be related as: Polarity \rangle Oppositeness \rangle Contradiction, where the mathematical symbol " \rangle " means 'greater than'.

Polarity, according to Archie, implies opposition and therefore duality (twoness) and negation (notness). Generally speaking, polarity (Lat. polaritas) denotes two contrary qualities at two opposing points of the same body. In Schelling's natural philosophy, each of these contrary qualities expresses a tendency toward unification and thus results in unity (Filipović, 1965: 311). "The poles of polarity are opposites but not contradictories", says B. J. Archie (1970: 31).

For the majority of authors, polarity is defined in terms of oppositeness (Sheldon, 1944: 108; Cohen, 1959: 165; Bruyn, 1966: 51-58). In W. H. Sheldon's model, for example, polarity appears as a relation of oppositions analogous to the north and south poles of a magnet. Therefore polarity includes balance, but it more significantly points toward process, says Sheldon (*ibid.*, 102).

In the same line is Morris R. Cohen's description of the principle of polarity. He stresses the opposites such as immediacy and mediation, unity and plurality, fixed and the flux, substance and function, actual and possible, etc., all of which "involve each other when applied for any significant entity" (Cohen, 1959: 165).

T. S. Bruyn expresses a similar position in his recent book, when he cites examples of polarity in theory and sociology: traditional empiricism versus participant observation; empiricism versus rationalism, etc. Sociological thought is particularly rich in typological dichotomies advanced, among others, by theorists such as E. Durkheim, F. Toennies, H. Maine, H. Becker, R. Redfield, P. Sorokin, T. Parsons. All of these advanced their typologies as dynamic concepts with the purpose of explaining continuum and the major direction of social change (continuity within discontinuity).

More precisely speaking in the sphere of the social, the opposites are mainly characterized by antagonism and confrontation. Thus they could be more properly exemplified by the relationship of capital and labour, metropolis versus hinterland, collectivism versus individualism, or socialism versus capitalism, idealism versus materialism, etc.

G. E. R. Lloyd's discussion shows, for instance, that the English terms "opposition" and "opposite" are used to refer to many different types of relationship, such as relationships between pairs of propositions (contradictories, contraries and subcontraries), but also more regularly in connection with pairs of terms such as contraries (e.g. black and white, tall and short, odd and even). "But we also use the term "opposite" more generally to describe the relationship between any pair of terms which we apprehend or imagine as contrast or antithesis" (Lloyd, 1966: 88). This is directly supportive of the position suggested above, that social opposites are mainly characterized by antagonistic relationships.

Generally in logic, contradiction (contradictio, kontradiktion) implies a statement that contradicts itself, or a relationship between two concepts or propositions of which one entirely negates the content

of another (Filipović, 1965: 329).¹ In its strictly logical meaning contradictory opposition necessarily contains truthfulness of one proposition and at the same time wrongfulness of its contradictory opposite. Its formula is thus, "either - or", or simply - tertium non datur.

Many philosophers are of the opinion that the concept of contradiction cannot be used outside of logic. Hegel, however, was of a different opinion. To him, contradictions existed in real events, they had ontological meaning. In this new meaning contradictions denote relationship between two processes or events which mutually negate or exclude one another, but are at the same time the only two possible alternatives. From Hegel to Marx was, naturally, not very far.

We have seen that polarity implies opposition, and that poles of polarity are opposites (Archie, 1970). It was also shown that most of the writers who tackled the problem of polarity, defined polarity more or less in terms of oppositeness. However, when one surveys Marxist literature, the impression one gets is that the dialectical category of contradiction is often explained in terms of oppositeness or simply used as synonymous with opposition. The examples are numerous and can be found in the works of Engels, Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung, and a number of second-rank Marxist writers.

In the very first sentence of his essay on contradiction Mao Tse-Tung says: "The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectic," in which respect he follows Lenin, whom he immediately quotes (Mao Tse-Tung, 1966: 23). Positing ontological universality of contradictions in nature and society, Mao Tse-Tung makes an effort to explain "the process of development of all things" as resulting from the existing internal oppositions (ibid., 29-30). In his explanation of "identity of contradiction",

Mao Tse-Tung is using contradiction and opposite interchangeably. He dwells mainly on the ideas of Engels and Lenin, who often did the same. Lenin also, for example, describes the identity of opposites as the discovery and recognition of the contradictory mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature, including mind and society. He concludes with the statement that development is 'struggle' of opposites (Lenin, 1961: 360).

Of interest here is the definition of a Soviet author. "Contradiction is a division within unity and a struggle between the various internally connected aspects and tendencies of objects and phenomena in the objective world" (Stepanyan, 1955: 73). We see it also portrays dialectic as ontological, while in its essence equates contradictions with oppositions.²

Illustrating the universality of contradictions, Mao Tse-Tung uses Lenin's examples of identity of opposites such as plus and minus, differential and integral in mathematics, action and reaction in mechanics, positive and negative electricity in physics, the class struggle in social science (Mao Tse-Tung, 1966: 32).³ To such handling of contradictions, by means of the above examples, the critique has (and to a certain extent with good reason), pointed out that in the majority of the cases there is really no contradiction involved at all. Properly speaking, the question is one of contrary opposites, as G. A. Wetter has pointed out (1958: 349). We see the semantic question coming again to the fore.

For any proper understanding of dialectical contradiction, of crucial significance is the conception of unity or interpenetration of opposites, sometimes referred to as "unity and struggle of opposites." Following Hegel, some authors use instead of "unity" the expression "identity" thus "identity of opposites."

Here the critique has pointed out that both Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung tend to confuse the term "unity" with the inappropriate term "identity". This time the criticism comes from the French Marxist Maurice Godelier, who suggests that his analysis definitely excludes the possibility that Marx could have held a theory of the "identity of opposites (Godelier, 1972: 357-8).⁴ Thus, says Godelier, Hegel's philosophical idealism is responsible for the specific internal content of this notion of contradiction, and this structure, based on the principle of the identity of opposites, is "the direct inverse of Marx's making the dialectic 'useless for science'. In fact anything, i.e. nothing, can be proved with the hypothesis of the identity of opposites" (ibid., 358).

To this should be added that C. W. Mills considered Engels' three laws of dialectic to be mysterious, and in particular "the interpenetration of opposites" as a "confusion of logic with metaphysics" (Mills, 1970: 130). When a critical sociologist of the calibre of C. W. Mills, and the French Marxist both assert the error in interpretation of the dialectical postulate of unity of opposites, there is reason for concern at least.

At this point we shall leave criticism and make a brief digression into the controversial dialectical tradition in philosophy. Plato reasoned in his Parmenides that one and many are the same. Heraclitus was among the first to teach that opposites are united. Hegel's Being and Nothing became identical, and Lenin emphasized identity (also unity) of opposites as basic to dialectic.⁵

With respect to the logical principle of unity of opposites - the most distinct characteristic of dialectic - it is necessary to point out the fundamental difference between the older formal logic and the dialectical Logic of Hegel. The formal logic of Aristotelians and Thomists

operated with its basic laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle.

With his new dialectical method, Hegel performed a substantive break in logic. He explicitly formulated - what was in earlier philosophy only implicit - the new logical principles of identity of opposites. The law of identity of formal logic operated simply on the basis of the formula "A equals A". Thus contradictory properties were considered incompatible. The same thing could not at the same time be and not be because it was self-contradictory. "In formal logic contradiction and especially self-contradiction are impossible in reality as well as illegitimate in thought." (Novack, 1971: 91). The new dialectical logic of Hegel on the contrary allows for contradictions in things, in reality. Thus, A equals not only A; it also equals non-A. The law of excluded middle was now replaced by the principle of non-identity, and the objectivity of contradictions was acknowledged.

Hegel's dialectical logic, in fact, does not invalidate formal logic, but rather supersedes it (Lefebvre, 1959: 24). Or, as Marcuse put it, "A does not contradict an external non-A, Hegel holds, but a non-A that belongs to the very identity of A; in other words, A is self-contradictory" (Marcuse, 1964: 124). Contradiction is internal, but unity, reasons H. Lefebvre, expresses and determines the emergence of new being (Lefebvre, 1959: 25). He also points out in the same place that the unity of contradictions exists only in concrete and specific forms.

To u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstand), which proceeds according to the canon of identity, Hegel contrasted r e a s o n (Vernunft) which reflects the development of mind on the level of the principle of identity of opposites.

For understanding each category remains an insulated self-existent being, completely cut off from the others. The categories thus regarded are static, fixed, and lifeless. To the eye of reason, however, the categories are seen to be alive with movement, to be fluid, to break up and flow into each other, as we have seen that being flows into nothing. For the understanding any deduction of category from category is impossible, for there is no passage from one to the other. Only reason can deduce the categories. Understanding meets every question with an inflexible "either . . . or." The truth is either A or not-A, either being or not-being. A thing either is, or is not. Reason breaks this hard and fast schematism of the understanding, sees that A and not-A are identical in their very difference, that the truth does not lie, as understanding supposes, either wholly in A, or wholly in not-A, but rather in the synthesis of the two.

(Stace, 1955:101)

One can easily recognize in this difference between Verstand and Vernunft a similarity to Engels' descriptions of dialectic as contrasted with what he used to call, metaphysics. Or to use another more original example from Hegel:

Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding), we should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'Either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition itself. The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are.

(Hegel, 1892: 223)

Contradiction with Hegel enjoys an ontological status and is considered to be responsible for movement and change. "Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable" (ibid.).

With reference to the still unconcluded debate over the relationship of terms "opposition" and "contradiction", of interest are the views of two Yugoslav authors E. Šešić and A. Stojković. Contrary to Stalin's views, they argue that contradictions in a narrower sense are relatively intensified oppositions taken in a broader sense, in the bases of which

lies the essential contradiction of a given "thing-process." Šešić and Stojković point out that the same views were shared by the classics of Marxism, where oppositions are taken to be a lower developmental stage of contradictions, and contradictions as intensified oppositions (Šešić and Stojković, 1962: 256-257).

The above views seem to be little in tune with the views expressed by Mao Tse-Tung or even with those of H. Marcuse. Mao Tse-Tung, namely, seems to hold the view that opposites are forms of contradiction or elements of contradictions. At least the following sentence leads to the above conclusion: "Between the opposites in a contradiction there is at once unity and struggle, and it is this that impels things to move and change"(Mao Tse-Tung, 1966: 91). When Marcuse says "Contradiction, or the concrete form of it we are discussing, the opposition ... " (1964: 124), he too seems to be expressing a similar viewpoint, namely, that contradiction is a broader category than opposition.

From the logical principle and ontological postulate of identity of opposites stem also two additional and widely known postulates: (1) the postulate of change of quantity into new quality and vice versa, and (2) the postulate of negation of the negation. Engels called these postulates laws, and the tradition of Diamat attributes to these "laws" ontological universality. It is usually stated that these "laws" of dialectic "explain" how change occurs and through which stages the changing entities pass in their 'development'. Compared to these two postulates, the so-called law of unity and interpenetration of opposites is supposed to explain the causes of change, and therefore is of crucial significance.

The usefulness of these postulates (or "laws") in explanation of change, one must admit, is highly dubious. C. W. Mills, H. Marcuse and

G. Gurvitch have also expressed serious doubt in their validity. Animated dialectical thought does not tolerate any 'codification' (Marcuse), and dialectic does not really explain, but rather brings us to the threshold of explanation (Gurvitch).

The postulate or principle of dialectical negation basically posits that anything existing changes and that, in the course of its change or development, it is being superseded or "sublated" (aufheben) by its other. The peculiarity of the Hegelian term aufheben is that it denotes the synthesis of a triad which both abolishes and preserves the differences of the thesis and antithesis. Thus the dialectical negation is not a simple act of destruction, but a qualitative change where the new entity preserves some characteristics of the negated one.

The most interesting aspect of this way of looking at change is the idea that as a part of the negation process, an entity turns into its opposite. Naturally, in the dialectical perspective this opposite is the result of previous quantitative growth, where the sprout of the new entity is generated within the old framework. Therefore, the new emerged entity, as opposite, is in fact its own other. Dialectical thought abounds with examples of this shift into the opposite of which the simplest instances would be the turning of war into peace, love into hate, joy into sorrow, life into death. Professor Marcuse has this to say:

By virtue of the negativity that belongs to its nature each thing is linked with its opposite. To be what it really is it must become what it is not. To say, then, that everything contradicts itself is to say that its essence contradicts its given state of existence. Its proper nature, which is, in the last analysis, its essence, impels it to 'transgress' the state of existence in which it finds itself and pass over to another.

(Marcuse, 1964: 124).

Examples of this specific viewpoint can be found in the dialectical conceptions of Georg Simmel, in the works of Marx and Engels, too, of course, and even in modern sociology.

That the relations of production from the form of the development of the productive forces turn on a certain stage of development into their fetters, is perhaps the most striking example of Marx's usage of dialectical negative and the idea of the turn into the opposite. The latter idea could also be called the "dialectical paradox". The theory of alienation, as developed by Marx in his early works, as well as its specific application to the problems of commodity fetishism in Capital, abounds with this dialectical paradox or turn into opposite.

Of more interest here is that contemporary social scientists deploy this dialectical paradox in their reasoning as well. Numerous examples could be cited. For the sake of brevity we shall limit this number to two modern writers. In his book Power and Privilege, G. E. Lenski says:

As the church gained in power and influence, the more radical tendencies of Christianity gradually lost ground, at least among church leaders. The conservative viewpoint came in time to be regarded as virtually a matter of doctrine, and as such was developed and elaborated to a high degree.

(1966: 8)

Comment is needless. We are clearly in the presence of the dialectical turn into the opposite. The same is the case with contemporary thinker, Ivan Illich, with whom the shifting into the opposite comes more as a result of quantitative change in a Simmelian manner.

Only within limits can education fit people into a man-made environment: beyond these limits lies the universal schoolhouse, hospital ward, or prison.

People feel joy, as opposed to mere pleasure, to the extent that their activities are creative, while the growth of tools beyond a certain point increases regimentation, dependence, exploitation and impotence.

(Illich, 1973: 63-67)

Needless to say, this sudden shifting into its opposite is illustrated by Hegel in his discussion of the general objectivity of dialectic and the presence of the same in the spiritual world. The proverbial expression summum jus summa injuria,⁶ extreme anarchy and extreme despotism leading to one other, extremes of pain and pleasure passing into each other, are among others given as examples by the great master of dialectic (Hegel, 1892: 150-151).

II. TYPOLOGY OF CONTRADICTIONS

Logical Contradiction

Different uses of the term contradiction in formal logic, dialectic, and dialectical materialism have brought about numerous controversies and a confusion in interpretations. A way out was suggested by Polish scholars, Casimir Ajdukiewicz and Adam Schaff.⁷ Following Ajdukiewicz's article on Zeno in 1948, Schaff and other dialectical materialists agreed that "contradiction" when applied to nature and society does not mean the same as logical contradiction. Thus, although dialectic asserts the objective character of contradictions in nature and society, the dialecticians (including Marxists), reject logical contradictions in thinking. In his article published first in Poland in 1955, Schaff pointed out that dialectic does acknowledge the validity of the principle of contradiction and the excluded middle as used in logic (Schaff, 1960: 241-250). A few simple examples suffice to illustrate this point. The assertion that someone has died and that he is also alive, or that somebody was at home and was not at home at the same time, are definitely contradictory and therefore logically inadmissible.

There is, however, an important difference between contradiction in the logical sense and the "contradiction" as used in dialectic and

dialectical materialism. This of course requires a separate discussion and will be dealt with in the next section.

Objective Contradictions

Obviously, the most typical meaning of contradiction in dialectic is related to the central thesis of dialectic - to the so-called "principle of unity and the conflict of opposites". In this conception every phenomenon and thing is a unity of opposites. Thus the opposing tendencies or forces within phenomena are considered to be the source of movement and change (e.g. the forces of life and death; the struggle of classes, etc.). As A. Schaff has put it, "Objects and phenomena have a polar structure" (ibid., 244). In this perspective the struggling tendencies or "opposites" are often referred to as "contradictions". This meaning of contradiction is naturally quite different from the meaning of the same expression in logic, and could be referred to as a "dialectical contradiction", or simply as "objective contradiction". This one, of course, has a clearly ontological meaning, unless it is employed as a hypothesis only.

To assume ontological existence of contradictions in the social processes is to touch upon the problem of the dialectic of the real movement of historical totalities as distinguished from the dialectical method which is epistemological. A number of authors agree on the point that dialect is the movement of historical reality or "the very structure of concrete reality itself" (Dupré, 1966: 43). In this group could be named G. Gurvitch, J. P. Sartre, L. Dupré, A. Kojève.

For Sartre, dialectic denotes the reciprocity between man and the world, man and man, the individual man and the group. It is a distinct part of man's lived reality resulting from human interaction and not a blind law of nature. Following the elements of Hegel's dialectic, Sartre

stresses the relational structure of human activity as very basic to dialectic. And he strongly disagrees with Engels who attempted to apply dialectic to nature and was in fact searching for the dialectical patterns in inorganic nature. Sartre's point of view was well summarized by W. Desan:

If there is dialectic in nature, it can only be insofar as human praxis confers upon matter its particular "importance", or stated differently, insofar as material conditions affect the human world and in turn themselves receive the impact of human interference. Only within the social orbit of man can matter have dialectical implications. Outside man and without man, dialectic is mere hypothesis.

(Desan, 1966: 73)

The leading scholars in Marxian tradition (Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-Tung) were all engaged in analysis of what is here called "objective contradictions." Marx studied the contradictions in history as well as in the reality of his time. In his historical analyses (e.g. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte), these were the internal contradictions which were responsible for production of historical totalities and for their dissolution, as pointed out by Sartre (1968: 25).

To Marx the very basic contradiction of the capitalist society was to be found between the collectivity of production and the private mode of appropriation; between developing forces of production and the crystallization of the established relations of production (property relations). These very basic contradictions are, according to Marx, at the root of or responsible for the conflict between the economic structure and the social superstructure (legal, political, ideological); between capital and labour (bourgeoisie and proletariat); between town and country. The above outlined contradictions are therefore complex determinants of all sorts of social conflicts.⁸

The concrete opposites in Marx's analysis are proletariat and wealth both of which, in Marx's own words "form a single whole ...," and are "begotten by the world of private property". These two opposites are mutually dependent and condition each other. As two sides of the whole, the one (private property) is the 'positive' side of the contradiction ("is compelled to maintain itself, and thereby its opposite, the proletariat in existence"), while the other, the proletariat, as its opposite is the 'negative' side of the contradiction ("is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and thereby its opposite ... i.e. private property") (Marx, 1956: 51).

We see above, the concrete contradiction with its positive and negative side results from the opposites which make the totality of the capitalist social formation. The same contradiction demands a supersession or sublation of the existing structure which is viewed as historical and therefore transitory. As A. Schaff pointed out, the question here is of "internal contradictions of the system," of the malfunctioning of the social system which is bound to collapse as a result of the opposed tendencies it contains (Schaff, 1960: 246). From his critical and revolutionary platform, Marx regarded every historically developed form as transient and in flux. He also sought to discover the laws of the phenomena, the investigation of which he was concerned with, the laws of their development and their transition from one historic form to another. These Marx considered to be the major characteristics of his method (Marx, 1957: xxvii).

The opening paragraph in The Manifesto, as well as numerous pages of Marx's opus make it sufficiently clear that in his dialectical perspective a qualitative change in society (often a "change into opposite"),

results from the basic contradiction caused by opposing factors within the social totality.

In explaining the conflict between expansion of production and production of surplus-value, Marx uses the expression "the conflict of antagonistic agencies", which find vent in crises. These crises, it is said "are always but momentary and forcible solutions of the existing contradictions". The author of Capital explains best what we call here concrete objective contradictions:

The contradiction, to put it in a very general way, consists in that the capitalist mode of production involves a tendency towards absolute development of the productive forces, regardless of the value and surplus-value it contains, and regardless of the social conditions under which capitalist production takes place; while, on the other hand, its aim is to preserve the value of the existing capital and to promote its self-expansion to the highest limit (i.e., to promote an ever more rapid growth of this value). The specific feature about it is that it uses the existing value of capital as a means of increasing this value to the utmost. The methods by which it accomplishes this include the fall of the rate of profit, depreciation of the existing capital, and development of the productive forces of labour at the expense of already created productive forces.

(Marx, 1967: 249)

The category of contradiction takes also a prominent place in the works of G. Lukács and the French Marxist scholars H. Lefebvre, J. P. Sartre, L. Goldmann, M. Godelier, and L. Althusser.

Althusser, for example, discusses the category of contradiction in connection with Lenin's theme of the "weakest link", and thereby arrives at his concept of "overdetermination" (Althusser, 1969: 89-116). He points to the so-called "law of uneven development" (emphasized by Lenin and later by Mao Tse-Tung), and the role of this notion in Lenin's analysis of the concrete historical contradictions in pre-revolutionary Russian society. Althusser concludes by saying that due to the law of uneven development in the 'system of imperialist states' (Lenin) Russia represented the weakest point. "This weakness was the product of this special feature:

the accumulation and exacerbation of all the historical contradictions then possible in a single state"(ibid., 95-96).

In his work on imperialism, Lenin engaged in a profound analysis of the very fundamental contradictions of this stage of capitalism, delineating the same as "the contradictions between monopoly and free competition which exists side by side with it, between the gigantic "operations" (and gigantic profits) of finance capital, and "honest" trade in the free market, the contradiction between cartels and trusts, on the one hand, and the non-cartelized industry, on the other, etc." (Lenin, 1965: 141-21).

Different writers in the tradition of dialectical materialism tend to classify contradictions. Thus among others we find polar types of "external versus internal"; "antagonistic versus non-antagonistic" contradictions. The antagonistic contradictions, it is said, are to be found particularly in social life and are characterized by the irreconcilable interests of the hostile classes or groups. They lead to conflict and can be resolved only by force, class struggle and by revolution (Šešić and Stojković, 1962: 267-268).

Stalin was among the first to argue (in his "conflictless theory"), that opposites (read "contradictions") in socialist society are non-antagonistic (e.g. between the peasantry and the proletariat in the Soviet Union). In other words, the antagonistic oppositions disappear while non-antagonistic oppositions remain in the socialist social order. This opinion seems to be well rooted in Lenin who said: "Antagonism and contradiction are not at all one and the same. Under socialism the first will disappear, the second will remain" (Lenin, 1931: 357).

Similar classification is pursued by Mao Tse-Tung in his essay on contradictions, who argues that antagonism is only one form of the

struggle of opposites (Mao Tse-Tung, 1966: 68-71). He says:

Some contradictions are characterized by open antagonism, others are not. In accordance with the concrete development of things, some contradictions which were originally non-antagonistic develop into antagonistic ones, while others which were originally antagonistic develop into non-antagonistic ones." (ibid., 70).

Mao Tse-Tung is reiterating that the formula of antagonism cannot be arbitrarily applied everywhere (ibid., 71).⁹ Following basically in the footsteps of Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung has in "a quite un-Hegelian light" (Althusser's expression) developed a typology of contradictions by emphasizing separately principal and secondary contradictions, the principal and secondary aspect of contradiction, and the law of the uneven development of contradiction.

Mao Tse-Tung's emphasis on praxis, on totality, on contradiction, and on unevenness of development was taken over by Louis Althusser. Basic to his conception is the emphasis on the qualitative difference between Hegelian and Marxian dialectic, which he summarizes in his concept of "over-determination". To Althusser, namely, the Marxist contradiction, in contradistinction to Hegel's, is "overdetermined" that is "complexly-structurally-unevenly-determined" (Althusser, 1969: 209). In other words, when translated from the obscure style of this French structuralist's language, the body social is complex-structured-historical totality in which some contradictions are basic and dominating.

We have seen, Marxists are seldom precise in distinguishing contradiction from opposition. More often both terms are used interchangeably as synonyms. Šešić and Stojković are among the few who tried to separate the two terms by specifying contradictions in a narrower sense as relatively intensified oppositions. Mao Tse-Tung, who does not make this distinction, uses primarily the term 'contradiction' (and sometimes 'opposition' as a synonym), and finds that he needs to distinguish between oppositions of

different kinds. Therefore, he takes up Stalin's terminology of 'antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions' which he uses quite ideologically like many of his predecessors in the dialectical-materialist tradition. The problem is only in defining what constitutes such non-antagonistic contradictions. Are not all contradictions by mere definition antagonistic? On the contrary, when distinction is made between oppositions and contradictions, as suggested by Šešić and Stojković, any distinction between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions becomes superfluous.

Besides, modern sociology has used for a long time a more natural term - conflict, denoting one of the very basic social processes. It also needs to be said that one of the leading theorists of conflict - Georg Simmel, despite his formalism, was a dialectical thinker. Simmel simply does not use the favourite term of the radical thinkers - contradiction. Since no social science can hope to be non-ideological, we can only conclude that if Simmel, or for that matter for example Émile Durkheim, were ideological in a conservative sense, the Marxists are ideological in the sense of their unreserved commitment to social change, or in Mannheim's terminology, in a "utopian" sense.

Essence - Appearance Contradiction

In addition to the two types of contradictions discussed above (logical and objective), it is possible to add one more, also often employed by Marx, although he did not call this type 'contradiction'. This type pertains to the discrepancy between appearance and reality, and perhaps would be better called 'dialectical paradox'.¹⁰ The true nature of dialectic can best be judged precisely on this aspect which portrays dialectic as

essentially a philosophical method with both ontological and epistemological traits.

This type of dialectical contradiction is seldom discussed by the authors who wrote on contradictions. The only exception seems to be M. Godelier, who discusses the problem of essence and appearance in his article on contradictions in Marx's Capital (1972).

For the purpose of exposition and clarity we shall first follow K. Kosik in the following paragraph.

As a philosophical method, the dialectic deals with the "mere thing" which is not immediately given to man.¹¹ What is given as the reality are the so-called 'phenomenal forms' or 'the world of pseudo-concreteness'. In performing his practical activity ("the practical utilitarian relationship with things"), or action, a historical individual (actor) creates for himself his own representation of things (e.g. 'personal constructs'). These phenomenal forms, which are related to immediate utilitarian praxis, are reproduced in the heads of actors as the categories of common-sense. On the other hand, the argument goes on, there is "real existence" (essence), which is not immediately given, but only mediated by the phenomenon, and this real world manifests itself as something other than itself. Thus the essence is, generally speaking, hidden, while the phenomenon, manifests itself first and immediately. The old idea of Hegel that nature likes to hide, we see present here. Now, what happens is that in the world of 'pseudo-concreteness' this difference disappears and the phenomenal aspect of the thing comes to be considered as its own essence.¹²

And here we come to dialectic as a philosophical method. Since the essence of a thing is not directly felt, the dialectic as a critical thought aids in comprehending the reality adequately. This can be

accomplished through the destruction of 'pseudo-concreteness' (Marcuse's 'negative thinking'), through the destruction of the "fetishized creations", and of the ideal and reified world. Dialectic, however, does not deny the objective existence of phenomena, but destroys only their 'pretended independence'. It must be pointed out, however, that the destruction of pseudo-concreteness which dialectic, as a revolutionary method seeks to accomplish, is not equated with tearing away of a screen or "seeing through" in modern sociology. On the contrary, the negative dialectical thought in the process of destruction of pseudo-reality, creates reality.¹³

Generally speaking, we are here in the presence of a dialectical illusion or semblance. Seen in this perspective, man's world appears to him in a distorted light or sometimes even in an inverted image as in camera obscura. In other words, we are in the presence of reification, and dialectical thought is seen as a heuristic device to aid man in his effort to penetrate below the surface of semblance. In this respect all the rhetorics of contemporary sociology such as the emphasis on 'seeing through', 'unmasking tendency', 'transformation of consciousness', 'debunking' (Berger, 1963), or the fuss about 'latent functions' is in no sense innovation in comparison with Marx. Following Kosik, we have seen that the critical stand of dialectic by far surpasses modern positivistic sociology.

Basic to dialectical perspective, as the previous discussion shows, is the cognizance of the unity of opposites in the existing reality of man's world. And this unity of opposites applies to appearance and reality as well. In a Hegelian manner G. E. Mueller says, "The dialectical unity of appearance and reality pervades all realms of experience. It is. Reality (being) is both in what is real and in what is apparent. It is an unavoidable ontological unity of opposites" (Mueller, 1952, 103).

Marx reasoned that a truly scientific study "would be superfluous if the outward appearance of things coincided with their essence". He did not use the term reification (Verdinglichung), but rather 'objectification', and with reference to commodities the term 'fetishism', connoting a definite social relation between things and acquiring a phantom objectivity, or in the meaning of transformation of all products into commodities, i.e. into exchange values. What is reification for Marx was perhaps best explained by Lucien Goldmann.

What characterizes exchange value in a commodity-production-economy is that it transforms the relationship between the necessary labour for the production of some object (commodity) and the object itself into an objective quality of the object" (1962: 70).

In other words, the economic category of value appears in human consciousness as an objective quality of commodity.

Marx's writings, and in particular Capital abound with this type of dialectical thinking, pointing to the discrepancy between existence and reality. Only a certain number of instances are selected here for illustration. Money, for example, is seen not as a natural object (although it appears as such), but rather as the objectified form of the basic social relations. Capital is not viewed as a thing but as "a social relation between persons mediated through things". And again in Capital, "use-value becomes the form of manifestation, the phenomenal form of its opposite, value" (Marx, 1957: 25). In a different piece of work we read: " ... the value or price of labour-power takes on the appearance of the price of labour itself" (Marx, 1949: 105). Marx's critique of the ideological facade, which conceals the mechanisms by means of which the existing society maintains and reproduces itself, is still another example.

Generally speaking, "In capitalist society real things appear as what they are not" (Paci, 1969: 9). Thus, for example, in Marx's inter-

pretation capital "personalizes" itself and becomes the historical agent. It appears so, and this appearing becomes a reality. But ultimately there are always authentic agents (men) hidden by the continually changing play of the transformation of what appears and what is (Paci, 1969: 6).¹⁴

To sum up this excursion into Marx, we shall conclude with his succinct statement on reification and alienation of men under the system of commodity production. "To them their own social action takes the form of the action of objects which rule the producer instead of being ruled by them" (Marx, 1957: 46).

As M. Godelier put it, "For Marx, the scientific understanding of the capitalist system consists in the discovery of the internal structure hidden behind its visible functioning" (1972: 335-336). Marx's primary methodological rule was to destroy the obviousness of immediate appearances.

Marx's dialectical analysis goes directly to the core and the essence of the economic and political system he was analysing. His analysis shows that while on the surface, in the eyes of the common man the capitalist economic system is characterized by freedom and equality of exchange, in its essence, and therefore in its hidden structure it is based on inequality, compulsion and the lack of freedom. As a fraction of the value created by the use of the workers' labour-power, profit is unpaid labour. But in practice, says Godelier, in the eyes of capitalists and workers, "everything takes place as if the wages paid for all the labour provided by the worker" (ibid.).¹⁵ And in the Hegelian tradition

Professor Marcuse says,

Knowledge deals with appearances in order to get beyond them.... The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation" (Marcuse, 1964: 145-146).¹⁶

Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the dialectical method is to be found in this quality and desire to penetrate beyond the "merely immediate, outward and individual, as opposed to the mediate, inward and universal" (Hegel, 1892: 43). In Hegelian language, the dialectical reason seeks to go beyond the complex mediations of everyday life in order to grasp the hidden essence.

Dialectic devoid of the category of contradiction is a caricature and an empty rhetoric. The same is the case with the category of totality to be discussed in the following chapter. For that matter a simple two-way-interaction, interpenetration, and mutual influencing is not yet a dialectic, although recent sociological writings abound with this crippled conception of dialectic.

The purpose of the preceding discussion was first, self-clarification, and second, to show the complexity of the problem, namely, that dialectical contradiction is not simply an opposition. Therefore, the suggested typology endeavours to delimit the contradictions of thought from the objective contradictions, and again the latter, from the dialectical paradox or essence-appearance contradiction. The works of scholars such as Lukács and Kosik have made it sufficiently clear that contradictions and totality are indispensable categories of materialist dialectic and as such also inextricably connected.

FOOTNOTES (Chapter III)

1. Since contradictories are a special type of oppositeness, it is not incorrect to state that contradiction denotes the relationship between two propositions which have the same subject and the same predicate but differ in quantity or quality, which of course, holds good for oppositeness as well.
2. Similarly, and even more in line with the identification of contradiction with oppositeness, is a recent Soviet source: "It follows that whenever opposites come up against one another and enter into some relationship, this gives rise to contradictions between them, because opposite tendencies, trends, forces, run against one another. Hence, a contradiction can be defined as a relationship between two opposites, and the opposites appear as two sides of the contradiction" (Spirkin, 1971: 57).
3. Mao Tse-Tung's essay on contradictions was first published in 1937. In a much later article on "Contradictions among the People" (published in 1957) Mao Tse-Tung names as antagonistic contradictions, those between the people and the enemy, and as non-antagonistic, those among the working people. In the latter group are found the contradictions within the working class, within the peasantry, and within the intelligentsia, and again between these classes and their groupings. Also mentioned are the contradictions between the government and the people, and between the working class and the national bourgeoisie (Mao Tse-Tung, 1966: 80-82). Still another distinction introduced by Mao Tse-Tung in the same essay is the distinction between principal and secondary contradictions, described here in chapter II.
4. "This hypothesis was, in fact, invented by Hegel to show that there is an internal solution to the internal contradictions of a structure. If such a solution is possible, each of the elements contradicted within the structure must at the same time be its own opposite. The thesis must be itself and its opposite the antithesis if the synthesis is already contained in their contradiction. Marx's work radically excludes this possibility, for neither the elements in contradiction within a structure, nor the structures in contradiction within a system are reducible to one another, identical to one another" (Godelier, 1972: 357).
5. "Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, - under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, - why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another" (Lenin, 1961: 109).
6. Meaning, that to drive an abstract right to its extremity is to do a wrong.

7. This controversy is described by H. B. Acton "Dialectical Materialism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Macmillan Co., 1967, Vol. 2, p. 392.
8. In contemporary sociology, for example, Professor A. K. Davis analyses Canadian society in terms of its basic oppositions between Francophones and Anglophones; between metropolis and hinterland, and - transcending all - between owning over-class and working under-class.
9. The separation of ideology and politics from scholarship, in the case of Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung, is difficult to make, due to their double role as scholars and political leaders. A contemporary sociologist would more likely tend to think of the above views as examples of defensive ideology.
10. This term is suggested here in the meaning as defined by Webster's Dictionary: (1) a statement contrary to common belief, (2) a statement that seems contradictory, unbelievable, or absurd but that may actually be true in fact.
11. In the concluding paragraph of his book Dialectic of the Concrete (1967), Kosik gives the following explanation of the term 'mere thing'. "Dialectic is concerned with 'mere thing'. However, 'mere thing' is not an ordinary object, not even a thing in general. The 'mere thing' with which the philosophy is concerned, is man and his position in the Universe, in other words: the totality of the world being discovered by man in history, and the man who exists in the totality of the world" (Kosik, 1965: 251). Obviously 'mere thing' is not equated with the Kantian Ding an sich, and therefore to translate it as 'thing in itself' (Telos, No. 2, Fall, 1968) is wrong. "Mere" is used here in the meaning closest to" unmixed; pure; unqualified; absolute, described as obsolete in Webster.
12. In this dialectical conception, the essence is not a reality of a different order from that of phenomena, which also exist objectively and have their structure. The whole conception is well summarized by Kosik: "Yet the world that is presented to man in fetishized praxis, in transcending and manipulating, is not the real world, although it has the 'consistence' and the 'validity' of the real world. It is 'the world of appearance' (Marx). The representation of the thing that passes for the 'thing itself,' and that creates ideological appearances, does not constitute a natural quality of the thing and of reality, rather, it is the projection of the determinate historical conditions that have been petrified into the consciousness of the subject" (Kosik, 1968: 25).
13. As Kosik puts it, "Pseudo-concreteness is precisely the autonomous existence of man's products, and the reproduction of man at the level of utilitarian praxis. The destruction of pseudo-concreteness is a process that creates reality and its concreteness" (Kosik, 1968: 28).

14. Marx describes the basic phenomenon of reification in the following manner: "A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses" (Marx, 1957: 42-43).
15. Here Professor Godelier gives a very pertinent quote from Capital: "This phenomenal form, which makes the actual relation invisible, and, indeed, shows the direct opposite of that relation, forms the basis of all the juridical notions of both labourer and capitalist, of all the mystifications of the capitalistic mode of production" (Godelier, 1972: 336-7).
16. And to the frequently posed question by a puzzled sociologist, of how does one determine the essence empirically, it is possible to answer by recalling once again Marx's analysis of capitalism. Beyond the appearance of equal exchange and formal freedom lies the essence in the form of the existing inequality, economic compulsion and exploitation.

CHAPTER IV

DIALECTICAL TOTALITY

Totality as Dialectical Category

Almost any discussion of dialectic deals with totality in some way. That this category is an inherent part of dialectical perspective is a commonplace. Georg Lukács has stressed forcefully the category of totality as the most essential characteristic of the dialectical method. In this respect he was followed by Lucien Goldmann and M. Merleau-Ponty.

Both the category of totality, as well as the dialectical method originated in philosophy. Sociology as a relative newcomer to social science finds this category already present in the works of Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Marx. Engendered by the crisis of western society in the middle of the 19th century, sociology was already at its inception split into two opposing trends - that of sociological positivism (Comte) and that of Marxism. Sociology, which after Comte developed mainly in a positivistic tradition, operates within the holistic conception. Holism is also quite pronounced in social anthropology, and in its European counterpart - ethnology.

Most frequently the term "holism" is used in the sense that a group is more than the mere sum of its parts. In other words, social systems constitute "wholes" which are entities sui generis, not to be explained as mere regularities or tendencies resulting from the behaviour of interacting individuals.¹ This theoretical principle posits a person or a group as having its own totality or Gestalt that is distinct and unique, and which cannot be understood by studying the individual elements comprising the whole. In its second and related meaning, holism posits that in

order to understand a phenomenon it is necessary to understand it in its entirety, that is, one must know the whole. In this sense it is often employed by philosophers, and could be said to be close to the dialectical category of totality.

Although similar to some degree in their outward appearance, holism and the dialectical conception of totality are not the same. Unfortunately, too often social scientists posit the identity of the two, failing to perceive and to understand the qualitative difference between one and the other, owing to the fact that the two theoretical principles overlap to some degree.

It will be the task of this chapter to explain dialectical totality and to show that this category and sociological holism are not one and the same.²

The Problem of Totality and Holism

Directly bearing on this problem are the views of C. Lévi-Strauss and of T. B. Bottomore. In The Savage Mind Lévi-Strauss says, "It is possible that the requirement of 'totalization' is a great novelty to some historians, sociologists and psychologists. It has been taken for granted by anthropologists ever since they learned it from Malinowski" (1969: 250). And T. B. Bottomore has added to this, "One might add that sociologists have used the category of 'totality' since the inception of their discipline in the works of Saint-Simon, Comte and others" (1971: 63).

The above views posit the identity of the dialectical category of totality and the holistic conception in sociology and anthropology. The real question remains whether Lévi-Strauss and Bottomore are right on this particular issue. In other words, the question is whether dialectical totality and the totality posited by holism are the same; and if they are not, what is the difference?

There is little doubt that the idea of totality in some form is present in contemporary sociology and anthropology. Instances, for example, can be found in the concept of 'logico-meaningful integration of culture' (Sorokin), in the functionalism of B. Malinowski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, and in the sociology of G. Gurvitch, or simply as "holism" in the anthropology of R. Redfield, R. Firth, J. Steward, and in the ethnology of Lévi-Strauss. A few examples will suffice.

Anyone familiar with Redfield's methodological essays The Little Community will know that his perspective is distinctly holistic. His first chapter deals significantly with the little community as a whole, and the last one in this collection is entitled "Whole and Parts".

The views of Raymond Firth and of Julian Steward deserve to be mentioned as particularly instructive. Firth, for instance, has this to say: "The . . . characteristic feature of the social anthropologist's enquiry is that it is holistic in its implication. Any particular item selected for examination is always considered with some regard to its place in the total phenomena in the life of the human group concerned." To this, Redfield has added a sentence from Professor J. Steward on the distinctive methodological aspect of the study of communities: "... it is ethnographic; the culture of a tribe, band or village is studied in its totality, all forms of behaviour being seen as functionally interdependent parts in the context of the whole" (Redfield, 1963: 156).

One should, however, allow for the possibility that some of the above-mentioned scholars were influenced by the dialectical viewpoint. For Gurvitch and Lévi-Strauss there is no doubt about it. In the case of Redfield, it is very likely that he was indirectly influenced by Simmel's dialectic.³ Georges Gurvitch, although not a Marxist, was a

dialectical thinker, and the conception of totality is central in his sociology. In his conception, the subject matter of sociology is 'total social phenomena' which are studied in their wholeness and their movement, and classified into dialectically expressed microsocial groups and social types, all of which are ceaselessly in the process of structuration and destructuration (Gurvitch, 1966: 36). Sartre's notion of 'totalization' is undoubtedly related to these ideas of Georges Gurvitch.

Besides the apparent similarity between dialectical totality and sociological holism, what further obfuscates their differences are some statements of dialectical thinkers themselves, especially when quoted out of context. Karel Kosik, for example, describes the dialectical viewpoint of the 'concrete totality' as meaning primarily that every phenomenon can be understood as the moment of the whole (Kosik, 1969: 37). Similarly, Lucien Goldmann states that in the perspective of totality the parts cannot be understood by themselves, outside of their relation in the whole (Goldmann, 1962: 385). In this respect one could think that Kosik and Goldmann are not far from the holism of Malinowski's functional school. However, following Lukács, Goldmann states significantly: "The idea of totality is in fact the center and the foundation of every dialectical thought"(ibid., 384-5). Kosik also emphatically denies the identity of concrete totality with the holistic point of view, which he says, 'hypostatizes the whole before the parts'.

Too often the dialecticians reiterate that social phenomena or facts must be analyzed and studied in their totality. Seldom, however, do they specify what they mean by totality. The natural conclusion is of the identity of holism and dialectical totality, as we have seen in

the views of C. Lévi-Strauss and T. B. Bottomore. To these could be added Pierre van den Berghe and Andre Gunder Frank (Van den Berghe, 1963: 695-705; Frank, 1973: 62-73).⁴

The Notion of Totality in Historical Perspective

It is in the philosophical monism of Spinoza that the category of totality is for the first time anticipated in modern thought. In his system of philosophy, mind and body are two processes both forming, in reality, inextricable unity. Spinoza equates the Aristotelian 'substance', as that which is capable of independent existence, with nature, and labels it 'God'. Thus, in Spinoza's attempt at a comprehensive conception of the world, the category of totality is an integral component of his thought. While K. Kosik points to this anticipation, it is L. Goldmann who in his study on Kant emphasizes that Kant seems to be the first modern thinker to recognize the importance of totality as the fundamental category of existence. In Goldmann's opinion the neo-Kantians failed to grasp, and in fact neglected, Kant's ideas of totality (Goldmann, 1971a:36, 53, 58).

With the category of the whole, the universe, Kant has, in Goldmann's words, opened the way for the later development which leads from Fichte, Hegel, and Marx, through Lask, Sartre, Heidegger, Lukács to contemporary Marxism (ibid., 47). From the 'precritical period' onwards, totality occupied the most important place in the works of the philosopher, concludes Goldmann. He also links this finding to the close relation between the concepts of space, time and God in the early works of Kant, all three of which are expressions of the category of totality (ibid., 66-67). Being influenced primarily by Platonic tradition, Kant did not admit totality to be subject to development, and thus he never became a dialectical thinker (ibid., 72).

That the category of totality stands at the centre of Hegel's dialectical method is little doubted nowadays. As a fundamental concept of Hegel's philosophy and an essential characteristic of Idea, totality expresses the completeness of the Universe where nothing is omitted and every part is incorporated into the systematic wholeness of Being. Das Ganze ist das Wahre (The truth is the whole), says Hegel (1949: 81).

Above all, it is important to note that Hegel's totality is dynamically conceived. This whole is a self-realizing essence only through its process of development. For Hegel, only a whole is real truth. However, this whole is not conceived as a finished result, but as a whole in the movement of becoming. "Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result", says the philosopher in his Phenomenology of Mind (ibid., 81-82).

We can see that Hegel did not avoid the idea of changing totality as did Kant. Goldmann has also succinctly summarized the principal characteristics of the Hegelian totality as "concrete, contentfull, changing, developing by contradictions" (op. cit., 71). Here, 'concrete and content-full' are contrasted with formal logic, and 'developing by contradictions' denotes the Hegelian triadic schema: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

For Hegel the end of philosophy is to understand what is and this not partially, but in its totality. Thus, the object of philosophy is the Whole, the Absolute, or God in its oneness. This Absolute in its aspect of self-dispersion is the world of nature, so that nature, the World, is understood as a single unified whole. Hegel was also the first thinker to discover the dialectics of the real, or the real dialectic of

Being. He considered his part was to describe this real dialectic in its totality, or to put it differently, the totality of the real in its becoming (Kojève, 1969: 169-190). Following Kojève's interpretation of Hegel, we could say that totality is the revealed Being, or self-conscious Being which Hegel calls 'absolute concept', 'Idea', or 'Spirit'. This concrete (revealed) real Being is neither pure Identity (Being) nor pure Negativity (Nothingness) but Totality (Becoming). "Totality is, therefore, the third fundamental and universal onto-logical category", concludes Kojève (ibid., 20).

If Kojève's interpretation of Hegel's dialectic as a description of the real dialectic of Being (still an absolutized abstractum), is sustained, Marx's historical dialectic was a dialectic of the concrete reality. His totality is always a concrete whole in becoming. "The production relations of every society form a whole", says Marx (1963: 110). In his critique of the method of political economy, describing his method of abstraction, we find the following characteristic wording:

The totality as a conceptual entity seen by the intellect is a product of the thinking intellect which assimilates the world in the only way open to it, a way which differs from the artistic, religious and practically intelligent assimilation of this world (Marx, 1970a: 207).⁵

Contrasting his conception of totality with that of Hegel's ("... conceived the illusory idea that the real world is the result of thinking which causes its own synthesis"), in the same paragraph, Marx talks of 'concrete totality regarded as a conceptual totality, as a mental fact', and says that it is indeed a product of thinking, of comprehension, but only as the result of 'assimilation and transformation of perceptions and images into concepts (ibid).

A less abstract and perhaps more instructive paragraph from the same source could be quoted for the sake of brevity only in part.

The conclusion which follows from this is, not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that they are links of a single whole, different aspects of one unit. ...A distinct mode of production thus determines the specific mode of consumption, distribution, exchange and the specific relations of these different phases to one another. ... There is an interaction between the various aspects. Such interaction takes place in any organic entity (ibid., 204-205).⁶

This passage significantly stresses mutual interrelations between the elements of the economic system viewed as a totality. Today these relations are again emphasized as the organization of elements in a system, and discussed in the contemporary system theory. Of interest here also is a recent interpretation of Marx in terms of 'the philosophy of internal relations' by B. Ollman, who offers a fresh insight into Marx's dialectic. The emphasis here is on the indisputable fact that Marx, in studying capitalist society, operated with social relations and that his language reflected the real social ties which he uncovered. The peculiarity of Ollman's interpretation is in his claim that Marx conceived of things as relations, and that the basic scaffolding of Marxism is best constructed as 'relations'. In brief, Ollman is of the opinion that the language of dialectic describes only in a different way what can be presented in terms of relations.

All I have described in terms of relations can also be presented in the language of the dialectic; for above all else Marx's dialectic is a way of viewing things as moments in their own development in, with, and through other things" (Ollman, 1971: 52).

The best known, and probably the leading interpretation of Marx's concept of totality was given by Georg Lukács in his History and Class Consciousness. The whole of Marxist historical dialectic is in fact

interpreted here in terms of the category of totality, which is at the same time regarded as the fundamental category of reality.

This dialectical conception of totality, says Lukács, is the only method capable of understanding and reproducing reality. "Concrete totality is, therefore, the category that governs reality" (Lukács, 1971a: 10). It is precisely this perspective of totality that, according to Lukács, constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought " ... the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts is the essence of the method which Marx took over from Hegel" (ibid., 27). Viewed from a contemporary perspective, young Lukács has obviously overstated the continuity between Hegel's and Marx's methodology, and in particular in terms of the 'epistemological break' emphasized nowadays by L. Althusser.

The category of totality, however, determines not only the object of knowledge but also the subject. Bourgeois thought judges social phenomena consciously or unconsciously, naively or subtly, consistently from the standpoint of the individual. No path leads from the individual to the totality; there is at best a road leading to aspects of particular areas, mere fragments for the most part, 'facts' bare of any context, or to abstract, special laws. The totality of an object can only be posited if the positing subject is itself totality; and if the subject wishes to understand itself, it must conceive of the object as a totality. In modern society only the classes can represent this total point of view (Lukács, 1971a: 28).

Lukács makes it particularly clear here that Marx's method is "... to consider the problems of the whole of capitalist society as problems of the classes constituting it, the classes being regarded as totalities" (ibid., 29).

Interpreting Lukács dialectic, I. Mészáros points out that Lukács' "concrete totality", as the 'true category of reality' is concretized as 'socio-historical process', and in Lukács' Ontology defined as a 'complex of complexes' (Mészáros, 1972: 62).⁷

This discussion could not be considered complete if the views of two contemporary scholars - those of Louis Althusser and of Karel Kosik- were omitted. Their conceptions could also be considered as complementary, and they definitely draw on the foundations set by Lukács.

Althusser is of the opinion that Marx had an epistemological break with Hegel, and that consequently the Hegelian and Marxist totality are different. "The Hegelian totality is the essence behind the multitude of its phenomena, but the Marxist totality is the decentered structure in dominance", says Althusser (1969: 256). Or again, and this time a more elaborate explanation:

We know that the Marxist whole cannot be confused with the Hegelian whole: it is a whole whose unity, far from being expressive or 'spiritual' unity of Leibnitz's or Hegel's whole, is constituted by a certain type of complexity, the unity of a structured whole containing what can be called levels or instances which are distinct and 'relatively autonomous', and co-exist within this complex structural unity, articulated with one another according to specific determinations, fixed in the last instance by the level or instance of economy.

(Althusser, 1970: 97)

Although expressing himself in a complex structuralist manner, Althusser nevertheless succeeds in delineating the two conceptions. Lukács' influence is also noticeable here. The Marxist category of totality is explained by means of what Althusser calls 'the structure of dominance', and this notion is in turn related to 'the law of uneven development'. (the latter conception being derived from Lenin). Each whole is a complex totality containing contradictions as a result of uneven development. In such a totality (which is a complex whole), containing many contradictions, one contradiction dominates others. "Domination is not just an indifferent fact, it is a fact essential to the complexity itself. That is why complexity implies domination as one of its essentials: it is inscribed in its structure.", says Althusser (1969: 201).⁸

Another author, Karel Kosik stresses also the close relationship of the dialectical conception of totality to dialectical contradictions, pointing to the possible dangers involved in their separation. Kosik thus talks of contradictions in totality and of the totality of the contradictions (Kosik, 1969: 37). In addition to his insistence on the important difference between the dialectical category of totality and holism, Kosik emphasizes a significant moment which he calls 'genetico-dynamic character of totality'. Totality is here viewed as a complex and dynamic process the determination of which presuppose the genesis and development of this totality. This author supports his conclusions by the concrete example of Marx's reasoning from Grundrisse (ibid., 50). Kosik describes concrete totality as the dialectical-materialist position in cognition of reality the moments of which are destruction of pseudo-concreteness, cognition of the historical character of phenomena, and discovery of the objective content and meaning of the phenomenon, as well as of its function and historical place within the social whole (ibid., 52).⁹

Among the dialectical thinkers of prominence who also stress the importance of the category of totality are L. Goldmann, G. Gurvitch and J. P. Sartre.

Lucien Goldmann, the French sociologist of literature, stands directly in Lukács' tradition. The idea of totality is for him the centre and the basis of dialectical thought. In his efforts to explain cultural phenomena, he reasons that every historical phenomenon in the sphere of culture and ideology must be understood in relation to a definite historical totality. Following again Marx and Lukács, Goldmann sees the historical classes as such basic totalities and he says:

Every time it was a question of finding the infrastructure of a philosophy, a literary or artistic current, ultimately we have been forced to consider, not a generation, nation or church, not a profession or any other social grouping, but a social class and its relations to society.

(Goldmann, 1969: 102)

Goldmann's views are here in fact close to his contemporary, the French sociologist G. Gurvitch, in whose system of sociology, classes figure as typical total social phenomena.

What Gurvitch and Sartre have in common is the view that dialectic has both ontological and epistemological aspects. In other words, it refers both to the "connection between objective events and to the method of knowing" (Barnes, 1968: xi). Second, both writers have also emphasized the totalizing aspect of the dialectical viewpoint, and both consider the dialectic as pertinent only to social reality.¹⁰ The total social phenomenon occupies a central place in Gurvitch's sociology. It is derived from M. Mauss, and finds its place in Gurvitch's definition of sociology, as it was shown earlier. To Gurvitch, the domain of sociology is social reality which is comprised of total social phenomena, and the dialectic is the modus operandi for grasping these total social phenomena in their totality (Bosserman, 1968: 102).

Totality versus Holism

Since the category of totality is a part of the wider problem of relationship of part and whole, it is in order to mention first the major conceptions of whole and totality. Both Goldmann and Kosik seem to be quite close when they delineate the three basic conceptions. Basically we shall follow their classifications.

1. Atomistic-rationalistic conception (Descartes to Wittgenstein) conceives of the whole as the totality of the simplest elements or facts (Kosik). In this conception 'society', for example, means at most the interaction of autonomous individuals. This is also known in science as methodological individualism or nominalism. In sociology its typical representatives are H. Spencer, M. Weber, V. Pareto, and Weber's followers in the USA, and in philosophy Descartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, and the neo-Kantians.
2. Organicistic or holistic conception, which formalizes the whole and expresses the predominance of the whole over the parts (Schelling, Spann, Bergson, Scheler, Heidegger). Here the parts exist only as a necessary means to the existence of the whole.
3. Dialectical conception, where the reality is understood as a structural and self-developing whole (Heraclitus, Hegel, Marx), and Goldmann adds here Kant and Lukács (Goldmann, 1971a:53).

It was again Hegel who put forward a dialectical solution to the problem of relationship of the whole and the parts by emphasizing the mutual interdependence and conditioning of these two categories, neither of them having priority and being in fact correlatives. In this perspective, totality can be thought of only in relation to parts, but it is at the same time irreducible to the mere sum of parts. Delineating this world-view, for which "the universe and the human community form a whole", Goldmann borrows Kant's phrase 'whose parts presuppose for their possibility their union in the whole', where the autonomy of the parts and the reality of the whole are not only reconciled but constitute reciprocal conditions" (ibid., 53). Marx was clearly in this tradition.

It was explained earlier how both Kosik and Althusser argue most decidedly that the dialectical conception of totality is closely related to dialectical contradiction. For this they deserve credit. However, it was also shown that the real originality and priority in this emphasis belongs to Lukács.

In his book The Dialectic of the Concrete, published for the first time in Prague in 1965, Kosik points significantly to the constant risk of interpreting the category of totality unilaterally, lest it be completely transformed into its opposite. In other words, it might cease to be a dialectical concept. Kosik singles out two instances of such a reduction of the concept of totality to a methodological postulate. The two trivial consequences of such tendency are " ... that everything is connected with everything else and that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" (Kosik, 1969: 36). This is, as the previous analysis has shown, typical holism and not a very sophisticated one.

On one more significant point we need to follow Kosik's reasoning. According to this author the materialist dialectic operates more precisely with the concept of 'concrete totality'. This expression is basically meant to be an answer of the materialist philosophy to the question: "What is reality?" So the answer is: - It is a concrete totality, that is, "a structured, self-creating, developing whole" (ibid., 37).

Opposite to this conception is the position shared by positivists. To them, the concrete structure of social reality cannot be grasped because the reality is understood to be an infinite collection of facts. Now, the previously quoted statement by Kosik, that totality does not mean all the facts, but a reality as a structured dialectical whole - becomes

more meaningful. Kosik was in fact contrasting two different conceptions of reality: the dialectical conception of totality with holism. His conclusion is that the viewpoint of the concrete totality has nothing in common with the holistic organicist totality, "which hypostatizes the whole before the parts and makes the whole into a myth" (ibid., 49). Durkheim's sociology, with its priority of the group over the parts (the society as an entity sui generis) could also be regarded as the most sophisticated form of holism known in sociology.¹¹

Quite on the opposite side is, of course, the methodological individualism (in the above outlined division called 'atomistic'), advanced first by J. W. N. Watkins, and in sociology advocated most vehemently by V. Pareto and M. Weber, and in philosophy by K. Popper and F. A. Hayek.¹²

Abstraction and Social Reality

Generally speaking, the dialectical category of totality, as a conceptual totality, is a mental construct, an abstraction, but a reasonable one, which has its basis in reality, and is therefore a necessary tool for comprehending social reality. To comprehend phenomena dialectically, in their totality, means to pay attention in the first place to all the relevant relations and their variables. It means to see the parts and the whole historically, that is, as transitory and subject to everlasting change. This historical dimension is absolutely essential, for any dialectical conception is always inherently historical.¹³ Besides, a distinctive trait of dialectical totality is that, in its wholeness, it incorporates contradictions or opposites, as was shown first by Lukács, and subsequently also by Kosik and Althusser, both of whom followed Lukács in this respect.

Compared to sociological holism, a dialectical conception of totality could also be considered as holistic, but it is at the same time more than that. In contradistinction to sociological holism, the dialectical conception of totality is the more complex and inclusive point of view. As such, it incorporates the wholeness of the social system's mutual interrelationships of parts, and of parts to the whole. All the relevant variables are here considered both structurally and processually, that is, historically and in constant process of dialectical transformations.

This temporal dimension requires one to view each social factor as internally related to its own past and future forms. And Marx's dialectic does precisely this.

Besides a way of seeing things, Marx's dialectic is also his approach to the study of problems which concentrates on looking for relationships, not only between different entities but between the same one in times past, present and future, says Ollman (1971: 52).

In Einstein's cosmogony there is no place for terms such as 'this', 'here', and 'now': likewise the dialectical totality requires a temporal perspective based on continuous transformation of potentiality to reality. Thus, the dialectical totum or whole is never finished, never ultimately knowable in its entirety - it is never completed.¹⁴ For this reason, T. Adorno challenges Hegel's position by stating that it is precisely the whole which is untrue (Das Ganze ist das Unwahre).

As Ernest Bloch puts it, " ... the matter of the Totality has not yet come out". Historical development for Bloch is first teleological and secondly dialectical. Thus, if "the future point; the kingdom of freedom", is once reached, only then does the "matter of Totality" appear. The dialectic ceases by fulfilling its role (Buhr, 1970: 267).

A legitimate question could be raised with respect to examples of totalities in social reality. Social classes have already been mentioned as instances of concrete totalities in the political sociology of Karl Marx and the dialectical sociology of Georges Gurvitch. Marcel Mauss, who defined the subject-matter of sociology as the study of total social phenomena provided an instructive example in his study of 'potlatch' as at once a juridical, economic, religious, and aesthetic phenomenon. While Mauss identified total social phenomena with global societies, Gurvitch seemed to have thought that even micro-sociological elements could constitute such totalities.

On one point, however, there is little doubt. The domain of sociology, broadly stated, is social reality, and this social reality is conceived in the dialectical perspective as a concrete totality. Thus, all basic Marxian abstractions are framed within certain socio-historical totalities - for example, capitalism and such other different economic systems as the feudal, ancient and Asiatic modes of production.

Of interest here is the point made by Professor V. Milić, that individual man is also a totality at least in potentiality, because he is a being of diversified needs and abilities. Even that very basic idea of Marx - alienation, as a social phenomenon, occurs precisely in the relationship between the two basic totalities, - individual and society, says Milić (1965: 58). To this it could be added that Marx indeed defines man as the totality of social relations (sixth thesis on Feuerbach), and in the 1844 Manuscripts he says:

Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual . . . is just as much the totality - the ideal totality - the subjective existence of thought and experienced society present for itself

(Marx, 1972: 72).

Once the category of totality is understood in terms of the transformation of potentiality into reality - as unfinished potentiality with the teleological 'future point' (Bloch) in view, then Marx's concept of man (which is at the centre of his theory of alienation), can also be more properly grasped through the concept of dialectical totality.

A further example of the category of totality is illustrated by the concept of "socio-economic formation" in Marxist social science. This concept, already present in Marx's works as a 'mode of production', or 'social formation', was later more precisely formulated by Lenin. The term 'socio-economic formation' covers all human relations in a specific society, or in a group of societies which are based on the same type of relations of production. Thus socio-economic formation would be exemplified by feudalism, capitalism, socialism. No doubt, such a construct is an example of the application of the conception of totality in the social science.¹⁵

The relation of the whole and the parts is central to the category of totality. These two aspects (the elements and the whole) are to be found in the relationship of mutual mediation. Thus the structure of the whole is reflected in the structure of the elements and the parts can be meaningfully understood only within the context of the whole. Lukács was not the only one to emphasize that something becomes a fact in the sense proper, only when encompassed and interpreted by some theory. In other words, the part or element contains truth only by mediation of the whole, or as Lukács put it, the structure of every element is determined by the structure of the whole.

As Kosik makes it clear, the whole is not immediately knowable to man, although it is accessible to the senses as a chaotic and obscure

whole. Therefore, the path of knowing, from this 'chaotic representation of the whole' (Marx's phrase), to concrete totality, needs a detour via abstraction. "Concrete becomes comprehensible through the mediation of the abstract, the whole through the mediation of parts" (Kosik, 1968:35).

It is widely known that the very basis of Marx's thought was the so-called method of abstraction. It is the method of ascension from the abstract to the concrete, nowadays emphasized by many of Marx's commentators, and concisely explained by Marx himself in his work called A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, published in 1859. To start in economics with "population" seems to be correct, says Marx, but on close examination this proves false. Very soon one realizes that this category (population) is only an abstraction, if we leave out the classes of which it is composed. And these classes are again an empty phrase if one is not familiar with the elements on which they rest, e.g. wage labour, capital, etc., which in turn presuppose exchange, prices, division of labour, etc. "Thus, if I were to begin with the population this would be a chaotic conception of the whole," says Marx. From there the thought moves analytically towards ever more simple concepts until it arrives at the simplest determinations or definitions. Now, from here the journey would have to be retraced until one finally arrives at "population" again ... but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations" (Marx, 1973: 100).

The most pertinent comment here is Kosik's conclusion:

Therefore, the progress, from abstraction to concreteness is generally a movement from the part to the whole and from the whole to the part, from the phenomenon to the essence and from the essence to the phenomenon, from the totality to contradiction, and from the contradiction to the totality, from the object to the subject and from the subject to the object. The process from the abstract to the concrete as the materialistic method of knowledge of reality is the dialectic of the concrete totality in which reality is reflectively reproduced in all of its levels and dimensions (Kosik, 1968: 36).

The preceding discussion leads to an obvious conclusion, namely, that in its complexity and thoroughness, the dialectical totality surpasses the sociological holism, the explanatory power of which is limited and often insufficient to provide a deeper insight. That is to say that, the dialectical totality offers a solution to the controversy between the extreme positions of holism and nominalism. As such the dialectical totality differs sharply from holism in that it is conceived as, a) a concrete totality and not an abstract totum), b) as a "negative totality" which "evolves only by virtue of its contradictory forces" (Marcuse, 1964: 158-9), and incorporates and is based on internal contradictions, and c) the dialectical totum is not a static or fixed whole. On the contrary, it is an antagonistic and objective totality, in the sense that "every particular moment contains, as its very content, the whole, and must be interpreted as the whole" (Marcuse, *ibid.*). This means, also, that it is the whole which determines the truth precisely in the sense that "its structure and function determine every particular condition and relation" (Marcuse, 1965: 83).

Part One of this work endeavours to describe some of the most prominent conceptions of dialectic, as well as to delineate the major categories of this perspective, conceived quite broadly as contradiction and totality. The totality category is, therefore, deliberately conceived as inclusive of dialectical interconnectedness, or dialectical reciprocity, and also as historical totality subject to continuous change, the temporal dimension of every social phenomenon, as well as the contradictions inherent in totality.

In the same way, the dialectical contradiction is interpreted as including the dialectical transformation into the opposite, (the so-called

"dialectical negation"), the dialectical complementarity, the dialectical unity of content and form, continuity within discontinuity, and the unity of theory and practice.

Many of these elements, incorporated here into the two major categories of dialectic, will appear in the second part, in the discussion of dialectic and sociology, as independent elements, approximating what was up to now treated only as an ideal type of dialectic.

FOOTNOTES (Chapter IV)

1. Holism can be best explained if it is contrasted with its opposite, i.e. with methodological individualism. Briefly stated, nominalism or methodological individualism in social science holds to the view that all social phenomena must be regarded as the sum of the acts of individuals, and that society is an aggregate of interacting individuals. Consequently, in this perspective, social wholes are only theoretical constructs which have no substantial reality.
2. Under "category" are generally understood basic logical concepts reflecting the most general and essential properties, aspects and relations of things and phenomena in reality.
3. Redfield was a member of the Chicago School of Sociology, and the influence of Simmel on the members of this school was considerable.
4. A. G. Frank partially agrees with P. Van den Berghe that both functionalism and dialectic are Holistic, although at the same time pointing to three major differences between these two types of 'holism'. Van den Berghe, on the other hand, states flatly that both approaches are holistic.
5. The quote is taken from a recent edition of Marx's "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" edited by Maurice Dobb and translated from German by S. W. Ryazanskaya, New York, International Publishers, 1970. M. Nicolaus in his recent translation (1973) uses the expression "appropriation of the world" instead of "assimilation of the world."
6. M. Nicolaus in his translation uses instead of 'links of a single whole' the expression 'the members of a totality'. Also instead of 'phases' and 'aspects' he uses the word 'moments'.
7. Mészáros also provides an example of a more complex definition of totality from a Lukács' paper of 1947. "The materialist-dialectical conception of totality means first of all the concrete unity of interacting contradictions ...; secondly, the systematic relativity of all totality both upwards and downwards (which means that all totality is made of totalities subordinated to it, and also that the totality in question is, at the same time, overdetermined by totalities of a higher complexity) and thirdly, the historical relativity of all totality, namely that the totality-character of all totality is changing, disintegrating, confined to a determinate, concrete historical period" (Mészáros, 1972: 63-64).

Lukács' grasp of the dialectical category of mediation is of great importance in the understanding of dialectical totality. In this view, concrete totality consists of concrete mediations which transcend " ... 'immediately given' in the ultimate unity of a dynamically changing dialectical totality" (Mészáros, 1972: 64).

Similarly, to the members of the Frankfurt School, the concept of totality implies a "heterogeneous constellation of mediated relationships, ultimately irreducible to any one of its components" (Jay, 1974: 41).

Quite opposite to Lukács' dynamic, and therefore dialectical, conception of totality, is the image of an unmediated, segmented, frozen, and therefore non-dialectical, conception of totality. Lukács' encounter with Marxism also provided a solution to "the problem of immediacy-mediation-totality" (Mészáros, 1972: 70). Lukács has thus found as the crucial intermediary link of all human phenomena in man's "practico-critical-activity", with its ultimate reference in the sphere of economics (ibid.). In this respect Lukács differs from some members of the Frankfurt School (such as Habermas), whose epistemological pluralism refuses to reduce the social whole to the economic substructure, (See Martin Jay, "Some Recent Developments in Critical Theory" Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. XVIII, (1973-74), p. 41).

8. To this difference between Hegel and Marx with respect to the category of totality, Professor Marcuse gives a somewhat different emphasis. "For Hegel, the totality was the totality of reason, a closed ontological system", to Marx ("who detached dialectic from this ontological base"), the totality is the totality of class society. In his work the 'negativity of reality becomes historical condition and dialectic becomes historical method" (Marcuse, 1964: 313-315).
9. Kosik's conception will be further discussed with reference to his views on holism.
10. This viewpoint was shared by M. Merleau-Ponty, who also considered the concept of totality a fundamental category of Marxism. In the whole controversy over the presence of dialectical processes in nature, the most relevant seems to be Professor Marcuse's comment: "The dialectical totality again includes nature, but only in so far as the latter enters and conditions the historical process of social reproduction." (1964:314).
11. The Frenchman, Raymond Aron, undoubtedly an authority on Durkheim, describes some of Durkheim's central ideas in the following words: "From this sort of analysis Durkheim derived an idea which he maintained all his life, an idea which is, as it were, at the center of his whole sociology, namely, that the individual is born of society, and not society of individuals" (Aron, Vol. II, 1967: 15-16). In the same place Aron has this to say: "We have here, I think, the outline of what is to be one of Durkheim's central ideas throughout his career - the idea with which he defines sociology - namely, the priority of the whole over the parts, or again, the irreducibility of the social entity to the sum of its elements, the explanation of the elements by the entity and not of the entity by the elements" (ibid.).

12. A discussion of the controversy over the methodological individualism and holism would go beyond the limits of this chapter and work.
13. Criticizing the vulgar materialists, Lukács expressed the same idea much better: "The crudeness and conceptual nullity of such thought lies primarily in the fact that it obscures the historical, transitory nature of capitalist society. Its determinants take on the appearance of timeless, eternal categories valid for all social formations. This could be seen at its crassest in the vulgar bourgeois economists, but the vulgar Marxists soon followed in their footsteps. The dialectical method was overthrown and with it the methodological supremacy of the totality over the individual aspects; the parts were prevented from finding their definition within the whole and, instead, the whole was dismissed as unscientific or else it degenerated into the mere 'idea' or 'sum' of the parts. With the totality out of the way, the fetishistic relations of the isolated parts appeared as a timeless law valid for every human society" (Lukács, 1971a: 9).
14. This is, of course, not the case with the common sense conception of totality, where the whole is conceptualized as a sum of separate parts after the model of closed circle. (See for details in Ollman, 1971: 253).
15. The complexity involved in Marxian concept of totality can well be illustrated by Mészáros' summary of the multifarious nature of Marx's analysis of capitalism. (See István Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, London, Merlin Press, 1970, pp. 99-100).

PART TWO

DIALECTIC AND SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER V

EUROPEAN BACKGROUND: FORMAL-HEURISTIC DIALECTIC

The dialectic and the science of society are inseparable. The same, however, cannot be said for sociology, which in its quest for a scientific definition has too often abandoned the dialectic as "metaphysical". Exceptions, of course, do exist because this separation proves impossible. Thus isolated elements of dialectic can be found in the conceptions of numerous western scholars. In fact, many of the precepts of scientific thought, which Engels considered to be the traits of the dialectic, have in the meantime been incorporated into the methodological and epistemological foundations of the social sciences, although they are not called dialectical.

No known sociologist could be considered a complete dialectician of the calibre of Hegel and Marx, for the quite understandable reason that Hegel and Marx were philosophers, while sociology developed at the turn of the century and was modelled after science primarily as an empirical discipline.

Hegel generated his dialectical perspective as the most complete philosophical method, suited to the purpose of his idealistic philosophical system. He also thought he had discovered the dialectic of the real world.

To Marx, the dialectic was essentially his own historical method in analysing the concrete social reality with both epistemological and ontological characteristics.

Nevertheless, the conceptions of certain western sociologists and social scientists abound with elements of dialectical perspective. One reason for this lies in the fact that the early origin of sociology can be traced to the philosophy of history, of such thinkers as Ibn Khaldūn, Vico, Saint-Simon, and Hegel.

For quite understandable reasons the following analysis must be selective. Not all sociologists, in whose thought the dialectic is present in one form or another, can be included. Even less is it possible to take other social scientists such as ethnologists, political scientists, economists or philosophers into consideration. Instead of selecting a smaller number of representative scholars, in whose works the dialectical perspective is most pronounced, it is more feasible to take a group of certain western social scientists, whose works show sufficient evidence of dialectic, and to deal with their treatment of a few major themes.

Dialectic is by no means a distinctly European pattern of thought. However, the fact remains that any dialectization of sociological thought in America can be traced to its European origin. In other words, the major themes or topics to be dealt with here usually carry, directly or indirectly, some European connection.

The American sociological tradition has generated two major schools in sociology. The more recent is structural-functionalism, now definitely in eclipse. Another, and older, was the Chicago school, which acquired a prominent place in the history of sociology. The members of this school had definite connections with the golden age of European sociology. Some of them studied in Europe (A. Small, R. E. Park, G. H. Mead). Others lectured as visiting professors (R. Redfield), or were otherwise influenced by the formal sociology of G. Simmel (L. Wirth, E. A. Ross).

Georg Simmel - the German philosopher of Neo-Kantian orientation - was by far the greatest dialectician among the founders of European sociology. Karl Marx was another, but he was not a sociologist by profession anyway. It is one of the theses of this work that the Simmel-Chicago School liaison has brought the elements of dialectical conception to American sociology.

With the exception of Marx, whose ideas have already been discussed, the European founding fathers of sociology (Comte, Spencer), were not dialectical thinkers. Not many elements of real dialectical thought can be found in two of the giants of French and German sociology - Durkheim and Weber.¹ For these reasons our next theme (the one we begin with), will be centered on the presence of dialectic in European sociology of Georg Simmel and Georges Gurvitch. Additional reasons are that, despite an extensive number of publications on Simmel in English, his dialectical ideas have not been sufficiently emphasized (sometimes they have even been de-emphasized); while Gurvitch's works have been translated only in part. Gurvitch has been in fact largely ignored in the USA and in the English-speaking part of Canada.

Another major theme to engage our attention will examine the historical sociology of Pitirim A. Sorokin and Barrington Moore Jr., which stand apart from the empirically oriented sociology of 20th century America. The sociological history of British historian Edward H. Carr will complete this picture of dialectical approaches in social science.

Certain scholars widely known as dialecticians of Marxian orientation, such as Sartre and Marcuse, will not be included in this analysis for the obvious reason that there is no point in emphasizing the obviously dialectical quality of their thought. An additional reason is our primary

emphasis on sociology. Our task is to emphasize the presence of the dialectic where its presence is not conspicuous and recognized.

Any discussion of the "elements of dialectic" presents a problem. It easily leads to a dangerous reduction of the complex dialectical perspective to a small number of "laws", "features", or "elements". In a fragmentary form, these "elements" (e.g. dialectical reciprocity, polarization, complementarity, transformation of quantity into new quality, essence-appearance contradiction, or totality) can be found in the thought of numerous thinkers. This, however, does not give us sufficient ground to call such a thinker a dialectician.

In the history of social thought, the dialectical method is primarily the method of radical thinkers, and in particular of scholars of Marxian orientation, such as Lenin, Lukács, Gramsci, Sartre, Goldmann, Marcuse, and Mészáros. Marxist materialist dialectic is also, above all, a critical method with an activistic orientation toward radical change of the existing social order. The goal of this orientation is well summarized in Mészáros' phrase, "the positive transcendence of labour's self-alienation " (1970). Or to put it differently, it is primarily anti-capitalist thought.

Now, the present endeavour to search for the presence of dialectical thought or attitudes in certain major schools of thought in the western social science needs justification. For it seems almost axiomatic that one or more fragmentary features or elements of dialectic do not constitute the dialectical perspective or method.

The fact remains that the dialectical perspective was present in old Chinese philosophy (Taoism and Confucianism) and in Ancient Greek philosophy. It was also firmly rooted in the German classical idealistic

philosophical tradition (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), and via Hegel in Marx's system. Today, this mode of thought can be found in the members of the Frankfurt school (Adorno, Horkheimer, Fromm, Marcuse); and also in the French existentialism of Sartre; and finally in its dogmatic form in the official ideology of Diamat in Eastern Europe.

More puzzling, however, is the presence or absence of dialectic in western non-Marxian social thought and in particular in American sociology. Most often, dialectic is absent in the major schools of sociology on this continent. The absence of dialectic in these schools can be fairly well accounted for by the empiricist or positivist tradition, and by the existing capitalist socio-political system with its predominantly conservative ideology of preservation of the status quo, sometimes through a mild reformism.

However, certain schools on this continent have experienced more European influence than others, and it is precisely in these sociological schools that the presence of dialectic is most strongly felt. One of them is the Chicago school directly influenced by Simmel, and another, the historical sociology of P. A. Sorokin (a newcomer from Europe himself), and of Barrington Moore, Jr.

A. W. Small, R. E. Park, L. Wirth, R. Redfield, G. H. Mead, and other members of the Chicago school were far from complete dialecticians. Nevertheless, the dialectical elements are present in their works, and it is our task to find out which of them can be commonly found in the representative scholars of this known school. Also, why are some elements present, and others absent?

In the same manner and for the same reasons, we are interested to find to what degree Sorokin's and B. Moore's historical sociology bears the marks of dialectical perspective and method.

Although the major components of the dialectical conception are only fragmentarily present in the works of the scholarly representatives of these schools, they are indicative of the growing interest in dialectics in America. It is precisely in this respect that one can find a rationale for analysing the dialectical components already present in certain schools that have thrived in American sociology. The following analysis thus hopes to show to what extent the dialectic is new, and to what degree it has been already incorporated into the system and thought of some of the major representatives of the specific schools in sociology.

* * *

Although the differences between Georg Simmel (1858-1918) and Georges Gurvitch (1894-1965) surpass by far their similarities, the fact remains that their sociological conceptions were a great deal permeated by the dialectical quality of their thought. Gurvitch, who really belonged to the next generation, was a real protagonist of the dialectical approach in sociology. Simmel, on the contrary, rarely used the term 'dialectic', although in his reasoning the dialectical mode of thinking loomed large.

Still another similarity lies in the fact that Gurvitch with his typological method is not very far from Simmel's 'forms of sociations'. Therefore Gurvitch is sometimes classified among the phenomenological branch of sociological formalism (Martindale, 1960). Both Gurvitch's and Simmel's dialectic have another common trait. Their dialectics are used primarily as heuristic devices.

I. THE DIALECTIC OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGY: GEORG SIMMEL

When Simmel's influence and career is considered, the striking fact, noticed by many who wrote on him, is that despite his personal qualities as a very talented lecturer, his prolific scientific output of books and articles, and his insightful analyses of social reality, Simmel had considerable difficulty in achieving adequate academic recognition.

Simmel's Jewish origin and the existing anti-semitism in the Germany of his time, his diversity of interests and his lack of systematic thoroughness, have usually been offered as explanations. Even in the decades that followed Simmel's death in 1918, Simmel's popularity was not great.

It is the contention of the present writer that Simmel was neglected in the 1930's and on, particularly on account of the rather devastating critique of P. A. Sorokin, whose classical book The Contemporary Sociological Theories, first published in 1928, and translated subsequently into many languages, contains a disqualifying and somewhat sweeping critique of formal sociology. In it, Sorokin simply attacked Simmel and his sociology as an inadequate and wrongly oriented school. He claimed that forms of social relations were being studied by almost all social sciences (law, economics, etc.), and therefore the claim of formal sociology, that the study of social forms was a new and eminently sociological domain, was baseless. He considered, too, that the separation of social form from its content was fallacious, and in particular the idea that social forms could exist independently of their content. Such was Sorokin's critique of the formal school.

It is worth noting here that Simmel was not only a sociologist but also a philosopher whose interest went beyond the strictly sociological

domain. His works, for example, disclose an interest in psychology, literature, art and history. Thus we are confronted with a problem as to how to classify Simmel as a thinker and scholar. Several authors have suggested that Simmel should be looked upon primarily as a philosopher of contemporary culture, whose leitmotif was the philosophy of life (Lebens-philosophy).

In the framework of this chapter we shall restrict our attention to one valuable aspect of Simmel's thought which is often, in the essays on Simmel, either insufficiently emphasized or only lightly touched upon. This aspect is Simmel's dialectical thought and method.² As far as this writer is informed, the only authors who perceive Simmel as a dialectician and treat him as such, are sociologist L. Coser (1965: 1971) and anthropologist R. Murphy (1971). Others, such as R. Aron (1965), A. Salomon (1965), T. Caplow (1968), P. K. Etzkorn (1968), and D. N. Levine (1971), only touch briefly upon this aspect of Simmel's thought.

One of the theses of this chapter is the claim that dialectical thought is amply present in Simmel's works, but that this fact is insufficiently recognized. A second, and related thesis is that the illuminating and penetrating thought of Simmel's analyses is firmly rooted precisely in the dialectical quality of his thinking. And finally, it follows as a corollary, that since this aspect of Simmel's work has been neglected, a full understanding of his sociology is not possible without a basic understanding of dialectic.

One of the most frequent critiques addressed to Simmel has been the one of unfounded separation of social form from its content. Commenting on Simmel's term 'form', which the latter used to denote the

"recurrent regularities of interaction", H. Becker and H. E. Barnes say:

Critics who have apparently understood very little of Simmel's work have even gone so far as to equate his exclusion of content, in the special meaning attached to that term, with "emptiness." Ergo, say these writers, Simmel's sociology is a hollow shell; the warm, pulsing life of society is to be sought elsewhere. Now the amazing thing about Simmel's work is precisely his ability to lend color and movement to the most abstract type of sociological analysis; there is far more content in his sociology, using that term in its ordinary meaning, than is to be found in many if not most of his critics." (1961: 890-891).

Although Simmel was known to American sociologists during his life-time through the works and translations of A. W. Small, R. E. Park, and later through the works of Everett C. Hughes, the more significant of his works were translated and edited by Kurt H. Wolff in the 1950's and 1960's. To these, one should add the significant contributions of Lewis A. Coser, whose best known work, The Functions of Social Conflict (1956), follows directly in Simmel's tradition.

In addition to Wolff and Coser, the German sociologist F. H. Tenbruck is also significantly responsible for the re-evaluation and rehabilitation of Simmel. In his discussion of formal sociology, Tenbruck points out that Simmel's emphasis is not on the abstract character of the forms of sociation, but on the process of abstracting them. He clearly perceives the difficulty of the problem and realizes (as well as Simmel did), that "The forms inhere in the totality of reality", and cannot have separate existence. Simmel (and Tenbruck proves this) admits that the content often modifies the forms of sociation. Therefore Tenbruck concludes:

Forms can be demonstrated only in an arrangement of contents, the "synopsis" of which makes them perceptible. Abstraction for Simmel is not - it could not be - abstraction from content-phenomena, in which the forms inhere and through which alone they can be set forth, but abstraction from a content-perspective. (1965: 78).

Forms, according to this author, are not general concepts arrived at by generalization and abstraction which retain the most common of all contents. (ibid.). "Simmel's program does not rule out content", continues Tenbruck. "All it asks is that reality be viewed, not with regard to inherent content, but with regard to its forms." (ibid., 79). Following Simmel and A. Small, Tenbruck concludes that sociology, although in this perspective understood as the study of forms, cannot study form per se (ibid.).

Tenbruck's defence of Simmel is carried on by Coser, who underlines that in formal analysis, certain features of concrete phenomena, which are not observable unless such a perspective is applied to them, are extracted from reality (Coser, 1965: 8). In this way, says Coser, it becomes possible to compare phenomena which may be radically different in concrete content, yet essentially similar in structural arrangement (ibid.).

As we have seen, Coser and Tenbruck emphasize the process of abstraction which characterizes Simmel's methodology. It is not the first time that we meet this mental process in the present work. It was an essential trait of Marx's dialectical method, discussed in Part I, Chapter 4.

It is the thesis of this chapter that Simmel was a dialectical thinker, and in fact the dialectician among sociologists. Dialectic, on the other hand, as is well known, does not allow for the separation of form from content, which are seen, on the contrary, in their dialectical unity. Therefore, when Simmel was charged with this separation, it was implied that he could not possibly have been a dialectician. The preceding discussion shows that a great deal of this criticism was not justified in view of the dialectical quality of Simmel's thought which will be explored further in this chapter.

As a German philosopher, Simmel belonged to the Neo-Kantians among whom the closest to Simmel was Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). Like Kant, Simmel was of the opinion that all experience is shaped by a priori categories. Simmel's distinction between form and content resulted from this view. Accordingly, it is the human mind which creates forms into which the matter (content) based on experience is fitted. As was pointed out by R. Mayntz, this distinction is clearly analytical. Form is for Simmel, first of all, a basic organizing principle of perception or modality of experience (Mayntz, 1968, Vol. 14: 253).

However, it must be noted that in contradistinction to Kant, Simmel's forms are not a priori-given and independent of experience. On the contrary, they are the result of the long evolution of the human psyche, and are influenced by experience (Lukić, 1969: 24).

Simmel was influenced by a number of philosophers of different orientations. In this grouping are found Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Comte, Marx, Nietzsche, Spencer, and among Simmel's contemporaries, Husserl, Bergson, and Dilthey. This variety of influences provides additional reasons why it is difficult to classify Simmel in any particular school. Simmel was undoubtedly familiar with the dialectical thought of Kant, Hegel and Marx, and was also influenced by their conceptions.

Coser's treatment of Simmel's dialectic is useful, but lacks somewhat in thoroughness. He, for example, never fails to point out Simmel's dialectical approach, yet he says nowhere what is the dialectic and the dialectical approach. By reading Coser's interpretation of Simmel's dialectic, we get the following answers to this question. Dialectic consists of reciprocal interaction, or as Coser says "dynamic interconnectedness", the conflict of social units which are subject to

sociological analysis, and the unity of opposites in social reality. Coser does not use the latter expression ("unity of opposites"), but the examples he uses from Simmel can be reduced, more or less, to this phrase.

Thus, for example, the dialectical tension between the individual and society is reciprocal, and the individual always remains in a dual relation toward society; he is incorporated within it and yet stands against it (Coser, 1965: 11).

And finally, in the section on the dyadic relationship and the transformation of the dyad into the triad, Coser emphasizes the significance of numbers for social life, as well as the qualitative change resulting from the change in number or quantity. Coser, of course, does not explicitly use the well-known expression of dialectical materialism, "change of quantity into new quality". Yet this postulate of dialectic is well exemplified in the consequences following from any quantitative augmentation of a group.

In explaining Simmel's conception of social conflict, Coser significantly points out that Simmel differentiated sharply between social appearances and social realities (1971: 148). This, of course, was emphasized earlier (Part I, Ch. 3) as an important trait of dialectical perspective.

It is also in Simmel's philosophy of life as a creative process of unbounded continuity and ceaseless flow, that one finds a distinctly dialectical position. Finally, Simmel's view of reality as basically movement, continuity, and process, is equally an extension of this basic dialectical position.

One of Simmel's basic tenets, that all things are to be considered as interdependent, or as functions of each other - called sometimes rela-

tivism, relationism, or even functionalism - is nothing less than one of the basic postulates of dialectic, only it is not recognized as such.

The instances of Simmel's dialectical views are really numerous, and it would mean going beyond the limits of this work to list them all. Only for the sake of illustration, will the most characteristic examples be mentioned.

The dialectical view of the unity of opposites, the transformation of phenomena into their opposites, and change of quantity into new quality - all these dialectical principles can be found in most of Simmel's works.

Thus, for example, when discussing his concept of "stranger", Simmel emphasizes the importance of the unity of nearness and remoteness that is involved in any human relation. The stranger is described as a potential wanderer, as a person who comes today but stays tomorrow. In him are united the two characteristics: liberation from a given point in space (exemplified in wandering), and its conceptual opposite - fixation at such a point (Simmel, 1964b: 402).

Conflict and peace are also interwoven as opposites, and in fact they condition each other. Each one turns into its opposite.

This also applies to conflict and peace. Both in the succession and in the simultaneity of social life, the two are so interwoven that in every state of peace the conditions of future conflict, and in every conflict the conditions of future peace, are formed. (Simmel, 1964a: 109).

The dialectical quality of these views cannot be denied, because perhaps the most distinct trait of dialectical thought (if one would want to single out just one aspect), is the idea of passage of a thing into its opposite.³

The dialectical unity of opposites is also well exemplified in Simmel's further discussion of the sociologically positive character of conflict.

Just so, there probably exist no social unit in which convergent and divergent currents among its members are not inseparably interwoven. An absolutely centripetal and harmonious group, a pure "unification" ("Vereinigung"), not only is empirically unreal, it could show no real life process (Simmel, 1964a: 15).⁴

The instances of dialectical transformation, or the turn of phenomena into their opposites, abound in Simmel's writings. "A swing into opposite", or simply a "turn into opposite" is mentioned on many pages in Simmel. For instance, the change into an opposite is discussed with reference to human feelings, the social form of 'triad', secrecy, and faithfulness and gratitude (Simmel, 1964a: 45-46: 1964b: 135, 152, 386).

Quantitative changes as leading to qualitative difference are also often mentioned, and this dialectical model is used as an heuristic device. This is particularly pronounced in Simmel's analysis of the quantitative determination of the sociological form of the group. An increase in the number of group members brings often a new quality to the group. In other words, an increasing quantity results in an entirely new phenomenon. This is the case with the change from dyad to triad; from a small clique to a political party; from a small community to an urban metropolis.

To see the dialectical structure of Simmel's thought in this respect, it is sufficient to read carefully his penetrating essay "The Metropolis and Mental Life".⁵ There, he explains the metropolitan blase attitude as being a result of increased interaction, and of the quantitative stimulation of nerves (and to use Simmel's phrase), "... the quantitative aspect of life is transformed directly into qualitative traits of character" (Simmel, 1964b: 419).

This quantitative determination of the group is obvious, since in Simmel's words, "... smaller groups have qualities, including types of

interaction among their members, which inevitably disappear when the group grows larger" (Simmel, 1964b: 87). Analysing authority and prestige, Simmel describes a person of superior significance and strength: "By acting 'authoritatively' the quantity of his significance is transformed into a new quality" (ibid., 183).⁶

A distinctly dialectical view of internal contradictions of social groups is also found in Simmel's characterization of human relations as ambivalent. Simmel's concept 'sociation' (Vergesellschaftung), is relevant here, and on this subject Professor Coser has this to say:

To Simmel, sociation always involves harmony and conflict, attraction and repulsion, love and hatred. He saw human relations as characterized by ambivalence; precisely those who are connected in intimate relations are likely to harbor for one another not only positive but also negative sentiments (1965: 11-12).

In other words, change and development of social groups need internal forces involved in mutual opposition as conditions for their existence.

An excellent example of what Gurvitch later called dialectical reciprocity is found in Simmel when he says, "The union and interaction of individuals is based upon mutual glances. This is perhaps the most direct and purest reciprocity which exists anywhere."⁷

Simmel was the most prominent member, and at the same time the real founder of the German formal school in sociology. This school (Toennies, Vierkandt, Leopold von Wiese, and Simmel), developed a particular perspective on the study of social phenomena, and as such has exercised a considerable impact on the American Chicago school.

With Leopold von Wiese, the formal school has today completely disappeared, and has been largely replaced by the study of far more relevant social problems.

When one considers the social causes and origins of his school, as well as the factors in its disappearance, the position taken by Prof. R. Lukić of the University of Belgrade is of interest. Formal sociology, he writes, appeared at the turn of the century, that is to say, precisely at the time when western capitalism, temporarily and in the short run, was going through a relatively stable and safe phase. Thus, the sociology of civil (bourgeois) society could indulge in 'pure', grand-scale, timeless and spaceless taxonomies of social processes and forms of socializations (Lukić, 1967: 46).

Simmel, as the most eminent representative of this school, was also a philosopher, whose dialectical views were rooted in the German idealistic philosophical tradition. His dialectic has both epistemological and ontological traits, although the former seem to prevail. In this respect his dialectic is similar to that of Georges Gurvitch. Another similarity can be found in the heuristic nature of this dialectic. In other words, dialectic serves Simmel as an aid in his analyses and discoveries through reasoning.

The results of sociology, like the results of any other science, are only partial. It is only with the help of philosophical generalizations that society can be known in its totality. This was Simmel's view on the relations between philosophy and sociology. This view is particularly relevant for understanding the role of the dialectic as primarily a philosophical method whose goal is to comprehend the totality of a society and its place in the world.

In some of his works, Simmel shows striking similarity to Marx. This is particularly conspicuous in his essays, Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur, and Die Philosophie des Geldes. This has been also

noticed by other writers. (Aron, 1965: 139; Coser, 1971: 192; Israel, 1971: 132; Murphy, 1971: 130-133). The similarity is especially pronounced with reference to the phenomena of alienation, objectification and reification. That Simmel dwelled on Marx's ideas is very likely. However, the similarity may also be attributed to the similar mode of thought, that is to say, both scholars were dialectical thinkers.

Finally, profoundly important is Simmel's opinion that the very character of human life is dialectical. Like Freud, his view of culture is based on the contradiction between the individual and civilization; between the continuity of the life-process and acts of individuation brought about by the trends of modern society. Where Marx saw labour's self-alienation as caused by the division of labour, exchange and private property ("second-order mediations"), the more pessimistic Simmel tended to view alienation as a more general destiny of mankind. Alienation, thus, for him is not a historical phenomenon of class society (as it is for Marx), but a far more general trend inherent to modern civilization. To put this in Lukács' and Mészáros' language: with Simmel the second-order mediation appears as a first-order mediation, that is as an absolute ontological factor.

Among the Neo-Kantians, Simmel was a prominent adherent to Lebensphilosophie (the philosophy of life). This philosophy, according to George Lukács, was the dominant ideology of the whole imperialist period in Germany. Its representatives were, for example, Bergson in France, Dilthey in Germany, and pragmatism in American philosophy (Lukács, 1966: 320). This philosophical movement was characterized by the rejection of the idea of progress, by agnostic relativism and subjectivism, and by aristocratic epistemology based on the intuition of the chosen ones, says Lukács (ibid., 320-364).

As a member of this philosophical movement, Simmel could scarcely be viewed as a complete dialectician, although still by far more of a dialectical thinker than the sociologists of his time and generation.

The most commonly found elements of dialectic in Simmel are the following: a) the unity of opposing forces as responsible for life and social change, b) dialectical transformation into opposite, c) quantitative determination of a group as responsible for qualitative change of relationship, d) sporadic reference to the philosophical method which alone is in a position to grasp the totality. On the other hand, the dialectical conception of Aufhebung (sublation), as supersession-preservation of the present by a new quality and higher complexity resulting from opposing forces within totality, as well as the totality of contradictions leading to this Aufhebung, seems to be something alien to Simmel's thought.

Although the personal talent and brilliance of Simmel's expositions cannot be denied, it is the thesis of the present writer that Simmel's thought is still of interest, and ought to be influential today, chiefly on account of its dialectical quality. If the preceding discussion has made this claim more viable, it has fulfilled its purpose.

II. HEURISTIC ROLE OF THE DIALECTIC: GEORGES GURVITCH

As the successor to Durkheim's chair in Sociology at the Sorbonne, Gurvitch occupies a unique place in the history of sociological thought. With his encyclopedic knowledge, his Russian academic background, and his own system of sociology, he was the counterpart of Pitirim Sorokin in the U.S.A.⁸

It is somewhat surprising that this prominent French scholar, the author of numerous profoundly important works, is very little known

in North America, where only a few of his books have so far been translated.

Even more surprising is the fact that the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) does not have an article on Gurvitch, who is in fact mentioned only once in the article on Maurice Halbwachs by Georges Friedman.⁹ Gurvitch was aware of this isolation when in his autobiographical notes he said, "For the most part, American and French sociologists consider me a 'philosopher' who has entered the wrong door, and the 'philosophers' regard me as a traitor who changed camps long ago." (Bosserman, 1968: 57). When it is remembered that modern western sociology has taken mainly the positivistic course of empirical science, that Gurvitch often reiterated the necessity of intimate collaboration between theory and empirical research and also between philosophy and sociology, and that he criticized trenchantly the American sociological positivism - this isolation is not altogether surprising.

Compared with other scholars, whose works are analysed here, Gurvitch's dialectic is explicit; that is to say, it is openly declared by the author as an absolutely essential method of sociology. In fact, Gurvitch was unshakably devoted to the dialectic, and he is unsurpassed in his advocacy of this method in western sociology. Thus, at the entrance of his 'house of the human sciences' is written: "Nobody enters here who is not a dialectician".

In addition to being explicit, Gurvitch's dialectic is also heuristic, ontological and epistemological.

To gain insight into Gurvitch's sociological dialectic, an essential familiarity with his system of sociology is necessary. Since among American writers, Sorokin (1966) and Bosserman (1968) have extensively

commented on Gurvitch's sociological system, in what follows only a few selected features of this system of sociology will be mentioned as a necessary introduction to Gurvitch's dialectic.

As a preliminary, it should be stated that Gurvitch was influenced by a number of scholars with a wide variety of orientations in sociology and philosophy. The most influential among them were: Durkheim, Mauss, Fichte, Saint-Simon, Marx, Bergson, Scheler, and Husserl.

One possible way to summarize the essential elements of Gurvitch's conceptual framework and his system of general sociology is to start with his definition of sociology.¹⁰

Sociology is the qualitative and discontinuous typology based on the dialectic of the total social phenomena in all their structural, structurable and structured manifestations. It studies all the depth levels, scales and the sectors directly with the aim of following their movements of structuration, destructuration and restructuration and rupture, finding their explanation in collaboration with history.

If a shorter definition is desired, it could be said that sociology is a science which studies total social phenomena as a totality of their aspects and their movements, capturing them in a dialectic of microsocial, group and global types, in the process of becoming and disintegrating (Gurvitch, 1964: 11, Emphasis by the original author)

For Gurvitch, the domain of sociology is the social reality "taken in all its levels, all its aspects, all its strata in depth". (1965: 14; Bosserman, 1968: 78). In his contention that social reality is irreducible to any other reality, Gurvitch follows Durkheim. Thus, this social reality affirms itself in the "total social phenomena", and the object of sociology is precisely the typology of the total social phenomena which sociology studies in their dynamic and in the movements of structuration and destructuration.

The concept of total social phenomenon is crucial in the above

definition. It also appears on almost every page of Gurvitch's major works, and thus occupies the central place in his sociology. The concept was taken directly from Marcel Mauss, and in Bosserman's words, it underlines Gurvitch's notion of society's totality, its wholeness. Total social phenomena are social reality (Bosserman, 1968: 2), or as Gurvitch says, "The total social phenomena are real totalities which move and are ceaselessly changing" (1965: 23).

Despite some vagueness regarding a more precise definition of this crucial concept of Gurvitch's sociology, one thing is clear. Gurvitch speaks of partial and global total social phenomena. Larger society (global society) is an example of Gurvitch's global total social phenomenon. Social classes are expressly mentioned as total social phenomena.

Thus the total social phenomenon, according to Gurvitch, is not only the larger society which contains all the characteristics of society, but also every social group, and even every form of direct spontaneous form of sociability (Communion, community, mass). Gurvitch has this to say:

To restrict the concept of "total social phenomenon" to global society, would mean, however, to commit a grave methodological error. Every group, as well as every manifestation of sociability can and should be conceived as total phenomenon as well, i.e., seen in the totality of their depth levels. (Gurvitch, 1965: 77-78)

This concept of total social phenomenon definitely possesses some elements of dialectical thought. First of all it presupposes that any culture item is not only identical to itself, but also different from itself; that it is 'this', but also 'that' at the same time, for example the phenomenon of 'potlatch' among the Kwakiutl Indians, in Marcel Mauss' analysis. The total social phenomenon, however, does not contain inherent contradictions, as is the case in Marxian conceptions of dialectical

totality. As we have seen, it is applicable not only to macro-structures, but to the micro-structures of society as well. In other words, even small groups could be considered as total social phenomena in Gurvitch's special meaning of totality.

Basically, the concept of total social phenomenon has two functions in Gurvitch's sociology. First, it stresses the basic structure and structural completeness or wholeness; that is to say, every social phenomenon is total if it possesses all basic, qualitatively specific, and mutually irreducible dimensions existing in social reality (Milić, 1965: 533). Second, the concept of total social phenomenon emphasizes the need for the holistic or total approach to the study of social facts, as opposed to the prevalent segmentalization and compartmentalization which characterize the repudiation of the dialectical processes on the part of positivistic sociology.

In Gurvitch's own words, "The total social phenomena are multi-dimensional and have different depth-levels". (Sorokin, 1966: 470). This requires an explanation of the very basic conceptual framework of Gurvitch's system of sociology.

According to Gurvitch, sociology is divided into three major domains: microsociology, macrosociology and depth-sociology.

Microsociology studies the forms of sociability (e.g., different types of "We" or "We-ness", and "the relationships to the others". There are infinite numbers of these forms of sociability, of which the main are: Communion, Communities, Masses.¹¹

Macrosociology deals with all the sectors of total social reality, such as social groupings, classes, and global or inclusive societies.

In his depth-sociology, Gurvitch distinguishes ten depth-levels of total social reality, according to their accessibility to observations. These are: 1) the morphological and ecological surface, 2) social organizations, 3) social patterns or models, 4) regular collective behaviour not confined to social organizations, 5) the web of social roles, 6) collective attitudes, 7) social symbols, 8) spontaneous, innovative, and creative collective behaviour, 9) collective ideas and values, 10) collective mentalities (or collective consciousness).

All these depth-levels are in themselves dead abstractions if separated from any concrete total phenomenon. They are only conceptual tools with an heuristic function. As such, this type of analysis is applied to global (inclusive) societies, to groups, and to forms of sociability.

All strata and levels of social reality are always essentially and inextricably mutually permeated. Separated one from another they will cease to be the elements of social reality. They are always the moments of the total social phenomenon, in its unseparable and irreducible unity (Gurvitch, 1965: 77).

Depth-sociology thus shows the vertical axis of social reality, while microsociology and the two basic branches of macrosociology (typology of social groups and typology of global societies) study the horizontal axis of the same reality.¹²

The very basic question which behooves our discussion is related to the relationship of this depth dimension and the horizontal aspect of society; and it is precisely here that the significance of the concept of total social phenomenon comes to the fore.

The depth scale shows qualitatively differentiated, mutually irreducible parts of the total phenomenon. On the other hand, the analysis

of the horizontal aspect investigates the different forms in which total social phenomena appear, as well as their relations. (Milic, 1965: 556).

Gurvitch was of the opinion that total social phenomena make their appearance in three basic forms: 1) microsociological (e.g., forms of sociability), 2) special social groupings, (e.g., social classes), 3) global or total societies. Mutual connectedness of all these three forms is frequently emphasized, for the supreme methodological principle of Gurvitch is that microsociology must not be separated from macrosociology. Thus, even the smallest elements of the body social, the so-called forms of sociability, possess collective character. They are also total social phenomena. This is at the same time the main critical point that Gurvitch addressed to Moreno and his sociometry. Here we see that dialectic is again playing its unifying role.

Dialectic is for Gurvitch an absolute prerequisite of any scientific endeavour. Having criticized various historical brands of dialectic of such thinkers as Plato, Plotinus, Fichte, Hegel, Proudhon, Marx, Sartre, Gurvitch has expounded his own version which he calls "dialectical hyper-empiricism", or "empirico-realistic dialectic".

Mere linguistic interpretation discloses here an eclectic attempt to reconcile the two opposing positions - the dialectic as a philosophical method, and its antipod - empiricism. What Gurvitch really tried to do was to purify dialectic of any philosophy, ideology, or dogmatism, and then to use what is left as an heuristic tool.

Gurvitch argued vigorously against any dogmatic dialectic, pointing out much as Durkheim did for his sociology, that his dialectic is neither materialistic nor spiritualistic, pessimistic, nor optimistic; nor is it the dialectic of progress or of regress. This is supposed to be an

advantage because, as Gurvitch says, "every marriage of dialectic with a philosophical-ontological or anthropological position unavoidably leads to dogmatism". (1962: 6, 13, 179, 180).

In this special interpretation of Gurvitch, the dialectic is again understood both as a real movement and as a method; as a unity of ontological and epistemological components. Gurvitch describes dialectic as 'a pathway', the way followed or taken by human groups in the process of their change. Thus dialectic is a "way and flow" which "men's totalities" (in the first place social and historical) take in reciprocal becoming and ceasing of their wholes and their parts. As a method, dialectic is a way of conceiving, comprehending, and understanding the movement of "men's real totalities".

Thus understood, the dialectic is, on the one hand, a manifestation of tensions, oppositions, struggles, and contradictions; and on the other, it points to the existence of these states of affairs in society. According to Gurvitch, the dialectical analysis by itself does not explain it. It merely points out a path toward historical comprehension and causal explanation typical of concrete and unrepetitive social totalities. The dialectic strips from social reality all apparent stability; it destroys every type of 'intellectual sclerosis' or 'mummification'. In this way, dialectic helps to grasp social totalities and their various parts as dynamic wholes.

However, in Gurvitch's opinion, most dialecticians have betrayed the dialectic by turning it into an apologetic dialectic. Therefore, Gurvitch sees it as his role to purify the dialectic of all apologies in favour of his conception of "empirico-realistic dialectic".

So conceived, dialectic does not really explain social phenomena. Its function is merely to ask questions, or to prepare a framework for explanations, such as functional correlation, regularities of trends, laws of probability and special causality.

Finally, Gurvitch distinguishes the following five operational procedures of the dialectical method:

1. Dialectical complementarity is more or less a commonsense scientific tool consisting of examination of a certain phenomenon from several perspectives, for example, the dichotomy between comprehension and explanation; relationship between effort and resistance, continuity and discontinuity, complementary relations between us ("we") and the others. So the two terms or elements dialectically complement each other, although they seem to be mutually exclusive on the first sight.

2. Mutual dialectical implication concerns itself chiefly with mutuality and interdependency, or with mutual involvement. Examples would be: culture and society, social and psychological, body and mind.

3. Dialectical ambiguity denotes such relationships as those where there is both attraction and repulsion. It is exemplified in the polar attributes of organized and spontaneous elements within social reality. Thus cases of ambivalence are the result of ambiguity, such as ambivalent feelings of love and hate, or the case of 'friendly enemies'. The similarity to Simmel's type of analysis is here enriched by Freudian insights.

4. Dialectical polarization is closest to some significant traits of the classical Marxian dialectic. Nicolas Cusa's coincidentia oppositorum, war, revolution, and, in general, class antagonism are among the best examples.

5. Reciprocity of perspectives involves, so to speak, mutual immanency. Examples would be, inventions which are results of individual creativity, but which occur under certain historical conditions; or a case of bureaucratic organizations which both create and attract certain personalities.¹³

Although on the surface, Gurvitch's operational procedures of dialectic seem very little related to the more conventional and traditional conceptions of dialectic (Hegel, Marx), on a closer look some similarities are nevertheless detectable. The similarity becomes particularly evident in the fourth procedure (dialectical polarization), which comes closest to the classical notion of dialectic.

As a true movement, dialectic concerns primarily human reality which is social reality par excellence. It is particularly in his latest works that Gurvitch emphasized the connection between dialectic of social reality and the dialectics of human experience, understood broadly as individual and collective human praxis. Thus, like other French scholars (Sartre, Goldmann), and like Lukács, Gurvitch too considered dialectic to be exclusively man's characteristic.

We have proposed to characterize Gurvitch's 'empirico-realistic dialectic' as chiefly an heuristic device, because this seems to be the main role assigned to it by the author. Arguing against equating dialectical analysis and explication, Gurvitch makes his position clear when he states that every dialectic leads only to the threshold of explanation in sociology, but does not pass over this threshold. The analogy is drawn with the saying "The most beautiful girl in France is no more than what she is".

At the beginning of his essay on dialectic and sociology, Gurvitch describes every authentic dialectic as a demolition of all acquired concepts with the purpose of preventing their 'mummification', which results from their incapacity to grasp the real totalities in motion ('en marche') (Gurvitch, 1962: 5). The heuristic nature of this dialectic comes again to the fore in the following formulation: "As a method, the dialectic has meaning only when considered as a preliminary purification, as an ordeal, a harsh test necessary to any science or philosophy." (ibid., 1962: 14).

Therefore, when Gurvitch attributes to his dialectic the role of cleansing the path to original experience and to original non-dogmatic thought through destruction of all acquired and crystalized concepts, this is another statement of the heuristic character of his dialectic.¹⁴

Gurvitch's interpretation of dialectic is different from the main philosophical tradition. Even in sociology it is unique and stands as a solitary conception, different from the dialectic of Marx and Simmel. This dialectic possesses a number of specific traits. One would probably agree that mere forceful emphasis on totality, as well as on the dialectical nature of social reality and thought, is in itself a very significant achievement of Gurvitch's sociology. Another significant aspect is, of course, the destruction of the facticity, fragmentation and compartmentalization which characterizes positivism.

As a general approach, the heuristic role of this dialectic seems quite acceptable. The least satisfying is a certain vagueness, as well as insufficient elaboration and to a certain extent questionable fruitfulness of the suggested five operational procedures.

Regarding Sorokin's critical point that Gurvitch was using this

dialectic only modestly in his analysis of social reality, some comments are in order here.

Undoubtedly, Gurvitch has significantly contributed to at least three substantive areas of sociology: to the sociology of law, the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of moral life, and to some degree to the study of social classes. In most of these areas of sociology Gurvitch has applied his dialectical method. One regularity can be noticed, however, when his works are reviewed in time perspective and progression. The dialectic is more often present in his later works.

Thus, in Gurvitch's Sociology of Law, first published in 1942, the dialectic is least noticeable. Nevertheless the roots of Gurvitch's dialectical views are already present in this work. Gurvitch here contrasts the dogmatism, slowness, and conservatism of jurisprudence with the always changing perpetual dynamism of law (1942:10).

In his study of social time, Gurvitch stresses that nothing requires the dialectical approach more than the problem of time, and that all the characteristics can only be understood dialectically as "discontinuous continuity" and the "continuous discontinuity" (Gurvitch, 1964: 23).

Dialectical reciprocity and mutual implication can be demonstrated, when Gurvitch says:

Furthermore, the "conditioning of time" is never unilateral for us. It is reciprocal because the social frameworks condition time as well as being conditioned by it. We have already noted, generally speaking, that since the movements which produce time also take place in time, by this fact they are partially produced by time. Here we meet dialectics again. (1964:14-15).

The same thing can be demonstrated in dialectical reciprocity between total social phenomena and social time.

The total social phenomena both produce and are products of social time, move and unfold in it. Thus social time cannot be defined without defining the total social phenomenon (ibid., 27).

The study of social time can be understood as a part of the sociology of knowledge. In his last major work Les cadres sociaux de la connaissance (1966),¹⁵ dialectic is amply applied in the discussion of the distinction between "sociality by partial fusion", and "sociality by partial opposition" (ibid., 1971: 46), and also in the dialectical theory of the relationship between society and the individual consciousness, or in the dialectic relation between a social framework and knowledge, where almost all five dialectical procedures are involved.¹⁶

The study of social classes is another domain in which Gurvitch stresses the radically dialectical process involved in structuration, restructuration and destructuration of these important and real social groupings.

In several of his major works (Traité de sociologie (1963); La vocation actuelle de la sociologie (1963); The Spectrum of Social Time (1964), Gurvitch has explained his conception of social classes as real, unorganized, factual and "superfunctional groups on distance", as total social phenomena and special products of industrial society. The complicated dialectical relationship between classes, on the one hand, and classes and the global societies on the other (class struggle and antagonisms), are emphasized, along with the important role of class consciousness. The dialectical quality of this view is seen when Gurvitch states that in our industrial society new classes are continuously being generated (Gurvitch, 1965: 376).

In other words, the social classes are seen as continuously emerging and changing, some ascending and others descending. In the modern

industrial society, reasoned Gurvitch, a new techno-bureaucratic class is emerging. It has been gaining in strength and power, to the detriment of both workers and the capitalists.

In this respect, compared to Gurvitch's views, Marx's optimism with regard to disappearance of classes, seems to have been premature. The dialectic of ceaseless restructuration and destructuration seems to be militating toward a more pessimistic view. This is the view of a new industrial and post-industrial society with a techno-bureaucracy (based on skill and knowledge) as a dominating social class, premonitioned by Gurvitch.

In conclusion, compared to Marx's dialectic, Gurvitch's dialectic remains formal and rather empty, because it is neither critical nor activist. It does operate with the category of totality, but is devoid of any contradictions.

As a dialectic of a non-Marxian sociologist, this dialectic resembles more the one advanced by Simmel, particularly in its heuristic and formal aspects.¹⁷ Besides the formalism present in these two sociologies, and the philosophical background of their authors, the roles of these two dialectics are heuristic. Namely, in Simmel's microsociological analyses, it is the dialectic that aids in the discovery of the internal dynamic of culture, society, and human groups.

The dialectical quality of thought which pervades the works of both Gurvitch and Simmel did not prevent Gurvitch from criticizing Simmel's views. Thus in his Traité de sociologie, discussing the subject matter and the method of sociology, Gurvitch credits Simmel for perceiving the important fact that the generalizations of sociology cannot go further than to establish particular types. This typological method of

sociology characterizes the works of Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Pareto, Sorokin, Parsons, Merton, and the whole of 20th century American sociology. Gurvitch, however, criticizes Simmel for wanting to exclude from sociological studies all cultural phenomena and all activity of groups and societies. In this respect Gurvitch supports Durkheim's criticism of the Simmel conceptions. Further, Gurvitch sees in Simmel's sociology nominalism, individualism, and idealism - which destroy social reality. Gurvitch thus concludes his criticism: "The trouble with Simmel is precisely that he does not understand that groups and societies cannot be reduced to interpersonal relations, and that he does not have a feeling for building of structures" (Gurvitch, 1966, Vol. 1: 13).

On the other hand, the dialectics of Simmel and Gurvitch are not of the same type. In Simmel, the dialectic is more subtle, and often present in the structure of his thought. It is, therefore, not on the surface and has to be discovered through the analysis of his reasoning.

With Gurvitch, the dialectic is also present in his reasoning, and in addition is openly acknowledged as the principal characteristic of his method. To put it differently, Simmel's dialectic is implicit, while Gurvitch's is more often explicit.

While both sociologists shared an interest in microsociology, Gurvitch showed also an active interest in macro-sociological generalizations. Thus, we can conclude by saying that these are two different but related types of dialectics.

Compared to Marx's dialectic, none of the two types of dialectic discussed above could be said to be critical, revolutionary, or activist. On the contrary, these sociological types are more passive in nature, in a sense hiding behind the screen of value-neutrality.

FOOTNOTES (Chapter V)

1. It could be perhaps argued that the dialectic was a characteristic of Durkheim's method. See in particular Ernest Wallwork, Durkheim Morality and Milieu, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972. However, if this view is accepted, then the dialectic must be interpreted in a very special and narrow sense. That is to say, as an intellectual skill in seeking a delicate balance between opposing views which are first criticized and seemingly discarded, until they are joined in a modified form in a new synthesis.
2. The whole sociological and philosophical output of Georg Simmel is not here examined in its complexity and entirety. On the contrary, the treatment is cursory, and its function is merely to illustrate Simmel's dialectical conceptions.

The sources for this analysis come from the following works by Simmel: Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, translated, edited, and with an introduction by Kurt H. Wolff, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964; Georg Simmel, Conflict (translated by Kurt H. Wolff) and The Web of Group-Affiliations (translated by Reinhard Bendix), New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964; Georg Simmel, The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays, translation and introduction by Peter Etzkorn, New York, Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1968; Georg Simmel, "The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group, Part I and II", The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 8 (July, 1902), pp. 1-46; 158-196; Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Religion, New York, Philosophical Library, 1959; Georg Simmel, On Individuality and Social Forms, edited and with an Introduction by Donald N. Levine, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1971.

3. See Walter T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel, New York, Dover Publications Inc., 1955, p. 104.
4. "Just as the universe needs 'love and hate', that is, attractive and repulsive forces, in order to have any form at all, so society, too, in order to attain a determinate shape, needs some quantitative ratio of harmony and disharmony, of association and competition, of favorable and unfavorable tendencies." (Simmel, 1964a:15).
5. See also Simmel's essay "The Transcendent Character of Life" in Donald N. Levine (ed.), Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms, The University of Chicago Press, 1971.
6. Simmel's essay "The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group", in translation of A. W. Small, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (July), 1902, abounds with instances of dialectical reasoning. More specifically, it is argued that numerical modification always produces a transformation into a

quite special sociological category. The dialectical change of quantity into a new quality, unity of opposites, and the unity through negations, are frequently and amply illustrated in this work of Simmel.

7. "By the glance which reveals the other, one discloses himself. By the same act in which the observer seeks to know the observed, he surrenders himself to be understood by the observer. The eye cannot take unless at the same time it gives. The eye of a person discloses his own soul when he seeks to uncover that of another. What occurs in this direct mutual glance represents the most perfect reciprocity in the entire field of human relationships." (Georg Simmel, Soziologie, Leipzig, 1908. Quoted according to R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 358).
8. The sources for this analysis come from the following works of Georges Gurvitch: Georges Gurvitch, La vocation actuelle de la sociologie, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1963 (Yugoslav translation 1965); Georges Gurvitch, Traité de sociologie, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1963, (Yugoslav translation, 1966); Georges Gurvitch, Dialectique et sociologie, Paris, Flammarion, 1962; Georges Gurvitch, The Spectrum of Social Time, Dordrecht, Holland, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1964; Georges Gurvitch, Sociology of Law, New York, Philosophical Library, 1942; Georges Gurvitch, The Sociological Frameworks of Knowledge, New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1971.
9. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967) does not mention him either, nor does the Encyclopedia Britannica. The same is, however, not the case with French, German, Dutch, Yugoslav encyclopedias, and the recent edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia, all of which have entries on Gurvitch. It could be perhaps explained that the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences excluded all living persons from their biographies, but again how does one explain that Gurvitch, who died in 1965 is not included, while P. A. Sorokin, who died in 1968, is included?
10. The same definition appears in Gurvitch's major works, such as Traite de sociologie (1963) and La vocation actuelle de la sociologie (1963).
11. The mass, as a manifestation of sociability, is the least intense and most constrained form of "we-ness" (les nous). This special meaning of the term is different from aggregate, crowd, or mass as used by other writers. Communion is the grouping of like-minded individuals and as such is the most intense and most spontaneous form of sociability. The members feel here "we-ness" as a liberation from every sociability and from individual weight. Community occupies an intermediary position. Here the participation of members, as well as the pressure and attraction are average, and a

balance is achieved. It is of crucial importance here to understand that these are not groups, but degrees of partial fusion into "we".

12. Sorokin's description of Gurvitch's sociology as divided into microsociology and macrosociology, of which the latter deals with depth-levels and sectors of the social, is thus incorrect and even confusing. Also Sorokin's summary of Gurvitch's depth-levels is not very accurate. See P. Sorokin, Sociological Theories of Today, New York, Harper and Row, 1966, pp. 470-472.
13. On these 'operational procedures' of Gurvitch, Sorokin (1966), Bosserman (1968), and Laszarsfeld (1972), have commented extensively. While Laszarsfeld and Bosserman restrict themselves to concise descriptions of the above five operational procedures of Gurvitch, Sorokin engages in some criticism. See P. A. Sorokin, Sociological Theories of Today, 1966, New York, Harper and Row, pp. 478-483).
14. This heuristic trait of Gurvitch's dialectic has been noticed by V. Milić and P. A. Sorokin as well.
15. Translated into English as Social Frameworks of Knowledge, New York, Harper & Row, 1971.
16. Dialectic is also more subtly present in Gurvitch's microsociology, where in fact it makes the core and the motive power of his analysis. It is through the dialectical process that Gurvitch arrives at the 'reciprocity of perspectives' between the three opposing 'poles' within the 'total psychic phenomenon' -- the I (individual), the Other (interpersonal), and the 'We' (collective). "Consciousness is a dialectical relationship between I, Others and We, which partially interpenetrate each other and partially converge through opposition," concludes Gurvitch (1949: 13).
17. The formal features of Gurvitch's sociology were noticed by Sorokin, who also pointed to the influence of formal sociology on Gurvitch (Sorokin, 1966: 494-5). Among others, the similar views were expressed by French sociologist Armand Cuvillier, and by Don Martindale. The latter one classified Gurvitch in the phenomenological branch of sociological formalism (Martindale, 1960: 276-278).

CHAPTER VI

DIALECTICAL ELEMENTS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL

The Chicago school of sociology is here chosen for analysis because of its unprecedented significance in the history of North American sociology. In contradistinction to other types of dialectic found in sociology, we have chosen to call the dialectic present in the Chicago school "practico-empirical", because of the basic empirical orientation of this school.

In this chapter we shall be dealing with the following five aspects of the Chicago school: general aspects of the practico-empirical dialectic; dialectical reciprocity; oppositions and conflict relationships; the view of totality; the participant observation method as a dialectical process.

Practico-empirical Dialectic

With the exception of Le Play in France, and Friedrich Engels and Charles Booth in England,¹ the American Chicago school of sociology was the first empirically oriented school in sociology, as well as the first major school on the North American continent. In addition to the interactionist social psychology of C. H. Cooley, J. Dewey, C. H. Mead, and W. I. Thomas, the Chicago Department of Sociology won prominence in the human ecology of Robert Ezra Park (1864-1944), his associates and students.

This group around R. E. Park, which included E. W. Burgess, H. W. Zorbaugh, F. M. Thrasher, C. Shaw, N. Anderson, and Park's younger students Louis Wirth, Robert Redfield, and Everett Hughes, was primarily interested in the ecological aspects of a rapidly changing urban agglomeration - the city of Chicago. Park and his associates were most actively conducting

their research in the second quarter of this century, and their human ecology bore some traits of modified social Darwinism.

Of significance is the fact that Chicago human sociologists headed by their Dean, R. E. Park, were responding in their own way to the most urgent practical needs of rapid social change caused by urbanization and the process of migration. This, they did by breaking with the older speculative and analytical sociology, and by setting out on the course of decidedly empirical research of specific problems in particular sub-communities ('natural areas') of their booming city.

Juvenile delinquency, ethnic sub-communities, skid row, and the Chicago slums were among their favourite topics of research. Yet all this empirical research was not done without any theoretical orientation or background. On the contrary, Park had emphasized a certain number of major social processes that he discovered in operation in the fast-expanding metropolis. These he delineated as competition, conflict, adjustment, and assimilation.

A deeper and more subtle premise of this orientation to significant social processes was the idea that human society consists of two levels of organization, the biotic and the social. The biotic or communal level is a common factor that humans share with other living beings, and as such an important substratum of society. It is, according to Park, characterized by close-knit patterns of interdependence among the cohabitants of a specific territory, and therefore communal. The other, the social level, involves distinctly human qualities, that is, a network of interpersonal relationships characterized by consensus and communication.

Thus the fundamental task of Park's human ecology was research and explanation of the communal level of organization, while consensus

and communication were considered as the consequence of man's struggle for existence on an impersonal level.

That Park and his associates were also influenced by the German tradition of formal sociology is a widely accepted fact. Park, it is known, studied in Germany (Leipzig and Berlin), where he was enrolled in Simmel's course and listened to his lectures. He also studied under Windelband.

Simmel's influence on Park is quite obvious, and relatively easily recognized. Park's writings on urban sociology and the city bear the distinct traits of Simmel's famous essay, "The Metropolis and Mental Life". Another source, where this influence can be detected with ease, is Park and Burgess' Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921), a long-time prestigious and classical integrated text with selected readings. The book has no fewer than ten selections from Simmel's Soziologie (1908).²

Since the previous chapters have already emphasized the dialectical quality of Simmel's thought, it is in order to pose a question concerning the presence of dialectical elements in the works of the members of the Chicago school of human ecology. Was Park, and through him his associates, influenced by the dialectical conceptions of Simmel, and if so, to what extent?

On the very surface of Park's writings, in his ideas on community and society, as well as in the empirical orientation of the Chicago human ecology, this influence seems rather frail and unsubstantial. However, a more in-depth and focussed insight will disclose a rather interesting and puzzling presence of dialectical elements in the reasoning of Park and some other Chicago scholars.

First of all, Park was not the only prominent Chicago scholar who studied in Germany, and with whom would rest the responsibility for importing Simmel's influence to America. There was in the first place Albion W. Small (1854-1926), the first chairman of the Chicago Department of Sociology, and a long-term dean of the graduate school, who founded and for more than two decades edited The American Journal of Sociology.³

Although the actual priority in human ecology belongs to Park, the real architect of the Chicago department was A. W. Small, who founded it in 1892. With the exception of L. F. Ward and W. G. Summner, it could be said that American academic sociology started with the organizational and scholarly activity of A. W. Small at Chicago.

To a hypothetical and ironical question, "Who reads A. W. Small nowadays?", one could answer that his thought is still very much alive because the science of society has not succeeded in solving some of its basic problems, of which Small was well aware, and to which he directed his attention and energy.⁴

Among other things, A. W. Small stood for establishing sociology as an objective study of social life. He also advocated the comprehension of total phenomena and not the study of mere parts. Thus he fought against the departmentalism of the social sciences. He also stood for the ethics of classlessness, for sociology as moral philosophy, for industrial democracy, and for ethical humanitarianism - concern about the welfare of man in society. He also showed a great interest in social improvement and reformism. Moreover, Small argued that man is inseparable from his history and his society.

Small also engaged in active criticism of the social sciences in America. Thus in a recent essay on Albion E. Small, Ernest Becker compares Small with T. Veblen and C. W. Mills whom he puts in the category of "a social-critical sociology in the service of human freedom" (Becker, 1971: 67).

Albion Small was much influenced by L. Gumplowicz, who stressed the conflict of social groups. Another source of influence was G. Ratzenhofer, also a conflict theorist. Finally, Small was familiar with the writings of Karl Marx, as well as with the works of his contemporary, Georg Simmel. In these European scholars the conflict perspective loomed large, and thus Small's theory of conflict of interest is firmly rooted in this tradition.

In the centre of Small's theoretical conception was the concept of social process. The social process involves a series of relations between persons (whose interests harmonize or conflict), and also a continual formation of groups and institutions around particular interests. "In the beginning were interests", says Small (1905: 196), and interest is defined in the same work as "an unsatisfied capacity, an unrealized condition of the organism". Small grouped interests into six categories: the interest of health, wealth, sociability, beauty, knowledge, and rightness. And since each of the above interests seeks satisfaction regardless of the others (has an absolute quality), the significant consequence is a universal conflict of interests.

As E. S. Bogardus in his interpretation of Small says:

This conflict boils itself down into a continuous contest between those who believe that social institutions are supreme and those who would hold institutions accountable to human beings. This basic conflict among conflicts resolves itself into a struggle regarding the present social and economic system (Bogardus, 1966: 438).

Although he was a conflict theorist, Small nevertheless gave due regard to the process of co-operation as well. There is even indication that he treated both processes as equals.⁵

There is sufficient ground for the contention that A. W. Small's political orientation was socialism. It was said that he had read Karl Marx with sympathy, and that in his critique of capitalism he was influenced by Marxism and T. Veblen (Barnes, 1968).

According to another source, Small maintained that, "There is an irrepressible conflict in modern society between the presuppositions of capital and the paramount values of humanity" (Small, 1912: 819).

The above quote indicates that Small was not only a conflict sociologist, but also a dialectical thinker. One need only substitute the term 'contradiction' for the term 'conflict' to get a statement strikingly similar to Marx's way of reasoning.

Not only was Small among the first pioneers of American sociology to lay stress on social processes and the conflict of interests. He was also probably the first advocate of industrial democracy in North America. Thus in his book Between Eras, From Capitalism to Democracy (1913), Small describes the conflict between labour and capital. With respect to his insistence on industrial democracy, as well as in many others, Small was truly ahead of his time.

Lewis A. Coser has rightly noted in his book on social conflict, that in contrast to early "structural reformers (Ward, Small, Rose, Veblen, and Cooley), in whose writings conflict occupies a central place, the contemporary American sociologists have very much neglected this important social process (Coser, 1964: 15-20).

From the Chicago school has emerged another conflict sociologist, It is George B. Vold, the criminologist mostly known by his book Theoretical Criminology (1967).⁶ As a conflict theorist, Vold represents a bridge between early conflict writers (Small, Cooley, Veblen) and such contemporary conflict theorists as L. Coser (U.S.A.) and R. Dahrendorf (West Germany).

Vold's work discloses Small's and Cooley's influence, as well as that of Park and Burgess. "Conflict is viewed, therefore, as one of the principal and essential social processes upon which the continuing on-going of society depends." (Vold, 1967: 204).⁷ As a criminologist, Vold was among few to explain crime in terms of conflict process. The following passage illustrates this point well.

In other words, the whole political process of law making, law breaking, and law enforcement becomes a direct reflection of deep-seated and fundamental conflicts between interest groups and their more general struggles for the control of the police power of the state. Those who produce legislative majorities win control over the police power and dominate the policies that decide who is likely to be involved in violation of the law. (ibid., 208-209).⁸

The contemporary conflict theorist Ralf Dahrendorf has summarized the conflict perspective in sociology in the following four basic tenets:

- (1) Every society is at every point subject to processes of change; social change is ubiquitous.
- (2) Every society displays at every point dissensus and conflict; social conflict is ubiquitous.
- (3) Every element in a society renders a contribution to its disintegration and change.
- (4) Every society is based on the coercion of some of its members by others.

(Dahrendorf, 1965: 162)

It is not that the dialectical perspective is somehow hidden in the above assumptions, but rather that some of them are components of a

more complex dialectical ontologico-epistemological paradigm. In other words, every conflict perspective is not per se dialectical, but every dialectical approach or paradigm does incorporate some form of conflict model.

In his formative period Albion Small was influenced by European conflict theorists. One of them was Simmel, the dialectician among the European classics. The conflict model is an inherent part of the dialectical paradigm. Was then Small a dialectical thinker? His sociology at least bears some traits of dialectic, which will be emphasized later in the integrated discussion. For the time being, only some instances of dialectical elements of thought in Small's works will be touched upon.

From Simmel, Small has taken the conception of sociology as a study of social relations. In its rudimentary form this conception involves dialectical reciprocity (interaction). In Small's words, "The structural or static phase of social occurrences is a sort of mirage", as R. and G. Hinkle say, "... because it is only a provisional representation of a tension of forces constantly rearranging itself and, consequently, never really static" (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1963: 8). The "provisional representation" and "mirage" here clearly stand for dialectical differentiation between appearance and reality, or what we have also termed the "dialectical paradox".

Still another instance of a dialectical viewpoint is Small's frequent emphasis on historical perspective in social research. "Sociology is primarily historical and analytical", says Small, and to this he adds: "Knowledge of society, as a fact extending through the past and filling the present, depends upon particular knowledge of persons, events, and

achievements past and present, in all the relations in which they have a permanent meaning." (1894: 56).

A possible objection that this position reflects a 19th-century social science, can be dismissed by the fact that the same emphasis on historical explanation is found in Small's much later work in 1924.⁹ It has also been carried into the present by scholars such as P. A. Sorokin, Barrington Moore, Jr., and E. H. Carr.¹⁰

Describing historical schools in each of the major divisions of social science, Small says: "We cannot fully know any human fact, or any human situation, without knowing it in its relations as a consequence of its antecedents." (1924: 17).¹¹ The same emphasis on historical perspective permeates Small's discussion of Savigny and the historical school of jurisprudence with the factor of "continuity as a phase of human experience".¹²

Dialectical Reciprocity¹³

Dialectical reciprocity or mutual interrelatedness is probably the most common dialectical element found in almost any scientific conception. In social science it is widely applied and is in fact inherent and therefore inevitable. Unfortunately, the dialectic is too often reduced to this single element, and all too often a conception based on interaction reciprocity is automatically called dialectical.¹⁴

Dialectical reciprocity is already implicit in the Simmelian conception of sociology as a science of human interaction, which Small took over from Simmel. A constant interaction between economic, political, and ideological factors in society is in fact at the root of Small's explanation of social change.¹⁵ And finally, the Simmelian conception of conflict as a form of sociation, on which Small had based his theory of conflict of interests, presupposes interaction or reciprocity.

The same holds good for Robert E. Park who was considerably influenced by Simmel. Interaction was the dominant social process for Park. His interest was primarily focussed on interaction and on types of relationships, among which the most typical processes in operation in the community are competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. Even Park's definition of a community as a territorially organized population possessing mutually interdependent individual units in symbiotic relationship is based on the idea of dialectical reciprocity. "In Park's view", says L. Coser, "society is best conceived as the product of interactions between component individuals which are controlled by a body of traditions and norms that arise in the process of interaction." (Coser, 1971: 358).

The concept of dialectical reciprocity, of course, looms large in George H. Mead's theory of self and society, and it is of interest to note that Coser's interpretation of Park is in the same vein. "To Park the self is constituted by the individual's conception of his role, and this role in its turn is built upon the recognition others in society accord the status upon which roles are based." (ibid., 365).

Social interaction is for Park only the most general and all-inclusive social process. More specific and elementary processes operative in human communities are, according to Park, communication and competition. "Communication and competition are elementary social processes by which the continued existence of the urban community, as an organic and functional unit, is insured and maintained" (Park, 1952: 122).

The dialectical reciprocity which figures so prominently in the thought of G. H. Mead, is clearly noticeable in the above citations from Park. However, the clearest statement of dialectical reciprocity can be

found in Park's Introduction to the Science of Sociology:

The idea of interaction is not a notion of common sense. It represents the culmination of long-continued reflection by human beings in their ceaseless effort to resolve the ancient paradox of unity in diversity, the "one" and the "many", to find law and order in the apparent chaos of physical changes and social events; and thus to find explanations for the behavior of the universe, of society, and of man. (1969: 339).

Or, a little later Park says, "Society exists wherever several individuals are in reciprocal relationship. This reciprocity arises always from specific impulses or by virtue of specific purpose" (ibid., 348).

Moreover, for Park, both "culture" and "civilization" are products of social interaction and of social organization.¹⁶ His concept of "natural areas" as distinct communities within the urban settlement, is described as a process which selects, and is selected by, individuals on impersonal grounds (ibid., 109).

George H. Mead (1863-1931), whose teaching at the University of Chicago has set the foundation of modern social interactionism, is well known for his dialectical conception of interdependence and reciprocity between the self and society, and between being and consciousness. Among others, this presence of dialectic in the thought of G. H. Mead was noted by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967), Bedrich Baumann (1969), Peter L. Berger (1970), James E. Curtis and John S. Petras (1970), and by Irving M. Zeitlin (1973). On this point B. Baumann is quite explicit:

In our view Mead is neither an idealist nor a subjectivist, but - along with Hegel and Marx - one of the greatest figures in the history of dialectics whose deep insights into man and society exclude any subjective onesidedness (1969: 203).

Mead's basic theories of social interaction, of interaction of the self and the society, of the emergence of consciousness as a thought-stream arising in the dynamic relationship between a person and his social

environment, and the relationship of 'I' and 'Me' are all definitely dialectical in character.

In the conversation of gestures what we say, calls out a certain response in another and that in turn changes our own action so that we shift from what we started to do because of the reply the other makes. The conversation of gestures is the beginning of communication (Mead, 1934: 140-141).

One more example will suffice. Mead discusses the dialectical reciprocity between the human individual and the community.

Indeed, any psychological and philosophical treatment of human nature involves the assumption that the human individual belongs to an organized social community, and derives his human nature from his social interactions and relations with that community as a whole and with the other individual members of it. (Mead, 1934: 229).

Mead considered individuals always with reference to their relations to groups of their significant others. By doing this, he engaged in a discussion of the ubiquitous dialectic between the individual and the group. The same holds for Mead's contention that social change and personality change are reciprocally connected.

As Peter Berger says,

This dialectic between social structure and psychological reality may be called the fundamental proposition of any social psychology in the Meadian tradition. Society not only defines but creates psychological reality. The individual realizes himself in society - that is, he recognizes his identity in socially defined terms and these definitions become reality as he lives in society. This fundamentally Meadian dialectic makes intelligible the social-psychological scope of W. I. Thomas' concept of the "definition of the situation" as well as of Merton's of the "self-fulfilling prophecy" (1970: 375).

It is of interest to notice here the striking similarity between the ideas of G. H. Mead and certain formulations of Simmel:

The simplest and most fundamental instance of what is meant here is self-awareness, which is also the original phenomenon of the mind as something humanly alive. The "I" not only confronts itself, making itself as knower the object of its own knowing;

but it even judges itself as a third party, esteems or depreciates itself, and so is put above itself. It moves beyond itself constantly, and yet remains in itself, since its subject and object are here identical. The self articulates this identity in the intellectual process of knowing itself without thereby mutilating it. (Simmel, 1971: 363-364).

Or again, in Simmel's thought on the dialectic of consciousness and society:

Every relationship between persons gives rise to a picture of each in the other; and this picture, obviously, interacts with the actual relation. The relation constitutes the condition under which the conception, that each has of the other, takes this or that shape and has its truth legitimated. On the other hand, the real interaction between the individuals is based upon the pictures which they acquire of one another. Here we have one of the deep-lying circuits of intellectual life, where an element presupposes a second element which yet, in turn, presupposes the first. (Simmel, 1964b: 309).

During his studies in Germany (Leipzig and Berlin) G. H. Mead had very likely listened to Simmel's lectures. Lewis Coser allows for that possibility (Coser, 1971: 343), and it seems proper to conclude that Mead's dialectic in his formative years has been strongly influenced by Simmel's dialectical thought.

No emphasis is needed nowadays on the widely accepted position that human action as interaction has become an essential characteristic of the sociological perspective. The dialectic is, as Gurvitch had argued, a must for any sociology proper.

Dialectical reciprocity, of course, can be found in other scholars of the Chicago tradition. Anthropologist Robert Redfield is among them. His rural and peasant communities are always seen as interacting with nearby urban communities and with the larger society of which they are parts. Also, his 'civilizations' are conceived as systems of coexisting and interdependent "Great Traditions": the science, philosophy, fine arts

of the critical and reflective few - and "Little Tradition": the folk art, lore, religion of the unreflective many.

Dialectical reciprocity is particularly vivid in Redfield's idea of interaction between the two types. "Beneath and within this high culture live the common people, whose "Little Tradition" is creator and then creature of the philosophy, science and fine art of the "Great Tradition" (Redfield, 1962, Vol. I: 303).

Oppositions and Conflict Relationships

Oppositions and conflict occupy a significant place in the works and conceptions of A. W. Small and R. E. Park, and can to some extent be detected in R. Redfield, although in a much modified and special sense.

Directly related to dialectical reciprocity and most typical of Park's conflict perspective, is the often quoted paragraph from Park's

Introduction to the Science of Sociology:

Every society represents an organization of elements more or less antagonistic to each other but united for the moment, at least, by an arrangement which defines the reciprocal relations and respective spheres of action of each. This accommodation, this modus vivendi, may be relatively permanent as in a society constituted by castes, or quite transitory as in societies made up of open classes. In either case, the accommodation, while it is maintained, secures for the individual or for the group a recognized status. (Park, 1969: 665).

In numerous ways Park continued Simmel's ideas. As Coser says, "Park's general approach to society as a system of interactions, and his more specific ideas such as those on social conflict, the marginal man, the characteristics of urban dwellers, and social distance, were all stimulated by Simmel." (1971: 374).

While A. Small was primarily interested in class conflict, Park's basic concern was race conflict, to the investigation of which he devoted a considerable part of his time and energy.

Park used to differentiate between prejudice and social distance on the one hand, and racial antagonism and conflict on the other. As Coser says, "The former operate when the subordinate accepts his inferior status; the latter arise when he is not willing to do so" (1971: 361). Park's views disclose that racial conflicts and antagonisms strongly indicate that the existing and traditional order is breaking and that previous accommodations are inadequate and inefficient. "Racial conflicts are harbingers of change in the racial status order", says Coser in his interpretation of Park's views on race (ibid.).

Of particular interest here is the structure of Park's thought, which, we may say without seriously stretching the imagination, comes close to Marx's dialectical model. First, the idea of four major social processes is presented. Competition dominates as the most prevalent among them. Then, through various forms of rivalry and war, conflict emerges as the determinant of status position in society. Accommodation implies a cessation of conflict when the relations of superordination and subordination have been temporarily fixed and controlled. Finally, change occurs when traditional accommodations break down under the impact of antagonism and conflict, and these conflicts prepare the way for a new accommodation between the contending parties.

We see then, that oppositions generate change. What alone is missing is the concept of revolution as a form of conflict resolution as is the case in the Marxian scheme. Instead, Park used accommodation as the basic mechanism of conflict resolution in his model of race relations.

Albion W. Small was a genuine conflict theorist. His intellectual background was the classical conflict tradition formulated in the works

of G. Ratzenhofer, L. Gumplowicz, K. Marx, A. Smith, and G. Simmel. In this respect Small was unique in American sociology. This background, as well as his socialist leanings, led Small to examine the structure and dynamics of capitalist society in terms of class interest and conflicts.

Following Ratzenhofer, Small relates class conflict to the state organization and thus views the conflict between economic classes as a struggle within and about the state (Page, 1969: 123). Although ideally the state as a mediating agency is above classes, it is the economic classes which struggle for the control of the state (ibid.). In this, "the State is a union of disunions, a conciliation of conflicts, a harmony of discords" (Small, 1905: 252-53). In other words, expressed in the language of dialectic, Small viewed the state as a unity of opposites.

In the Marxian manner, Small stressed ownership or non-ownership of property as indices of class position. His class model was basically dichotomous (the rulers and ruled, the haves and have-nots, conservatives and radicals, as the following excerpt indicates.

... we find that there has always been a more or less evident division of men into those who looked upon life with the eyes of those who had reached secure standing ground, and those who regarded things from the situation of those who were struggling for place. The former have always been the minority. Their presumption has always been that things were about as well settled as could be, and that all good citizens should be content with the established order. The latter have always been the vast majority, and as a rule the social influence of the two strata at a given moment has been, let us say, at a venture, something like the inverse of the cube of their numbers (Small, 1912: 808).

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In accordance with his ethical humanitarianism, Small, however, was prone to see the resolution of class conflict in a form of a middle-road adjustment between individualism and socialism, that is, in cooperation of capital and labour, which he called "socialization".

Although revolution as conflict resolution in the Marxist sense is missing from Small's conception of class conflict, a partial dialectic is here present nevertheless. Conflict of interests leads to a synthesis found in cooperation and socialization. The similarity to Park's model of racial conflict and assimilation process, as a conflict resolution, is obvious.

It would be possible to view Robert Redfield's ideal-type construct of "folk society" and its implicit opposing type of "urban society" (later replaced by "civilized society") as conceptual opposites. But, then, by the same token, every dichotomous typology, including Redfield's dynamic continuum of folk-urban, could be considered as consisting of dialectical opposites. This could easily lead to a superficial conclusion that the thought of virtually every social science scholar of prominence is dialectical. As in any research, the exercise of caution is necessary.

Therefore, we must look for possible dialectical elements in other works of R. Redfield. And they can indeed be found, primarily in his methodological essays entitled The Little Community. There, the basic holistic conception of anthropology borders on the dialectical category of totality, for Redfield views little communities not only in holistic terms, but also as a combination of opposites. As an experienced field-worker, he well understood that one and the same community has more than one face.

The question now is addressed particularly to the possibility that this one community before us may be described not as having just "this" content but as having also "that" content - that it may be two things of the same kind: two views of the world, two types of personality, two sets of emphasized values, two kinds of social relationships. I ask if this may be true in some little communities or perhaps in all of them. I ask further if this

possibility can be made the basis of another deliberate instrument of understanding and description of band or village. The community may have more than one face; it may, within the guidance of any descriptive concept, be understood not simply as just "this" but as also "that" (Redfield, 1963: 133).

Commenting further on the criticism of Oscar Lewis, addressed to Redfield's report on Tepoztlan, Redfield says in the same place:

It seems to me that with the recognition of the influence of personal choices on the resulting description we arrive at the possibility of combining two contrasting viewpoints into a combined viewpoint of a protean and unattainable absolute reality. I think we may well conceive of the process by which understanding of human wholes is advanced as a kind of dialectic of viewpoint, a dialogue of characterizations. "This," but on the other hand "that," is the orderly swing of the mind toward truth (ibid, 137).

The similarity of the above paragraph to what P. Sorokin, following Nicolaus Cusansus, called "coincidentia oppositorum," is striking. And Sorokin described later his own philosophical conception of "integralism" as dialectical.¹⁸

Naturally, within the context of his discussion with O. Lewis, Redfield was talking of different, contrasting, and even opposing views of the same community arrived at by two different researchers. But the question remains, how they could have come to contrasting and opposing views if the object of their study is characterized by a definite set of traits? We are left with the conclusion that social reality is most likely ontologically dialectical, that is to say, that it is a coincidentia oppositorum.

When Redfield in the same essay says, "In every isolated little community there is civilization; in every city there is a folk society" (ibid., 146), one cannot ask for a better illustration of the dialectical unity of opposites. Redfield even concludes his chapter with a direct note on dialectic.

All advance in knowledge is a dialectic, a conversation. To hear the relative truth of what one is one's self saying one must listen to what the other worker says about what one's self has described otherwise. The point I have striven to make in this chapter is that, among the many and varied mental instruments for the understanding of little communities, is to be included a controlled conversation, a dialectic of opposites, carried on within one's self (ibid., 148).

Proposing thus, an internal and external dialectical dialogue, Redfield underlines the old legal adage of every justice: Audiatur et altera pars (Let us hear the other side).

The View of Totality

When Redfield states that in every isolated little community there is civilization, and that in every city there is a folk society, he is expressing not only the unity of opposites, but also the viewpoint of totality. That is to say, in every particularity there is generality, and vice versa.

As an anthropologist and researcher on small communities, Redfield always insisted on an holistic approach. This was, however, a common characteristic of most functionalists in anthropology. We want to see, therefore, on what point, if any, Redfield differs from other members of his profession.

In addition to insisting on the viewpoint which considers any one community in its entirety, as a whole, Redfield stressed the existing relationship of any particular community to the larger community in which it is implicated. He spoke of "a community within communities, a whole within other wholes" (1963: 114), and tried to develop models for viewing adequately such interrelationships of distinct human entities, among which human community is a prominent one. Needless to say, this holistic perspective is completely opposed to the viewpoint and model of research

whereby the community is atomized by the investigation of a single and specific problem within its boundaries.¹⁹

Besides, in his comments on peasant communities, Redfield underlines the long established interdependence between such communities and the gentry and nearby towns. In this manner he has recognized the systems that connect the small community with other such communities, within the nation, and with industrial systems wider than the nation.²¹ His view of peasant culture and community is consistently seen as inextricably related to the civilization of which it is an inherent part.

Thus we see, Redfield transcends the narrow holism of the classical anthropologists (of course in a different case - the peasantry), and thereby comes closer to dialectical totality.

However, dialectical totality, as we have shown in the first part of this work, involves contradictions, and we are puzzled as to why, or whether, they are missing from Redfield's analyses. Yes, and no, depending on the viewpoint. He definitely considered human communities as entities containing, and characterized by, a combination of opposites. But Redfield's view of the opposing qualities is quite static. What is opposed in his conception seem to be the static qualities, and it is a far cry from the dynamics of the opposing forces which are responsible for generating change in Hegel's or Marx's dialectical paradigm.

A view of totality permeates much of A. W. Small's writings. On the organizational plan of sociological discipline he argued against compartmentalization of social sciences (as mentioned earlier), and for a more inclusive view of social totality, which he thought sociology is called upon to fulfil.

"Sociology deals with the whole of social life.", says Small in the first manual of sociology that he published as early as 1894.²¹ Twenty years later, as a guide for the immediate future of social research he says: "Final interpretation of human experience is not to be found in abstractions from experience but in composition of abstractions into a reflection of the totality of experience" (Small, 1924: 36).

Repeatedly, Small insisted on comprehension of total phenomena, on showing "the human whole", and not the study of mere parts. He used to warn against the danger of separating social reality into disciplines such as history, economics, and politics which missed human reality precisely by fragmenting it.²²

A broader perspective of the totality category is not easily found in the works of Robert E. Park. To some extent this is also the case with R. Redfield. This should not be surprising. Both men were primarily students of communities as local territorial groups, more or less in the classical anthropological tradition, and their conceptions of totality therefore remained basically on a comparatively limited holistic level. As Maurice Stein says, while referring to American community studies, "The unity of study is always the total community: (1960: 9).

One of the methodological precepts of Park indicates, however, a glance toward a wider category of totality. Events were thought of by Park in terms of process, and their interpretation was first within a social frame of reference, and then, in a sociological frame of reference (Bogardus, 1966: 556-7). Now, if research begins with individual acts or events, it is only a beginning. To achieve its goals the research must strive to attain a sociological frame of reference.²³ And this sociological frame of reference, if A. Small's dictum is applied, is totality.

Participant Observation Method as a Dialectical Process

In his critique of the philosophy of empiricism in contemporary psychosocial sciences, R. Sorokin criticized the metaphysical separation of subject of cognition (knower, the researcher) from the object of cognition (phenomenon studied), in the approach which calls itself "positivism", "logical positivism", "operationalism", etc. In the latter universe of discourse, these two aspects of cognition are seen as mutually independent and separated by a chasm from each other (Sorokin, 1956b: 279).

Sorokin here forcefully argued for the significant role of super-conscious intuition in scientific discovery; he asserts that it is possible for the knower and the known to merge into one unity, and that some degree of merging is necessary for any accurate cognition of an object.²⁴

In Sorokin's opinion "the True Reality", "the coincidentia oppositorum", can be attained only by the intuitional identification or merging of the knower and the known into oneness (ibid., 287-9).

"When in opposing the subject and object, intellectual theory abstracts them both from Being (reality), it makes the apprehension of Being impossible. To oppose knowledge and Being is to exclude knowledge from Being", says Sorokin, quoting Hindu and Buddhist logicians (ibid., 290).

Obviously, Sorokin was not criticizing the Chicago sociologists, but a more recent brand of empiricism. As is well known, Sorokin considered his own conception of society dialectical, and he even calls the approach of intuition to knowledge, described by Hindu logicians, a case of "brilliant dialectical logic" (ibid.).

Dialectic maintains a specific perspective on subject-object relationship. First of all, any separation of the two is straightforwardly

rejected as metaphysical. Any separation of the knower and the known cannot be the ground of real cognition. On the contrary, subject and object merge; they are reciprocally related and mediate each other. We are, thus, in the presence of the Marxian dialectic.

All the known materialist philosophers before Marx had conceived of man and of his thinking process abstractly. They used to interpret the object, reality, as something given, as something that the subject reflects and therefore becomes cognizant of. However, what they did not grasp was that the object, nature, is in fact human nature and a 'thing-hood' made by man. Neither did they grasp that historical nature does not exist without man, nor man outside of nature.

Thus, in this conception, the subject ceases to be a passive subject which reflects reality, and reality ceases to be an object which is passively reflected.

In other words, before Marx, the materialists like Feuerbach used to treat "material reality" as the determinant of human activity, and did not consider the reciprocal modification of the object (the world) by the subject (i.e., by the activity of men). In fact what exists in reality is a constant reciprocity between consciousness and human praxis. Marx makes this clear in his first thesis on Feuerbach:

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism - but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence, in Das Wesen des Christentums, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judicial manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of "revolutionary," of practical-critical, activity (Marx, 1972: 107).

The Marxists who really grasped the meaning of the above thesis (for instance, Lukács or Horkheimer) stressed the active element in cognition. As Horkheimer later argued, the objects of perception are themselves the product of man's actions.²⁵

So far, we have considered the substantive aspects of the works of some of the Chicago scholars. Considering the Golden Age of the school to be between 1920 and 1932, it can safely be stated that their major contribution, in substantive terms, was to urban sociology and to community studies in general. The theoretical orientation of the most influential men at the Chicago school (Small and Park) was predominantly a conflict perspective. Simmel's influence is clearly present in their works, as well as in the works of such younger members as Redfield and Louis Wirth.

Thus two moments ought to be stressed for a clearer understanding of the orientation and achievement of the Chicago school. First, European, and in particular Simmel's influence was strong. In this respect, continuity is established with German formal sociology. Second, a new quality is found primarily in the empirico-practical orientation of this sociology. This moment or aspect represents the discontinuity from the former speculative, arm-chair and philosophical orientation widespread in both Europe and North America.

Now, with respect to the methodological component, a real breakthrough was accomplished by Park and his students. The complex methodology of urban community research was for the first time successfully applied on a large scale on American soil. Park was against sociology conceived as armchair philosophizing, and on the contrary insisted that real research should only begin with people where they really live and with what they are doing.

The urban community researchers, therefore, relied on available statistics, on existing reports and documents (both official and private), on biographies and interviewing, and above all on the method of participant observation.

To the extent that Chicago sociologists were investigating what they called "natural areas", or subcommunities of the large city, by means of participant observation, their methodology, we may say, carried characteristics of the dialectical approach.

It is the thesis of this chapter that field-work methodology, also called qualitative methodology, is per se based on dialectical reciprocity between subject and object, and therefore is the social science methodology closest to dialectical conceptions.

The field-work methodology of participant observations well reflects the dialectical relationship between subject and object in social research, and therefore, we may say, that where dialectic is most clearly present, is precisely in the Chicago school's methodology of participant observation.²⁶

It was stated above that the participant observation method is based on dialectical reciprocity of subject and object. Traditional empiricism, still present today in American ultra positivism, employs primarily quantitative techniques of research, and therefore claims to be more scientific. The participant observation method on the other hand is based on direct and personal interaction of the researcher with the members of the studied group. The subject (the observer), and the object (the field situation) are thus brought into direct contact. They merge and mutually interact, thereby guaranteeing to the observer, of course, depending on the degree of involvement, firsthand knowledge of the field-situation.

It is one of the central tenets of Marxist dialectic that the truth can be best discovered in human practice. And the corollary of this position is the principle of unity of theory and practice. "The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question", says Marx in his second thesis on Feuerbach (Marx, 1972: 108). This position can be supported by the thought of J. J. Rousseau, which states: "We see other's actions only to the extent that we act ourselves.", as well as by Karl Kautsky, who was convinced that "A man never gets far with mere looking-on, without entering into things practically" (Kautsky, 1953: XII).

Of all the methods in social science, it is precisely the method of participant observation which possesses in the highest degree these qualities of unity of subject and object in the process of cognition, as well as the unity of theory and practice emphasized by modern dialectics.

"To be more objective about man in society, social science today must become more subjectively adequate.", says T. S. Bruyn in his recent book on participant observation (1966: 163). The method of participant observation, the most salient one in the studies of communities, is complex and very demanding on a researcher. It requires, although this is not always realized, the most complete social-science training, including a knowledge of linguistics, economy, history and social psychology. Conrad Arensberg, one of the protagonists of this method, has described the community study method as necessarily comparative, multifactoral, and naturalistic, and aimed at studying behaviour and attitudes as objects in vivo, through observation, rather than in vitro, through isolation and

abstraction, or in a model through experiment (1965: 29-31).

A similar idea is also expressed by S. T. Bruyn in his distinction between traditional empiricism (positivism, behaviourism), a mode which tends toward quantitative research, and participant observation as qualitative research, a more interpretative type of inquiry (Bruyn, 1966).

In this type of inquiry, the participant-observer (subject) by his mere presence and participation is to some degree influencing the field-situation (object), and the object, on the other hand, reciprocally influences the subject. Thus mutual modification and mediation of each results in a synthesis which is realized and presented in the field-work report. This, of course, has its advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is in a more insightful and adequate report, while the disadvantage consists in a certain degree of almost inevitable distortion of both the situation and the researcher's report.

One of the inherent characteristics of community studies, both anthropological and sociological, is their holistic character. In that respect they are approaching the dialectical conception of totality. What they often fail to examine is not so much the lack of relationship between the community and the larger society, but more often the location of such a community within the larger context of the economic and political organization of the society in question. This was a drawback of the Chicago studies as well.

One last comment must be made here. The demands of Albion Small for relevancy, historicity, a critical approach, and understanding in totality, were almost non-existent in Park's papers on urban communities. What methodological value the Chicago studies possess is precisely their

practico-empirical directness of field-work approach. Thus, by uniting subject and object through direct observation, participation, and reporting, the Chicago sociologists established a dialectical relationship between the two essential components of research. We would dare to say that this is one of the principal reasons for the wide popularity of this school in the history of sociology.²⁷

FOOTNOTES (Chapter VI)

1. Le Play, Frédéric, L'Organization de la Famille, Tours, 1884; Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People in London, London, Macmillan Co., Ltd., 1902; Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, Stanford University Press, 1968.
2. On Simmel's influence on Park, see in particular Lewis A. Coser, Masters of Sociological Thought, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971, p. 374.
3. Albion Small studied also in Germany for a period of two years, and he was in the first place responsible for the importation of Simmel's ideas to the American audience. A number of essays and selections from Simmel's Soziologie were translated and published by Small in The American Journal of Sociology at the turn of the century.
4. In E. Becker's words, "Albion Small is contemporary. And the reason is that for the first time since the 1920's there is again deep searching for what sociology is, should be, or might be." (1971: 3).
5. "In the mind of Small the social process turns out to be two social processes, namely, conflict and co-operation, with the latter playing an increasingly influential role" (Bogardus, 1966: 439).
6. Vold studied at the University of Chicago, where he received his M.A. Degree in 1924. He received his Ph.D. later at the University of Minnesota, where he became full professor in 1937. Don Martindale has also classified Vold among conflict theorists. See his The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1960, pp. 200-207.
7. Vold's reliance on A. Small and C. Cooley can be seen in the following paragraph: "The normal principle of social organization is that groups are formed out of situations in which members have common interests and common needs that can be best furthered through collective action. In other words, groups arise out of important needs of group members, and groups must serve the needs of the members or they soon wither away and disappear. New groups are therefore continuously being formed as new interests arise, and existing groups weaken and disappear when they no longer have a purpose to serve. Groups come into conflict with one another as the interest and purposes they serve tend to overlap, encroach on one another, and become competitive. In other words, conflicts between groups occur principally when the groups become competitive by attempting to operate in the same general field of interaction." (Vold, 1967: 205). In fact Vold refers on the same page to both A. Small and C. Cooley.

8. Vold here relies on Edwin H. Sutherland who can also be viewed as a conflict theorist.

Of special interest is the recent popularity of the conflict model, and even a proliferation of dialectical elements in British and American criminology and the so-called sociology of deviance. See in particular Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, The New Criminology: for a Social Theory of Deviance, London and Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973. As further instances generated by American scholars in this field, one could enumerate Edwin Schur, Our Criminal Society, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1969; Jack Douglas (ed.), Deviance and Respectability, New York, Basic Books, 1970, and in particular the conflict perspective advanced by American criminologist Austin Turk, Criminality and the Legal Order, Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 1969.

9. See Albion W. Small, Origins of Sociology, New York, Russel & Russel, 1924. Significantly the book was reissued in 1967, which is another indication of Small's contemporary importance. See in particular Ch. II (The Thibaut-Savigny Controversy: Continuity as a Phase of Human Experience).
10. The dialectical elements in the thought of these scholars is discussed in the next chapter which deals with historical sociology.
11. One cannot help noting the similarity of this phrase to one of the prescriptions of Durkheim in his Rules of Sociological Method.
12. See for this Albion W. Small, Origins of Sociology, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1924, Chs. II and XIX.
13. Dialectical reciprocity was earlier discussed as one of the five operational procedures of dialectic of G. Gurvitch (Chapter V). It is also implied as an element in the dialectical category of totality.
14. This conception is widespread in American sociology. L. A. Coser has already been mentioned as an example. Another widely read source is the book by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (1967), essentially a phenomenologically oriented essay on the sociology of knowledge.
15. See Charles S. Page, Class and American Sociology, New York, Schocken Books, 1969, p. 121.
16. See Alvin Boskoff, The Theory in American Sociology, Boston, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970, p. 98.
17. For the discovery of this important thought of Small the writer is indebted to Charles Page, Class and American Sociology, New York, Schocken Books, 1969. Small's basic dichotomous model was later in

General Sociology (1905) modified to a trichotomous model of three classes: "the privileged", "the middle class", and "those without property, rights or influence". When compared to the Marxian dialectical approach to society, this is, of course, a non-dialectical position, and for the purpose of our analysis points to non-dialectical elements in Small's thought.

18. See more on this in next chapter. Also in P. A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, Vol. IV, 1941, Ch. 13; P. A. Sorokin, "Reply to My Critics", in Philip J. Allen (ed.), Pitirim A. Sorokin in Review, Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1963.
19. See in particular Robert Redfield, The Little Community, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1963, Chs. 9 and 10.
20. See Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1963, Ch. 2, (Peasantry: Part Societies).
21. "Society is a complex of activities and movements originated by the energy of those physical and psychical attributes which determine human motives. These elementary factors of social activity produce social phenomena that fall into groups, each of which is distinguished by certain common peculiarities. Society cannot be known through one of these phenomena only, any more than matter can be known through a single one of its properties. Each of these groups of facts must be known separately, and then in its actual relation to coexisting groups, before society or social life can be understood" (Small, 1894: 55).
22. See more on this in Ernest Becker, Lost Science of Man, George Brazillier, New York, 1971, pp. 18, 22, 65.
23. See more on this in Emory S. Bogardus, The Development of Social Thought, New York, David McKay Co., Inc., 1966; pp. 656-57.
24. To the above two assertions Sorokin adds a third one: a claim that a complete merging is the only way for the adequate cognition of the "ultimate or true reality". This "reality" is of course described as "unutterable", "inexpressible", that can only be symbolized, and in exceptional cases intuitively communicated by merging of the minds of the communicants (Sorokin, 1956: 287). One can easily see that modern science is not interested in any "ultimate or true reality", but prefers to leave this to metaphysics.
25. See Martin Jay, Dialectical Imagination, Boston, Little Brown, 1973, p. 53.
26. Reflecting on the Chicago school and their study of natural areas, Maurice Stein says: "'Natural areas' as an object of inquiry have received little attention in recent years and the whole social-anthropological field tradition, which figures so large in Park's methodology, has given way to statistical and ecological research.

... Everett Hughes and his students remain the most important descendants of Park now working in the field of sociology" (Stein, 1960: 28).

Of course, the two classical community studies of American sociology, Middletown by Robert and Helen Lynd, and Street Corner Society by W. F. Whyte, both of which were based on participant observation, were not direct products of the Chicago school. Nevertheless, their authors conducted their research in the second and third decades of this century, precisely when the Chicago community studies culminated in the works of R. E. Park and his students.

27. It is of interest to note that the British authors of a recent critical text in criminology emphasize a specifically sociological critique of prevailing social conditions on the part of the Chicagoans. They stress their detailed empirical research-orientation, as well as their implicitly biological conception of society. All this is supportive of our account of the same school. However, the same authors hold the Chicago ecological tradition as "most responsible for the continuing hold of positivistic assumptions in American sociology". Continuing in their critical vein they also say: "The abstraction and anti-theoretical nature of much of American sociology (and criminology) can best be explained, not as the legacy of Durkheim being translated for home consumption by Merton, but as the legacy of the scientism of Comte translated into naturalistic observation for quantification and codification by technologists attached to the sociology departments" (Taylor, et al., 1973: 110-112).

CHAPTER VII

HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY AND DIALECTIC

Dialectic is primarily a theory of social change. History, in general terms, is largely a study of changes in human societies. Thus dialectic, as a theory of change of man's distinctive reality is inextricably related to the history of mankind. In other words, the dialectic is inherently historical, and every authentic human history is dialectical.

The above preamble provides a rationale for the examination of another type of dialectic to be found in sociology and the related social sciences. This type is present in the historical sociology of P. A. Sorokin, Barrington Moore Jr., and in, for example, the sociological history of E. H. Carr. These three eminent scholars are here chosen as examples of the historical tradition in sociology.

The most significant works and theories of P. A. Sorokin deal with the problems of social change. The same can be said for the contemporary sociologist B. Moore Jr. Their long-span historical and cross-cultural generalizations can be compared with the grand theories of civilizations of A. Toynbee and O. Spengler.

As a contemporary historian, E. H. Carr analyses the human events of the modern era in their processes of change. Thus, a common ground is established for the investigation of dialectic in historical sociology and in sociological history.¹

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

In a paper on Sorokin, Arthur K. Davis has expressed the opinion that North American sociologists have not learned enough of what Sorokin

offered to his students and what he stood for (Davis, 1967: 1-7).

Contemporary sociology on this continent in the decades following the Second World War has indeed largely ignored Sorokin, although he was still in the prime of his creative capacity during this period.

The time of grand theorizing and of system-building in sociology has seemed to many writers to be a matter of the past. The great classics of European sociology had faded from the scene by the second decade of the 20th century. And sociology, in the effort to become more exact and scientific, has assumed mainly the character of an empirical science. The German formal school of sociology was in decline, and the only systemizer left was Leopold von Wiese (1876-1969). In France, Durkheim left a school of able followers in such scholars as Marcel Mauss, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and Maurice Halbwachs. In American sociology Sorokin stands as a solitary giant whose scholarship is firmly rooted in the European classical tradition.

Compared to the Marxian approach to society, non-Marxian sociologists lacked a coherent and general theory of society. From this perspective, Sorokin's system of analytical sociology, as well as the grand theorizing of Talcott Parsons, can be seen as an effort to fill that void.

The reasons for the relative neglect of Sorokin's numerous works in American sociology are complex. One of them has already been mentioned - the strong empirical trend in sociology. Another contributing factor was likely Sorokin's classical European training. This was responsible for his distinctive outlook on social reality, which was not very congenial to the North American mind and cultural background. In addition, Sorokin's extremely critical stand toward American social science and toward Sensate culture in general, played a significant part. As a scholar, Sorokin

considered criticism to be his duty to his profession, to society, and to humanity. He simply refused to play the role of a nice, docile American-immigrant scholar. No wonder, then, that he had to bear the consequences in the form of a negative labeling by the academic community.

Despite his academic position (professor and chairman of the Sociology Department at Harvard University), this lack of acceptance by American academic circles has meant a negative attitude toward his ideas and theories, and consequently an insufficient appreciation of this eminent scholar.

The dialectic is inherently historical, and the major works of P. A. Sorokin are distinctly of an historical nature. His theory of social change, as well as his treatment of various social institutions historically bear the traits of the dialectical approach.

Sorokin's opus encompasses a huge variety of sociological studies. Among other works, his theory of socio-cultural change is the best known and most original. If one wants to search for possible dialectical elements in the conceptions of this eminent scholar, then his theory of immanent causes of social change must be considered first. It is also in this theory that the dialectical element in Sorokin's thought is most likely to be illustrated.

Historical sociology is the study of social change and development over long periods of time. In this respect, Sorokin's theory of socio-cultural dynamics belongs to the same group as Oswald Spengler's study of emergence and dissolution of cultures, and Arnold Toynbee's studies of historical civilizations. These modern theorists of the 20th century had their forerunners in the cyclical theories of Vico and Comte.

Sorokin's macrosociological analysis of two major socio-cultural supersystems - Ideational versus Sensate - in Graeco-Roman and Western societies is well known, and has often been commented upon in the recent past (F. R. Cowell, 1952; N. S. Timasheff, 1955; C. P. Loomis, 1961; P. J. Allen, 1963; A. K. Davis, 1967, 1970a; A. Boskoff, 1970; F. R. Allen, 1971). No extensive description is therefore needed, beyond a brief summary as a reminder.

Based on his extensive research, with some twenty collaborators, Sorokin set forth the results and his conclusions in four bulky volumes (together some 2800 pages) entitled Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937-1941).

Sorokin's conclusions (summarily described here with the unavoidable risk of oversimplification) were that, in the past 2,500 years in the history of Graeco-Roman and Western societies, it is possible to distinguish two major cultural supersystems: Ideational and Sensate, with their corresponding types of mentality. Each of the two historical culture types is based on different and almost opposing values and ideals, and is permeated by an entirely different conception of truth. Each of them lasted over a long span of several centuries.

Thus, the unified system of culture called Ideational is based on the principle of a supersensory and supernatural God as the only true reality and value (Sorokin, 1941:19). This type of mentality or cultural supersystem characterized Greek society from the eighth century until the end of the sixth century B.C., and was also typical of the long period of medieval culture from the sixth to the thirteenth century A.D. The list of traits of this type of culture mentality is too long to justify enumeration. Examples would be: reality is seen as spiritual and eternal; the

emphasis is on other-worldly values and absolute eternal principles. Cognition of truth depends on divine revelation, on intuition and faith.

Another, and opposing culture style is called Sensate. This one stresses mainly materialistic, worldly and utilitarian values. The primary needs of man are physical; values are transient; the truth is based on observation, measurement and experimentation. Morals are relativistic and changeable. Greek and Roman culture from the later part of the fourth century B.C. to the fourth century A.D., was primarily sensate, and the modern era after the 14th century, as well.

The third, intermediary or mixed, type of cultural supersystem, Sorokin calls Idealistic. This one combines the characteristics of the former two oppositional types, and has (according to Sorokin's research and data), occurred only twice so far in the transformation from ideational to sensate culture type: the Golden Age of Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., and from the twelfth century to the early 14th century in Western Europe.

The above historical macro-typology is in itself a very interesting construction. However, for purposes of our discussion, the most pertinent aspect is Sorokin's explanation of the mechanism or the dynamics of change.

Sorokin has examined the fluctuations in the historical types of mentality or culture in a number of specific areas such as art, philosophy, science, ethics, law, and social relationships. His conclusion is that the macro-culture types fluctuate - each of them being replaced by its opposite after it reaches its culmination - all these changes occurring over long-time periods. For example, the Ideational mentality was replaced by the Sensate after three to seven centuries.

Thus the historical, alternating super-beat or rhythm is: Ideational - Idealistic - Sensate, with the Ideational system seen as mixed, uniting some traits of the two opposing primary types. In the history of western civilization, with the dissolution of the Sensate Graeco-Roman culture, there came into existence an Ideational mentality in medieval society, which in turn gave way to the present Sensate culture. Sorokin was of the opinion that the present socio-cultural system (Sensate) has now reached its maturity and shows signs of crisis, and is ready to give way to a new ideational cultural mentality.

We see that Sorokin's theory of socio-cultural dynamics posits two large cultural supersystems and their alternation in history, with concomitant fluctuations in particular subsystems such as art, law, science, mores, "basic principles" in philosophy, etc. It is precisely this alternating quality, as well as the support of the theoretical scheme by research data, that distinguishes Sorokin's model from the evolutionary scheme of Vico, Comte, Morgan, Marx, Engels, and Spencer. The same qualities differentiate this conception from Spengler's and Toynbee's predominantly organismic conception of growth, decline, and eventual dissolution of individual cultures or civilizations; or for that matter also, from the typology of historical societies set forth by G. Gurvitch.

Despite the absence of overt conflict in this theoretical model of culture change, certain elements of dialectic are nevertheless traceable in Sorokin's explanation of the immanent nature of socio-cultural change. Of particular significance are the following moments:

1. The component parts of a social system (persons, social organization, and culture), constitute an interrelated and integrated unity, or totality.

2. There is the assumption of continuous flux and change of each culture type.
3. The sources of change in any socio-cultural system are primarily internal (immanent change) and thus located in the system itself, because change is inherent in the nature of culture and therefore a general law of all life.
4. As a going concern, each socio-cultural system is constantly active, working, pulsating, and cannot help changing. As Sorokin says: "The change is an immanent consequence of the system's being a going concern. Its functioning makes change inevitable" (SCD, Vol. IV, 1941: 593)²
5. Culture as such never dies completely. On the contrary, its elements change and are absorbed by different cultures, and thus survive in new combinations.

More specifically, an answer to the question of why there is socio-cultural change can be found in the following statement by Professor Sorokin:

Since any sociocultural system is composed of human beings as one of its components, and since any organism, so long as it exist, cannot help changing, the sociocultural system is a 'going concern' and cannot help changing so long as it exist, regardless of its external conditions, even when they are absolutely constant (ibid., 594).

To a very general question "Why ~~change~~?", Sorokin later says that each culture and society is destined to change, " ... is destined to change, bears in itself its own motor that propels it incessantly to transform itself" (ibid., 667).

The reader is still puzzled as to what is that motor, and Sorokin's analysis seems to suggest that change is a natural trait of every socio-cultural reality. He says, "The change is an immanent consequence of the

system's being a going concern. Its functioning makes change inevitable" (ibid., 593).

To a more specific question of the deeper reasons for the "why" of the transition from one specific supercultural system to another (for instance, Ideational to Sensate), Sorokin's analysis seems to suggest the following explanation: Each of the three main systems of truth and reality (and their corresponding culture) is a house divided. Each system is partly true and partly false, partly adequate, and partly inadequate. Each of them contains a vital part and also an invalid part (error and fallacy side by side with truth). Thus a reason for the super-rhythm of Ideational-Idealistic-Sensate forms of culture is, according to Sorokin, in the internal inadequacy of each of the main systems of truth and reality. Nobody can explain it better than the author himself:

When such a system of truth and reality ascends, grows, and becomes more and more monopolistically dominant, its false part tends to grow, while its valid part tends to decrease. Becoming monopolistic or dominant, it tends to drive out all the other systems of truth and reality, and with them the valid parts they contain. At the same time, like dictatorial human beings, becoming dominant, the system is likely to lose increasingly its validities and develop its falsities. The net result of such a trend is that as the domination of the system increases, it becomes more and more inadequate. As such, it becomes less and less capable of serving as an instrument of adaptation, as an experience for real satisfaction of the needs of its bearers; and as a foundation of their social and cultural life. The society and culture built on such a premise become more and more empty, false, inexperienced, ignorant; therefore, powerless, disorderly, and base; nobody can build his or society's life and culture on error, ignorance and pure illusion. The moment comes when the false part of the system begins to outweigh its valid part. Under such conditions, the society of its bearers is doomed either to perish, or it has to change its major premise -- to "redefine the situation" -- and with it, its system of culture. In this way the dominant system prepares its own downfall and paves the way for the ascendance and domination of one of the rival systems of truth and reality, which is, under the circumstances, more true and valid than the outworn and degenerated dominant system. The new dominant system undergoes again the same tragedy, and sooner or later is replaced by its rival (ibid. 743).

On a closer look, Sorokin's model of social change possesses several evolutionary characteristics. Examples are: inevitability and immanency of continuous change; unfolding of the immanent potentialities of the system; the so-called principle of limits, as a corrolary to the theory of immanent change. Most of these components of evolutionary Weltanschauung are also essential parts of a complex dialectical perspective. Generally speaking, the evolutionary perspective, together with the idea of progress, can be regarded as constituent parts of a broadly conceived dialectical model.

Except for the primacy of politico-economic factors, in one particular instance Sorokin's thought-structure is unusually close to that of Karl Marx. Thus, when Marx says: "With the change in the economic foundation the whole vast superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed" - this can be interestingly compared with the following sentence from Sorokin's Social and Cultural Dynamics: "When a culture passes from, say, the Ideational to the Sensate type, or vice versa, all its art, philosophy, religion, science, ethics, and law undergo the same profound transformation" (SCD., Vol. II, 1937, vii). This, of course, shows that both writers thought in terms of society as a relatively coherent or consistent complex of component institutions and their structures.

Sorokin's theory of social change possesses a number of dialectical traits, as can be seen from the preceding analysis. However, when compared to Marx's dialectical paradigm of social change, then the oppositions inherent in Sorokin's model are different. First of all, Marx's paradigm is built on inherent contradictions within the totality of the social system, and those contradictions or opposites are held responsible for the qualitative change of the whole system through revolution.

Sorokin indeed operates with oppositions, but those oppositions or contradictions are not assigned a pre-eminent role as causes of change in socio-cultural systems.

As an idealist, Sorokin operates on a different level of reality and conceptualization. In a word, his reasoning remains on the level of ideological superstructure. This Weltanschauung or system of truth, as against that Weltanschauung or system of truth. A clear answer to the question of "why" one system of truth or culture runs itself out, why it is unable to satisfy its human bearers, why its vital parts (true aspects) are progressively being lost, and invalid parts (errors and fallacies) proliferate - this answer seems to be still lacking. Marx and the Marxian social science have an answer in the general theory of historical materialism. Sorokin, as idealist, remains in the domain of ideas and shares this aspect with the idealistic sociology.

Three things need to be stressed now before we proceed further. First, Sorokin sporadically uses the term "dialectic" or "dialectical" in a number of his writings. However, this usage is often quite vague, and the terms are seldom precisely defined. In most such instances, the term conveys the meaning of dialectical complementarity or of reciprocal influencing of two items or social phenomena. Second, when Sorokin is discussing dialectic, he usually approaches the subject with respect and more or less with approval. It also seems quite plain that he considered his own conception of society, and in particular his theory of immanent change, as dialectical.³ Third, Sorokin was critical of particular types of dialectic found in sociology and related social sciences, such as the dialectical theories of G. Gurvitch, Jean-Paul Sartre and Otto Kühne (Sorokin, 1966: 462-525).

Directly supportive of our position that dialectic is definitely present in Sorokin's sociology and thought, are the views of L. Schneider in his assessment of Sorokin's views (1964: 371-400). Schneider is also among the few, and probably the first to point to the significance of dialectical method in Sorokin's works. Another writer who emphasizes the presence of dialectic in Sorokin's theory of social change is E. A. Tiryakian (1968, Vol. 15: 61-64).

Both Schneider and Tiryakian found that the dialectic is at the centre of Sorokin's theory of social change.⁴ Schneider, for example, argues that the dialectical outlook is present in Sorokin's theory of change and recurrence of the Ideational - Idealistic - Sensate sequence of culture types. He finds the two related ideas of inherent dissolution "transitoriness", both in Buddha and Sorokin, in a form that could be called an "immanentist" views. In this perspective, change as a process works in such a manner that every system contains in itself the seeds of its own destruction.⁵

In this instance the similarity to Marx is more than obvious. This idea is sometimes called by Sorokin "the principle of limits", which underpins the rhythmic periodicity of socio-cultural phenomena. On this point Tiryakian says:

Moreover, the process within sociocultural systems is a dialectical one, for the very accentuation and predominance of the fundamental Weltanschauung, or basic conception of reality, leads to its exhaustion and eventual replacement by one of the two alternative Weltanschauungen. This dialectic is at the heart of Sorokin's "principle of limits", which underscores the rhythmic periodicity of sociocultural phenomena. (ibid., 62).

In his reply to Schneider's observations, Sorokin stresses the important role played by dialectical method in his theories of change, with a note that American sociologists "... with a few exceptions,

have largely neglected it". In the same place he makes favourable comments on the important cognitive functions and the heuristic use of the dialectical method in the study of natural and socio-cultural processes (Sorokin, 1964: 402-3).

Sorokin concludes this section of his essay with the following statement:

In other words, in the construction of my Integral system of sociology, and in my analysis of culture as systems, supersystems, and congeries, I continue to use the dialectic method in its different forms (tempered and tested by empirical verification and combined with 'postulational-deductive' and inductive methods)" (ibid: 403).

To this, Sorokin adds a note on Gurvitch's conception of dialectic, with a claim that at least four of Gurvitch's operational procedures of dialectic have been used in his integral system of philosophy, sociology and personality structure. Sorokin concludes: "I think that without a skillful use of the dialectic in its various forms no adequate theory of the socio-cultural structures and forms is possible" (ibid., 405).

Naturally, our opinion of a scholar cannot be based on what he thinks of himself. Therefore, we still need to pursue the problem of the nature of Sorokin's dialectic by a closer examination of some of his major works.

The dialectical theories of social and cultural systems are critically examined by Sorokin in his book Sociological Theories of Today (1966, Ch. 14). The essential point that emerges from this work is that Sorokin's understanding of dialectic is primarily epistemological, and in no way ontological, although he seems to be somewhat contradictory on that, as will be shown later. This is where Sorokin's conception differs from almost all dialecticians of the Marxian orientation.

In other words, Sorokin understood dialectic as a method or a form of logic. Criticizing Gurvitch's "dialectic of real social movements" and the "dialectic of the dialectic relationships", Sorokin says: "Although I understand somewhat dialectic as a specified form of logic and method, I fail to grasp the meanings of those two forms." (1966: 481) Sorokin concludes with a statement, "To sum up, we cannot and should not impute the characteristics of dialectic to the real phenomena analyzed by dialectic, as it is done by Marx, Soviet dialecticians, and Gurvitch." (ibid., 483).

Sorokin's claim that it is unwarranted to impute the properties of dialectic logic or method to real social movements or processes, is based on his conception of dialectic as epistemological. Namely, he draws the analogy between dialectic and deductive or inductive logical rules, or statistical procedures, none of which in his view can be imputed to inorganic or organic reality or to sociocultural processes (ibid., 482).

By admitting further his lack of understanding of Gurvitch's plea for the "dialectization of dialectic" (the relation between the dialectic as method and the dialectic of real social movements), Sorokin shows that he has never quite grasped the dialectic of the subject and the object, as reciprically related and conditioning each other.

Most dialecticians, as was shown in the first part of this work (Chapters 1 - 3), do consider the dialectic as having both epistemological and ontological characteristics. When Sorokin's views and comments on dialectic are considered, the impression one gets is that he wants to restrict the dialectic, as a special logic, to method, and thus to broaden the domain of epistemology.

Still, Sorokin is not consistent on this point, and one could even say that he is contradictory. Namely, on the one hand, he is against ascribing the characteristics of "dialectic logic or method" to real movements of the body social, while on the other hand, indirectly, by his reasoning and research he admits that the processes of polarization do occur in social reality. This is, for example, corroborated by his own conclusion about religious and moral polarization under the impact of calamity or catastrophe. Also, his own research shows that changes in sociocultural or personality systems lead to consequences contrary to those that the system possessed at the preceding phase of its existence, and that it happens quite often.

Sorokin tries to reconcile this contradiction by pointing out that these and similar " ... forms of the real movements of social totalities (systems) have been and can be described and studied without imputing to them a dialectic character (ibid., 481).

As was indicated above, Sorokin fails to perceive the important reciprocal influence between thought and being (subject and object).⁶ He simply refuses to see that nobody is "imputing" or "ascribing" to reality a dialectical character, but that instead the processes of man's social world exhibit the dialectical properties in their movement and change. Therefore, dialectical thought cannot be dialectical apart from the dialectical nature of reality, nor would reality be dialectical apart from the human mind as the subject.

It was also indicated earlier, that Sorokin's theory of social change, in order to become fully dialectical, needs built-in contradictions. On a broader plan, however, Sorokin's analysis does incorporate

oppositions and dialectical polarity. Instances can be found both in Social and Cultural Dynamics, and in other works from Sorokin's later phase. One such instance can be found in the description of antagonism between the partisans of the rising Ideational truth (the Christians) and the partisans of the declining truth of senses and of reason in the first five centuries of the Christian era (SCD, 1937, Vol. II: 79). "In brief", says Sorokin, "In its constructive aspect the system of truth of early Christianity is one of the purest militant forms of the truth faith, diametrically opposite to the truth of senses and reason, to science and logic, which prevailed before and at the beginning of Christianity" (ibid., 81 and 94).

Much later in 1963, Sorokin describes his integral philosophy by saying expressly that,

It views total reality as the infinite X of numberless qualities and quantities: spiritual and material, everchanging and unchangeable, personal and superpersonal, temporal and timeless, spacial and spaceless, one and many In this sense it is the veritable mysterium tremendum et fascinosum and the coincidentia oppositorum (reconciliation of opposites). (Sorokin, 1963: 372).

"Empirical reality appears, indeed, as a reconciliation of opposites", says Sorokin in 1963 (ibid., 375). This, of course, is again a distinctly dialectical point of view.

When Sorokin describes his ontology as a mere variation of the ancient perennial stream of philosophical thought - he mentions, among others Taoism, Zen Buddhist thinkers, Heraclitus, Plato, Plotinus, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Nicolas of Cusa, Descartes, Spinoza, he is describing nothing else but the dialectical tradition in human thought. When S. M. Mueller describes dialectic as going beyond materialism and idealism, as reconciling both perspectives, and when modern interpretations of Marx do not see in his ontology merely Materialism, there

seems to be a good reason to consider Sorokin's integralist philosophy as dialectical.

This is corroborated also by J. B. Ford's interpretation of Sorokin's philosophy, where the "integral truth" incorporates partial truths of each of the main forms of truth (based on intuition, reason, and senses); it is not identical to any of the three, but embraces elements of all of them.

The dialectical unity of opposites finds its place on the pages of other works by Sorokin. Thus when in Social and Cultural Dynamics he analyses the most general pattern of socio-cultural change, as that of "incessantly varying recurrent processes", Sorokin says, "Thus history ever repeats itself and never repeats itself; both seemingly contradictory statements are true and are not contradictory at all, when properly understood" (SCD. Vol. IV, 1941: 732). In his last major work, Sociological Theories of Today (1966), he returns again to the same phrase, but adds after "properly", in brackets, "dialectically", thus qualifying "properly" as meaning "dialectically." (ibid., 616).

Dialectical thought is also quite noticeable in Sorokin's comments on recent studies of social change and revolutions.

All great revolutions produce destructive as well as constructive (creative) effects in practically every aspect of the cultural and social life of the revolutionary society. These changes are common to all fully developed revolutions. This dialectically opposite two-sided uniformity can be called the "Law of Polarization." (ibid., 626)

This principle of polarization (in itself dialectical) can first be detected in Sorokin's early work on the sociology of revolution in 1925. It is also further elaborated in his sociological study of calamity and disaster from a much later period (1942). An extremely vivid description

of the same can be found in the foreword to his book The Crisis of Our Age (1941), where the "double processes" in the realms of religion, philosophy, ethics, and politics are concisely described and the possible consequences of the struggle between the ideational and the sensate forces commented upon.

Finally, Sorokin's major typology of socio-cultural supersystems includes the mixed type called Idealistic. This type discloses some correspondence to a dialectical conception. Thus the Idealistic phase of Greek civilization (the 5th century and the 4th century B.C.) succeeds the Ideational phase, eventually giving way to the Sensate phase. It is not difficult to see that the Idealistic phase is at the same time a phase of development of the ancient dialectic. Heraclitus and Plato were, for example, among the most prominent thinkers of that period (SCD, Vol. II, 1937: 62).

In Sorokin's interpretation, this Idealistic system incorporates three types of knowledge and truth. First is the knowledge based on senses (unreliable, uncertain, "mere opinion" in Plato's language). Second is knowledge based partly on senses and partly on reason and logic. Finally third, is the knowledge based on "divine intuition" and contemplation.

The Platonic system of truth and knowledge, then, embraces all the three forms of truth - the truth of "divine madness or revelation," the truth of reason or intelligence, and the truth of senses. It also combines them, giving suum quique, into one coherent whole, in which empiricism is assigned an unimportant but a real place and divine contemplation is given the highest place. All this is shaped through and by the finest dialectic of human mind. Such a system is idealistically rationalistic, par excellence (SCD, Vol. II, 1937: 63).

When this is compared to Sorokin's description of his integral philosophy, the picture becomes fairly clear. Sorokin seems to be basically a Platonic idealist.⁷ It is also worth recalling here Merton and

Barber's characterization of Sorokin's sociology of knowledge as "idealistic and emanationist" (Merton and Barber, 1963: 337). The same authors then compare Sorokin's idealism to the materialistic conception of K. Marx, with the conclusion that these two scholars could not be farther apart (ibid., 344-5).

Perhaps these authors are correct insofar as materialism-idealism dichotomy is concerned. But, was Marx only a materialist, when it is known that he was a supreme dialectician? Or, was not there a great deal of similarity between Marx's and Sorokin's dialectic?

Sorokin's analysis also reveals a noticeable correspondence between what he calls "temporalistic mentality" or Sensate culture, and the dialectical perspective.

Thus, not only do the systems of truth fluctuate, according to Sorokin, concomitantly with the major types of culture, but so, too, do the 'first principles', such as idealism and materialism. "Eternalism" and "temporalism" - the philosophical orientations concerning reality (SCD, Vol. II, Chs. 3 and 4). Eternalism is denoted by Sorokin as the "ideology of being which stresses that the true ultimate reality is unchangeable super-all-time Being (ibid., 212). Temporalism, or the ideology of Becoming, claims that everything is in the state of incessant becoming, change, flux (ibid., 214). Since such thinkers as Heraclitus and Hegel are in particular mentioned in this connection, it is not difficult to see that Sorokin's "temporalism" is in fact a moment of a dialectical conception, or to put it differently, that the dialectical paradigm overlaps with what Sorokin calls "temporalism".

Through further analysis, Sorokin shows that another aspect of this temporalistic and dynamic viewpoint was an ordinary rise of various

theories of becoming (the theory of biological evolution, the theories of social dynamics, social evolution, cultural change). The corollary of this is the development of an "evolutionary historical mentality par excellence", where "historismus" is a category of the Sensate-temporalistic mentality (ibid., 233).

Both historical and evolutionary perspectives are the constituent aspects of a more complex dialectical conception. Thus "temporalism" and dialectic are at least historically overlapping, if not quite the same.

Generally speaking, in the grandiose scheme of social development and change devised by P. A. Sorokin, the dialectic as a method and a form of logic finds its place as one of the more general traits and vehicles of the Sensate and the Idealistic mentalities.

It is well known that Sorokin was a trenchant critic of other social theorists. However, and perhaps more significantly, he was extremely critical of numerous aspects of industrial civilization or Sensate culture. In this respect his position is close to the critical aspects of Marx's dialectic or to modern critical theory, basically Marxian in orientation.

However, even here, differences appear. Sorokin as idealist, has criticized the ugliness of the present world in the name of abstract humanity and the ideals of Judeo-Christian ethics. Marx's critique was socially concrete and in the name of the rising social class - the industrial proletariat, whose spokesman he was.

The category of totality, so prominent in dialectical theory, is present in Sorokin's concept of logico-meaningful integration of culture and in the conception of a socio-cultureal system with its componential

structure of three aspects: personality, society, culture, as a unified whole. Moreover, as we have seen earlier, the total reality is for Sorokin, a coincidentia oppositorum. With approval, Sorokin comments on Alfred Weber's appeal for understanding of the historical processes in their totality:

Such is the essential framework of this theory. Not much different is the theory offered by A. Weber, R. MacIver, and T. Veblen. Alfred Weber rightly points out that if sociology does not want to be sterile and pedantic, it must deal not only and not so much with the pure study of forms and the description of little facts (however precise), but must attack the central problems of social and cultural life, and try to understand the historical process, their meanings and how and why in their totality. (Sorokin, 1966: 292).

And to this can be added the following comment by Professor A. J.

Toynbee:

Sorokin has overridden the conventional barriers between the "disciplines". He has taken human affairs as a whole, and has studied them from any promising angle by any promising method. Perhaps this is the greatest of his many services to mankind's common cause. (1963: 94).

Although Sorokin's totalities are sometimes devoid of internal oppositions or dialectical contradictions, and thus occasionally closer to the holistic than to the dialectical conception of totality, such comments as the one above by Toynbee are good indicators of the philosophical breadth of Sorokin's approach to society.

Philosophy seeks to grasp human life as a whole, so that the parts of the mosaic are complete. Sorokin desired the same, and so does the dialectical thought which originated in philosophy.

Philosophy and scholarship merged in the person of Pitirim A. Sorokin.

BARRINGTON MOORE, Jr.

The best known book by the contemporary American sociologist Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1967), is an historical and comparative work. Although this major work of Moore contains little explicit dialectic, it is the contention of the present writer that its latent structure is based on dialectical premises. Moore's generalizations cover a long span of several centuries. However, the period in which he is interested is much shorter than Sorokin's two and one-half millenia.

Although temporally shorter, Moore's generalizations are spacially or geographically much broader than those of Sorokin. To put it differently, Moore is interested primarily in the emergence of modern societies, and this on a comparative basis, crossculturally. He uses as samples certain societies (Japan, India, England, France, the U.S.A.), as the most typical of several distinct routes of modernization.

More specifically, Moore's focus is on the conditions of growth of democracy and dictatorship in transition from traditional to modern industrial societies.

Basically, Moore's thesis consists of the following propositions:

In the transition from traditional to modern societies, different countries have taken different routes. Thus, the three major routes to the modern world were:

1. The route of bourgeois revolution, which combined capitalism and parliamentary democracy after a series of revolutions; and which was typical of western bourgeois democracies (England, France, the U.S.A.).

2. The path of revolution from above, also capitalist, which passed through reactionary political forms and "in the absence of a strong revolutionary surge", culminated in fascism (Germany, Japan).

3. The route of communism, where the revolutions had their main but not exclusive origin among peasants (Russia and China).
(Moore, 1967: 413).

The above summary of the main lines of Moore's analysis sounds like a standard typology. It is, however, the subtitle of the book, "Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world", which indicates the main focus of Moore's interest. In the author's own words:

To sum up as concisely as possible, we seek to understand the role of the landed upper classes and the peasants in the bourgeois revolutions leading to capitalist democracy, the abortive bourgeois revolutions leading to fascism, and the peasant revolutions leading to communism. The ways in which the landed upper classes and the peasants reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture were decisive factors in determining the political outcome. (Moore, 1967: xvii).

Procrustean stretching has never benefitted anyone except a dishonest demagogue. Despite the dangers of such a procedure, we feel it is possible to minimize this risk and still to find the dialectical patterns in the substratum of Moore's major argument.

1. Moore posits the need for modernization, and the challenge of commercial agriculture as decisive factors.
2. The second crucial factor was the success or failure of the upper classes in taking up commercial agriculture and thus responding to the challenge.
3. In the societies where the landed upper class has successfully performed this transition ("has turned to production for the

market"), as was the case in England, peasant revolutions were weak or absent.

4. Conversely, the societies where the landed aristocracy failed to develop a commercial orientation and impulse, the revolutionary movements (mostly based on peasant masses) were likely to occur, as was the case in 18th century France, and in Russia and China during this century. As Moore says:

Turning to the process of modernization itself, we notice once again that the success or failure of the upper class in taking up commercial agriculture has a tremendous influence on the political outcome. Where the landed upper class has turned to production for the market in a way that enables commercial influences to permeate rural life, peasant revolutions have been weak affairs. (Moore, 1967: 459).

Although granting an exception in the case of India as a generalization one could say that Moore posits the survival of peasant society as a precondition of modern revolution.

As a matter of fact, one could say that the structure of Moore's thought in this major argument is dialectical. His thought also seems to be very close to the famous passage from Marx's preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, where the contradictions between the forces of production and the relations of production are seen as generating social change through revolution.

Thus in dialectical terms or terminology, Moore's scheme could read:

- The challenge of commercial agriculture is an imperative need or prerequisite of the dynamic character of the forces of production (tools, men and their know-how).
- The inability of the existing social structure (social relations of production) to satisfy this essential need, is the second important factor.

- The resulting contradiction is resolved through revolution, which brings resolution and a qualitative change in the relationships of production.

In other words, Barrington Moore's model is essentially a tension paradigm where the contradiction develops between the existing structure of relationship and the ability of society to implement the needed social transition required by the new need (technological), commercial, organizational). This mode of reasoning, plus the historical dimension, disclose Moore's model or paradigm, at least in part, as dialectical.

To this one could add that mutual dialectical implication and reciprocity within the framework of totality are also present in Moore's reasoning, as the following excerpts disclose:

A moment's reflection on the course of any specific preindustrial rebellion reveals that one cannot understand it without reference to the actions of the upper classes that in large measure provoked it. ... Before looking at the peasantry, it is necessary to look at the whole society (Moore, 1967: 457).

A reader familiar with dialectic will not have difficulty in recognizing the presence of dialectic in the recent book by B. Moore, Jr. Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them (Boston, 1972). History as a conflict between the opposing principles is well illustrated in the following paragraph:

Revolution seems to be a relatively recent and distinctly Western cultural invention, appearing in full bloom for the first time with the French Revolution. On the other hand, Western history has, from the very beginning, been a conflict between opposing principles of social organization: from the age of the struggle between the Persian bureaucratic monarchy and the Greek city state, through that between paganism and organized Christianity, down to the rise of modern social forms out of and against feudalism and royal absolutism. This struggle of course continues in our own time, now mainly between advanced industrial capitalism and efforts at revolutionary modernization. (Moore, 1972: 23).

In this recent work of Barrington Moore, all these aspects of dialectical thought can be found - the dialectical turn into opposite, conflict and resulting change in society, the application of the dialectical category of totality, quantitative change leading to a new quality, the dialectical reciprocity and contradiction.⁸

A few typical examples will suffice to illustrate the presence of dialectic in Moore's analysis. Perhaps the most vivid examples of the dialectical turn into opposite (which could be conceived as a form of dialectical negation), can be found in the essays titled "Of Hunger, Toil, Injustice, and Oppression", and in "Some Prospects for Predatory Democracy" (Moore, 1972). Thus, commenting on the relations of direct democracy and terror, with specific reference to a phase of the Chinese revolution, Moore shows how democracy turns into terror:

But in a very short space of time revolutionary terror turned against direct democracy. In general, it is safe to assert that the restoration of order and security has not been for the benefit of the little people in whose honor the revolutions were proclaimed. Direct democracy generates revolutionary terror, its own nemesis (Moore, 1972: 65-66).

The above can be supplemented by one of the concluding statements of this book. "The first revolution that took power mainly as a result of a radical thrust, the Bolshevik Revolution, turned into a vicious form of oppression that has yet to be shaken off" (ibid., 192). Later on, it will be shown that similar thoughts and mode of thinking are present in the analyses of the contemporary British historian, E. H. Carr.

Barrington Moore also criticizes and compares contemporary structural-functionalism to the radical and historical approach of Marx. He finds, significantly, a progressive decline of the historical perspective, starting with Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Leopold von Wiese, and this

trend continues straight to Talcott Parsons. Thus the prevailing strategy in modern social science, according to Moore, is that it is ahistorical, that it lacks in critical spirit, and tends to be abstract and formal (Moore, 1965: 123).

Argumentum a contrario, the reader can conclude for himself, that opposite is the dialectical approach, and in particular the Marxian dialectic, which takes into account the concrete political struggles, class antagonisms, oppression, and change. Criticizing equilibrium theory and functionalism, B. Moore concludes with a direct note on the dialectic. "The Hegelian dialectic with its conception of developing contradictions that lead to intermittent abrupt changes provides, one may argue, a better heuristic guide to the explanation of many important processes of historical growth" (1965: 138).

EDWARD HALLETT CARR

In a series of lectures on history, the contemporary British historian E. H. Carr describes history as a process of interaction, a dialogue between the historian in the present and the facts of the past (1971: 35).

Unlike Marx or Sorokin, E. H. Carr does not offer a general theory of change. He is primarily a historian who, however, does not hesitate to pass some general but relevant comments on historical facts and social change.

Carr's major work, the eight-volume History of Soviet Russia has been called "an outstanding work of English scholarship", and the author, "most distinguished modern historian". If the reader turns to this multiple-volume modern history he is bound to find, instead of an endless

description of historical events in their details, that the author is rather continuously interpreting the historical facts, and searching for their meaning, connections, and the directions of influence. This is precisely what makes the writings of this modern historian sociological.

Now, from the special focus of this thesis, the relevant question is to what degree is E. H. Carr a dialectical thinker, or whether he is one at all.

The fact is that Carr seldom uses the term 'dialectic'. Nevertheless, the dialectical perspective seems to be often present in the structure of his thought. In fact, this dialectical bent (to use L. Schneider's expression) is quite pronounced in Carr's writings. As an illustration and perhaps the most typical statement with far-reaching consequences, and of general application, is the opening paragraph from Carr's volume, Socialism in One Country, Vol. I.

The tension between the opposed principles of continuity and change is the groundwork of history. Nothing in history that seems continuous is exempt from the subtle erosion of inner change; no change, however violent and abrupt in appearance, wholly breaks the continuity between past and present. Great revolutions - the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity, the English revolution of the seventeenth century, the French revolution, the Bolshevik revolution - represent this tension in its most acute form. Dramatic turning-points in history, they reflect, and set in motion, new social forces which alter the destinies and the outlook of mankind. (Carr, 1958: 3).

One cannot help noticing the similarity in the structure of thought - and quite dialectical at that - with Sorokin's immanency of socio-cultural change. Even more striking is the similarity of the above passage to the reasoning of Barrington Moore in his recent work.⁹

This idea of the dialectical unity of continuity and discontinuity is then applied by Carr as an explanatory model in his interpretation of modern Russian history.

It is of interest to note that the same dialectical model is nowadays quite acceptable in anthropology and sociology. One example would be the application of the continuity-discontinuity model in the explanation of man's biological and evolutionary development in comparison to other species.¹⁰

Abstract dialecticizing makes little sense. The great masters of dialectic, Hegel and Marx, have seldom written on dialectic as such. In social science there is even less justification for such indulgence. For the above reasons it is therefore imperative, always, and in each particular instance, to apply the dialectical perspective as a heuristic device to a specific problem under consideration, or to any particular aspect of life. And this is precisely what E. H. Carr has been doing.

Revolutions do not, however, resolve the tension between change and continuity, but rather heighten it, since the dynamic of revolution stimulates all the forces in play. In the heat of the moment, the desire for change appears to triumph unreservedly over the inclination to conserve. But presently tradition begins to unfold its power as the antidote to change: indeed, tradition is something which remains dormant in uneventful times, and of which we become conscious mainly as a force of resistance to change, through contact with some other "tradition" which challenges our own. Thus, in the development of the revolution, the elements of change and continuity fight side by side, now conflicting and now coalescing, until a new and stable system is established. (Carr, 1958: 4).

And Carr remains faithful to these generalizations. Or, more properly speaking, he generalizes on the basis of numerous historical facts, which he analyzes on the pages of his multi-volume history of Soviet Russia.

Of particular interest here is the immediate post-revolutionary period of modern Russian history, where the above-mentioned continuity and the force of tradition asserted themselves in the face of the profound discontinuity or change brought about by the revolution.¹¹

It is easily understood that revolution, war, or a civil war, are forms of conflict process, but it is not so conspicuous that a relatively peaceful phase in the life of a society is equally characterized by opposing forces and tendencies, by friction and competition, by now hidden conflict of opposing groups engaged in a struggle for privileges and social power. And this is precisely what E. H. Carr brings forth in his history of the post-revolutionary phase of the Soviet Union.

Oppositions, contradictions of real and pulsating life, as well as the related processes of the dialectical turn into opposite, can be amply illustrated in the historical analyses of Carr. For reasons of brevity, we shall restrict the examples cited to the most typical cases.

By reading about the post-revolutionary political development in the Soviet Union (Socialism in One Country, Vol. I and II), one realizes that although the front was of one unified or "monolithic" party running the country, there were in fact two parties within the official party - the official and the oppositional faction.

That oppositions are inherent in the mere socio-political system is corroborated by Carr's lucid analysis of the most important struggle between the regime of Lenin and the regime of Stalin (Vol. II, Ch. 19, "The Monolithic Party"). Another, equally significant opposition of that period in Russia was, of course, the one between two theoretical and political conceptions - the one of permanent revolution (Trotsky), and the other of Socialism in one country (Stalin).

The impression and the message one gets by reading Carr is that the essential oppositions, the conflicts of that period of Russian history, Stalin's infamous purges, and the removal of the revolutionary team of Russian political and military leaders, can only be understood

as the basic opposition between two types of attitudes and two types of work - one belonging to intellectuals devoted to revolution, the other to bureaucrats or "apparatus-men" (aparatchiky).

If the party no longer encouraged independence of thought, it provided safe careers for those who would serve it faithfully and efficiently. Stalin's "apparatus-men" were in this sense the very antithesis of the intellectuals whose far-ranging thought had provided the inspiration of the revolution. A fundamental animosity and incompatibility of temper sharpened every clash between the party leadership and the successive oppositions. Order and discipline, not revolutionary enthusiasm, were now the prime virtues of a party member and of a party official. It was these virtues which the secretariat of Stalin strove to inculcate. (Carr, 1959: 201).

There is no need for a better example to illustrate what is sometimes called "turn into opposite", as a moment of dialectical negation, and as a type of change to be discussed still further.

Analyzing the change in the Red Army, Carr describes the constant friction and rivalry between the opposing tendencies of party authority and the military experts, or between the political commissars and the military supporters of unity of command (Trotsky versus Frunze), (ibid., Ch. 23).

The contradictions and oppositions within the system are disclosed also in the description of the dissident group called "Workers' Truth" (Rabochaya Pravda) that appeared and was active in 1921. This group operated secretly, and occupied an out-and-out leftist position, it treated NEP (New Economic Policy) as a return to capitalism, and denounced compromises with the bourgeoisie or with capitalism.

Other significant instances of conflicts within Soviet society are found in the strained relations between the agricultural and industrial sectors of economy (the struggle between the peasantry and the proletariat), (ibid., Ch. 3, "The Crisis Breaks"). Another, and perhaps more

crucial sign of internal class struggle can be seen in the instances of mass workers' strikes, of which the first occurred in 1923, and was triggered by delays in wage payment. That things really turned into opposite is shown in the following paragraph:

The proletariat had seized power; the means of production belonged to it. Yet the revolution had brought it few material advantages. These had gone for the most part to the specialist and the nepman. The conditions were sufficiently similar to those prevailing in the factories in the worst days of the Tsarist regime to provoke wry reflexions on the fate of the workers under the "workers' state". (Carr, 1954: 95).

In the domain of social control and law enforcement, Carr says "Reformation and repression struggled side by side as twin elements in Bolshevik penal theory and practice" (Carr, 1959: 423).

Dialectical turn into opposite as a form of dialectical negation comes again to the fore in the discussion of the changed role of concentration camps as instruments of repression, from preventive to punitive function (ibid., 424-426). Closely related to this is the gradual transformation of the police state by means of concentration camps and the Cheka (state police). Cheka, as an administrative organ, could commit a person to a concentration camp by administrative action only, without a court decision or the right to defense. This, of course, spells the complete suspension of judiciary system as a guaranty of individual freedom which equals to despotic rule of state bureaucracy.

These, as well as many other examples on the pages of Carr's history speak vividly of the perversion of the revolution into a bureaucratic autocracy anxious to perpetuate its own rule at all costs. These and similar examples prove also that the dialectic works in the so-called socialist societies as well as in capitalist societies. Finally, they portray E. H. Carr as a dialectical thinker.

The dialectical turn into opposite seems to be a recurrent theme of Carr's thought. The instances are numerous, and only a few more examples will suffice to illustrate this.

To what has been said above, one could add description of the changing function of Soviets from a representative organ of the people to an agency of local government carrying out orders of the central authority (*ibid.*, 365-366).

Analysing the past revolutionary development in Soviet Russia, Carr says significantly: "The radicalism of revolutionary doctrine was succeeded by the conservativism of administrative empiricism" (Carr, 1958: 25).

Georges Gurvitch expressed the opinion that in human societies new classes are continuously being generated, subject to unceasing structuration, restructuration, and destructuration. He did not share the view of Karl Marx regarding the disappearance of classes. On the contrary, he had a premonition that the new dominating class of industrial societies would consist of various strata of technocrats and bureaucrats, or in one word, of techno-bureaucracy.

E. H. Carr's analysis of class and party (1958: Ch. 3) in the Soviet Union (1958: Ch. 3) in itself rich with historical facts, carefully selected and interpreted, is a direct corroboration of Gurvitch's dialectical views.

By his penetrating analysis, Carr has shown how in concrete life and specific historical circumstances, rule in the name of the proletariat has turned into rule over the proletariat by its own party. The political party of Bolsheviks, in which in the course of time the workers were less and less represented, and in which the clerks and intellectuals

became a majority, had become the new ruling class of that society. Thus the dictatorship of the proletariat was a political, not an economic or social phenomenon. It was a rule not of a class, but of a party. In this hypertrophy of power the Bolshevik party became society in miniature and succeeded automatically to the prestige, authority and sanctity formerly attached to the person of the Tsar (ibid., 134-135).

With the development of the cult of Stalin, a new factor was added which, in socialist education and indoctrination in the Eastern European block of the socialist countries, echoed: "Our father is Stalin, and our mother - the Party". Thus the dialectical negation was complete, even in openly declared slogans and ideology. Or as E. H. Carr put it, "... the truth seems to be that every revolution is succeeded by its own reaction (1950: 213).

Finally, one cannot omit Carr's brilliant essays on history which again display numerous instances of his dialectical thinking. Numerous examples of what Gurvitch called dialectical complementarity, mutual implication, and dialectical reciprocity can be found on these 150 extremely instructive pages. The following is the most typical of Carr's dialectical reasoning:

Dialectical complementarity and reciprocity. Society and individual are inseparable, necessary and complementary to each other, not opposites (Carr, 1971: 31). "The development of society and the development of the individual go hand in hand, and condition each other", says Carr (ibid., 32). Similarly, the dialectical interdependence and complementarity between historical facts and the interpretation of the historian, is emphasized (ibid., 12). Again, historical causes and the interpretation of them by the historian, which exhibit dual or reciprocal character

(ibid., 103). This also applies to the social sciences, where subject and object belong to the same category and interact reciprocally on each other (ibid., 70).

Closely related to these are examples of mutual dialectical implication or interpenetration. Man and society mould each other (ibid., 33). History is seen as a "continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past" (ibid., 30, 35). Carr sees the interaction between past and present in the works of the historian, and says, "Great history is written precisely when the historian's vision of the past is illuminated by insights into the problems of the present" (ibid., 37).

When E. H. Carr says: "We have moved far from the conception of truth emerging from the interplay of divergent individual opinions. Loyalty has come to mean the submission of the individual to the general will of the party or group" (1951: 65), there seems to be a hint in this comment which could help to explain the presence of dialectics in Ancient Greek philosophy and the corresponding absence of the same from the contemporary American social science.

Greek democracy favoured differences of opinion, encouraged dialogue, and the predominant conception of dialectic was one of the methods of discovery through dialogue. On the contrary, the present era credits individual loyalty to the general will, and a typical social entity of this epoch in its pure form is modern American society. There, there is little place for dialectic in the traditional sense, since modern regimes do not in fact appreciate differences of thought and opinions, although they profess the contrary. It is only to be regretted that so many

countries follow the American route to modernization. In itself the above hypocrisy is a paradox, and as such, it once again confirms the dialectical nature of social reality.

FOOTNOTES (Chapter VII)

1. Not every history is sociological, nor is it dialectical. Simple and dry description, recording of events and persons who played specific roles in such historical happenings, may be good historiography, but it is not yet history. To be history, it needs to be a meaningful interpretation from the perspective of the present. It needs a dialogue between the historian living in the present and the historical facts that he has chosen from the past. To be sociological, it needs to look into historical facts for causes, functions and meanings. If such history tries to establish historical or sociological types, social processes, or to discover possible laws, then history turns into sociology. To become dialectical, both history and sociology must make use of the central categories of dialectic - contradiction, negation, mediation, and totality.
2. In this, as well as in the future references, SCD stands for Sorokin's Social and Cultural Dynamics.
3. See Sorokin's reply to Louis Schneider in George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsh (eds.), Explorations in Social Change, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., pp. 401-05.
4. When Schneider declares, "I hold to the view that it is in connection with dialectical notions that Sorokin makes his largest contribution to the theory of change -- at the very least in a sociological perspective" (1964: 375), it is precisely the point we want to establish not only for Sorokin, but for several other scholars (Marx, Simmel, Gurvitch and others). In other words, their success as scholars, and the vigour of their ideas, is here attributed largely, although not exclusively, to the dialectical quality of their thought.
5. The dialectical qualities of Sorokin's reasoning have also been noted by the same author in what he calls "development into opposite (similar to Simmel), and in the related processes of "discrepancy between initial intentions and final outcomes" (Schneider, 1964: 381).
6. A word of caution is necessary here to qualify the above statement. What was stated above is based on general impressions one gets by reading Sorokin's comments on dialectic in sociology. However, the above conclusion may not hold when Sorokin's views on empiricism, and his criticism of the same in sociology and psychology, are considered. Thus in his book Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences (1956), arguing against empiricism, Sorokin points to the overwhelming importance of 'superconscious intuition' in scientific discovery in the history of science. The relationship between the knower (subject), and the known (object), and their identification is here particularly stressed as absolutely necessary for any scientific discovery.

7. Sorokin was also a deeply religious man. "Who except Almighty and Omniscient God can decide which of these three main truths is the real truth", says he in Social and Cultural Dynamics, Vol. II, New York, American Book Company, 1937, p. 93.
8. Barrington Moore Jr., Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them, Boston, Beacon Press, 1972, pp. 33, 43, 44, 54, 55, 65-66, 150, 192.
9. Compare this to Barrington Moore Jr., Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them, Boston, Beacon Press, 1972, p. 23, quoted also in the section on B. Moore in this chapter.
10. See for example, Dennis H. Wrong and Harry L. Gracey (eds.), Readings in Introductory Sociology, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1967.
11. These problems are dealt with by E. H. Carr mainly in the volumes: Socialism in One Country, I and II, and The Interregnum. All volumes are part of his History of Soviet Russia, I - X, London, The Macmillan Co., 1950-69.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters have first outlined the major aspects of dialectic, and then traced the dialectical elements in western sociological thought, taking as examples the views of a selected number of scholars, representing the trends or schools in which the dialectic was most characteristically present.

What do this survey and this analysis show, and to what are they pointing? Is there any discernible pattern in the path of dialectic from Hegel via Marx to contemporary western sociology? Another relevant question concerns the decline and revival of the dialectical paradigm in western social science as related to the socio-political causes of this fluctuation. These are the questions to which the concluding remarks in this chapter will be addressed.

Dialectic, as a conception of the world and a method of viewing the life of society, has been present with us from the ancient times of Greece and China. With the modern vogue of positivistic orientation in western social science, the dialectic almost disappeared from the academic scene.

The only exception was the work of the scholars of radical orientation. In this neglect of dialectic, an entirely new social phenomenon is the recent revival of interest in dialectic in North America. Both the above mentioned neglect of dialectic, as well as the recent growing interest in it have deep and complex social causes, some of which will be touched upon in these concluding comments.

For a long time the development of different trends and schools in different branches of art was considered to be patterned after an organismic analogy, in the sense that particular schools develop and culminate, then decline and disappear. Science, on the contrary, as distinct from art, was considered more cumulative, in the sense that any subsequent achievement that is accomplished, is based on previous success. In dialectical terminology this is the process of continuity.

This conception of the cumulative nature of science was seriously shaken in the 1960's by Thomas S. Kuhn's ideas concerning scientific revolutions in terms of continuously competing and changing paradigms (Kuhn, 1970). Dialectically speaking this is the process of discontinuity.

Another discernible pattern is noticeable, particularly in social science. It is an often occurring swing from one extreme or opposite pole of orientation to another. It is a sort of pendulum model, or a challenge-response reaction, where one particular conception or paradigm dominates and provokes a reaction of opposite orientation. The latter, then, by its growth and accretion gains in strength, and in a form of opposition pushes and overthrows the supremacy of the former paradigm. Sorokin has, for instance, tended to view the changes in socio-cultural supersystems along this same pattern. This, too, amounts to a discontinuous process.

The dialectical paradigm (to use again Kuhn's language), can be viewed in terms of the above model, too. It was never really a dominating paradigm in science, but still occupied a significant place, even as an oppositional and perhaps not so prestigious model for viewing man's world. More precisely, one could say that the dialectical paradigm always possessed this quality of oppositionality - in being often opposed to

something and therefore critical. Hegel's dialectic was developed in opposition to Kant's critical philosophy. Marx's dialectic was opposed to positivistic metaphysics and to Hegelian idealism. Similar was the case with Lukács' emphasis on dialectical totality, and Lenin's stress on oppositions as central to revolutionary dialectic. Gurvitch's and Sorokin's criticism of shallow empiricism and atomism in social science, as well as Marcuse's devastating critique of positivism, corporate capitalism, and technological civilization, are further examples of this oppositional and critical character of dialectic.¹

It is almost a commonplace nowadays that advancement in social theory is often attained as a reaction to some predominant trend. Therefore we wonder, might not dialectic, and in particular the contemporary growing interest in dialectic, be considered as a reaction to the prevalent positivistic and empirical orientation in western academic sociology. And also, might it not be more properly seen as a reaction to the growing crisis in western social science, and especially in sociology? Or, does not this crisis in turn reflect the deepening social crisis in western capitalism?

By crisis in social science is here meant the general state of sociological theory and methodology criticized by P. Sorokin (1956b), C. W. Mills (1959), and A. Gouldner (1970). An existing paradigm can be safely considered in a state of growing crisis when its basic assumptions are seriously shaken by criticism, and when the longer lasting "awareness of anomaly" (Kuhn) has penetrated deep into the consciousness of the members of the scientific community. It is an open fact that the once dominant Harvard School of Parsonian normative functionalism has been subject

recently to thorough critical examinations, for instance by R.

Dahrendorf (1965), D. Wrong (1961), D. Lockwood (1956), A. Gouldner (1970), and others. It can safely be stated that its supremacy has been overthrown, and its predominant phase is already now a part of history.

Undoubtedly, we live in a period of feverish search for new paradigms. Ethnometodology and Goffman's dramaturgy, as ramifications of symbolic interactionism, are only two among several influential endeavours. The dialectic related to so-called radical or critical sociology is still another effort in the search for a new paradigm.

The first part of this work endeavours to explain the major aspects of dialectic in its historical development. Thus, Chapter Two delineates the beginning of dialectics in western philosophy (Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle) and relates the development of this perspective via Hegel and Marx to our 20th century contemporaries. Lukacs and Marcuse. Special emphasis was given to some hidden aspects of Marx's dialectic and to the dialectical basis of his theory of alienation.

Chapter Three discusses one of the most essential and general traits of every true dialectic - the dialectical category of contradiction. Three types of contradictions (logical, objective, and essence-appearance contradiction) are separately analysed. The objective or dialectical contradictions are given particular emphasis, and are described, following A. Schaff, as "internal contradictions of the system," as contradictions which point to malfunctioning of the social system which is bound to collapse as a result of the opposed tendencies it contains.

The philosophical distinction between essence and appearance is here treated as another type of contradiction also characterizing the

dialectical paradigm. The same chapter deals extensively with the categories of polarity and oppositeness. An effort is made to relate them to the dialectical category of contradiction. In this, it is stated that contradictions denote a relationship between two processes or events which mutually negate or exclude one another, but which are at the same time the only two possible alternatives. In the unsettled debate over the relationship of the category of contradiction to that of opposition, the view which tends to see contradictions as intensified oppositions, is supported.

Chapter Four reflects Lukács' dictum that totality is the domain of the dialectic. In its centre is the distinction between sociological holism and dialectic.

The first part of this work points to dialectic as a philosophical method. This is particularly pronounced in the emphasis the dialectical method places on essence-appearance distinction, as well as on the category of totality.

Among the classical writers, it was Simmel who pointed to the multiple ties existing between philosophy and sociology. These ties were first found in the domain of epistemology, and second, in the fact that all sociological works are always partial and not in a position to provide a complete knowledge of society. Hence, in Simmel's opinion, there is a need for philosophy which generalizes on the basis of the partial results of sociology, and is thus in a position to grasp society in its totality. Obviously, only dialectic with its category of totality can fulfil this requirement for totalization.

Part Two leaves behind abstract dialecticizing and the needed description of major dialectical categories in favour of concrete analysis

of the chief types of dialectic found in western sociology. In this endeavour three major types of dialectic are delineated: a) formal-heuristic dialectic, b) practico-empirical dialectic, and c) the dialectic of historical sociology.²

The present author feels that the existing literature insufficiently emphasizes the presence of dialectic in sociology, regardless of the degree of dialectization of the sociological thought. The rationale, therefore, behind the efforts contained in Part Two, is the need to redress the balance in favour of an adequate understanding of the presence of dialectic, even in the schools of sociology where this quality is not so pronounced and easily recognized.

At the same time an effort was made to assess critically and from a dialectical perspective the work, and in particular the type of dialectic found in the different authors whose works were analysed.

As a study in the history of social thought, this work endeavours to show the path of dialectic from its early beginnings in the so-called "cradle of Western civilization" (Ancient Greece), up to its present forms in the science of society. More precisely, it is the trend leading from Hegel, via Marx, through the European sociology of Georg Simmel and Georges Gurvitch, elements of which can be found even in certain major schools of American sociology such as the Chicago School and the historical sociology of P. A. Sorokin.

While the former school was very influential and dominated the American academic scene in the second quarter of the present century, the latter (historical sociology) never attained that degree of popularity on American soil. On the contrary, it remained on the periphery of other

more popular orientations such as structural-functionalism, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and the dramaturgical approach. Nevertheless, historical sociology (and this holds good for the dialectic present in it), has had its eminent representatives in such scholars as P. A. Sorokin and B. Moore, Jr.

When the general trend is observed in the historical perspective, one is prone to view the path of dialectic in sociology as one of progressive attrition, especially if compared with the dialectics of Hegel and Marx.

This, of course, is to be expected. The dialectic originated in philosophy, and the early roots of sociology can be traced to the philosophy of history. Sociology, on the contrary, from its early inception in the works of Saint-Simon and Comte was positivistically oriented and patterned after natural science. In its effort to become more scientifically exact, sociology therefore had to eliminate what was considered philosophical and speculative theorizing, and with this the method of dialectic as congenial to this orientation.

However, not much serious scholarship was possible without a minimum of dialectical thought. And therefore certain disconnected elements of dialectic have nevertheless crept in under the cover of "reputable scholarship," making their presence now and then, more or less visible.

The dialectic of Georg Simmel is already considerably modified compared to that of Hegel and Marx. So is the case with its more contemporary form in the works of Georges Gurvitch. Generally speaking, the activist and critical spirit is lost and with this even the basic notion of contradiction within totality. To some degree Gurvitch's extremely critical stand toward other theorists is an exception, but only in this respect.

The impetus which was already lost with Simmel and Gurvitch deteriorated even further with the practico-empirical nature of the Chicago school, where only fragmentary elements of dialectic can be found. Although it is still possible to speak of dialectic in the conceptions of certain members of the Chicago school, there seems to be a noticeable diminution of dialectical thought when the trend from Small to Park and Redfield is viewed in time perspective. The activistic, historical, and critical aspects, still strongly present with Small, are all almost completely lost in this transition. So is the emphasis on social class and the conflict of interests.

With the culmination of structural-functionalism (T. Parsons, R. Merton, M. Levi, K. Davis, W. Moore), in the third quarter of this century only sporadic and isolated elements of dialectic could be found in American sociology. These are exemplified in the idea of mutual interrelationship and interdependence or reciprocity of social phenomena, as well as in the notions of social interaction and the conception of emergence, most of which can be traced anyway to pragmatism and anthropological functionalism.³

Further scrutiny could possibly find additional elements of dialectic even in Parson's pattern variables as sets of oppositional alternatives, or for that matter in Merton's anomie theory presented in terms of contradiction (discrepancy) between culture goals and institutionalized means, or in the oppositional modes of individual adaptation (conformity vs. deviance or non-conformity).

However, regardless of this overlapping of sporadic elements, what matters is the total structure of the edifice. And this shows that the

dialectical categories of objective contradictions, class conflict, social change as a result of internal oppositions, (as well as the category of totality, and the historical dimension), are largely absent in this recently dominating school of American sociology. Thus, Barrington Moore's remarks that modern social science tends to be abstract, formal, and ahistorical, are well placed.

Practically the only exception to this almost ubiquitous absence of dialectic in the schools of contemporary American sociology is the historical sociology of P. A. Sorokin and B. Moore, Jr.⁴

As the preceding analysis has shown, the dialectic is always historical, and this means that historical sociology is relatively close to the dialectical treatment of social phenomena. When the source of social change is sought in the immanent structure of the ever changing social system, and in the oppositional tendencies of its totality, then the assumed approach possesses already a number of dialectical traits.

Indirectly, the preceding analysis contains a criticism of the historians of sociological theories, such as E. Bogardus, N. Timasheff, D. Martindale, A. Boskoff, C. L. Loomis, and others. All of these failed to perceive the previous quality of dialectical thought as a powerful mode of analysis always present to some degree in the works of the scholars whose major works we have examined.

The preceding discussion points to the presence of dialectical elements in the prominent representatives of European sociology (Simmell, Gurvitch), as well as in the two significant schools of American sociology.

German formal sociology is a matter of the past, and Gurvitch has not left any able followers. The Chicago School was a brilliant chapter

of empirical sociology on this continent, yet still only history today. The historical sociology of P. A. Sorokin and of B. Moore, Jr., is not very influential, although it is contemporary. Does that mean that the dialectic in western sociology is extinct today. Obviously the answer depends on the conception of dialectic one has in mind. If one takes the critical Marxian dialectic, this has scarcely appeared in American academic sociology.⁵ If on the other hand, the dialectic is considered loosely, then the dialectical elements can be seen as diffused and even proliferating. It is only in this loosely and restricted meaning that the elements of dialectic can be found in the writings of P. Berger, T. Luckman and P. Blau.

Parallel to this discernible trend is the recent radicalization of sociological thought in America exemplified by journals such as Insurgent Sociologist, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, and Catalyst. This has, of course, precipitated the revival of interest in the dialectical method and paradigm during the last half decade.

So far we have addressed ourselves mostly to the presence of dialectical elements in American sociology. This perspective must be also counterbalanced by asking the question: Why is there a frightening absence of a radical and critical dialectic in American sociology? The reasons are more complex than they might seem at first glance. The political, social, cultural, and the general intellectual climate can provide some answers.

First, on the political and ideological level, the dialectic is related to Marxism, and this philosophy in turn to Communism - the chief evil and bogey of capitalism.

Second, Marx and his dialectical method was for a number of years ignored and dismissed as a political ideologist of communism. His dialectic was often criticized although never fully understood.

Third, the American intellectual climate has been permeated by methodological individualism (in the tradition of Spencer, Weber, Pareto, Simmel), empiricism and pragmatism, none of which were dialectical, and in fact were anti-dialectical.

Fourth, Max Weber (his "value neutrality," typological method, and nominalism), as an intellectual antipod to Marx, was imported to American sociology via Talcott Parson's theory of social action.

Fifth, in the political life the radical socialist movement was submerged by the effects of imperialistic affluence resulting from the privileged position of the United States after each of the two world wars. Political radicalism was also repressed by the brutal force of the state apparatus, which of course points to the fascism in the making.⁶

* * *

It is only natural that a number of problems and directions of research must remain unexplored and outside the limits of the present work. Among them of particular significance are: the relationship of the Marxian dialectic to phenomenology, to systems analysis, to structuralism, to functionalism, and to the science of law. Despite the existing publications, all these areas merit a thorough investigation since existing literature treats these problems mainly in a cursory way.

Above all, however, the relation of dialectic to pragmatism and symbolic interactionism deserves a separate study. This is particularly so in view of the recent popularity of symbolic interactionism in the

U.S.A. and Canada. This trend bears almost the characteristics of a school and could be, in addition to structural functionalism, considered a major orientation in American sociology.

Undoubtedly in the American intellectual scene pragmatism looms large. Since this thesis has examined certain conceptions of the Chicago sociologists, and because G. H. Mead's teachings at Chicago were chiefly responsible for implanting the seeds from which the symbolic interactionism sprang, it is in order to shed some tentative light on the relationship of pragmatism and dialectic.

It is a known fact that G. H. Mead as philosopher belonged to the famous group of American pragmatists. Pragmatism in general, as a specially American philosophy "of the society of alienated labour, and as the ideology of everyday life of industrial society" (Zaječaranović, 1969: 88), looms large in the background of a great deal of American sociology. No scrutiny is necessary to establish that almost every good introductory text in American sociology quotes W. J. Thomas' dictum "If men define situations as real they are real in their consequences." Thomas, who was also one of the Chicago sociologists shows by this statement a definite influence of the pragmatist philosophy.

This pragmatist philosophy of utilitarian empiricism was basically interested in the consequences of ideas and theories, as well as in their usefulness. "...to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce," says William James interpreting C. Peirce (James, 1972: 23). Or, as Peirce says, "...in order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity

from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception."⁷ In other words, the pragmatists used to judge the values of their beliefs by what useful consequences those beliefs had.

In the light of pragmatism as a philosophy, one should also evaluate the most important tenets of structural functionalism, because the functional analysis, as is well known, searches for consequences of culture items for the larger structures.

While recent literature (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Baumann, 1969; Curtis and Petras, 1970) has plentifully emphasized the similarities between the dialectical conceptions of G. H. Mead and Marx, it seems that only in the newest works are the dissimilarities brought to the fore.

Pragmatism generally carries some resemblance to the dialectical conceptions of Marx. Therefore this apparent resemblance and overlapping must be taken into consideration while assessing the presence of dialectical elements in American sociology. There is even reason for the contention that pragmatism has borrowed certain of its elements from Marx. Of interest here is a comment by A. Gramsci, in whose opinion "the philosophy of praxis" (Marxism) has suffered a double revision. Namely, some of its elements have been adopted directly or indirectly by some idealist trends (Pragmatism, etc.). Further, the orthodox Marxists have identified it with the traditional materialism.

Thus for instance the first similarity appears in the common Weltanschauung that the world is a complex of processes and has unfinished quality (process-like quality of the world).⁸ This, of course, was known in Marxism much earlier. The same is the case with the emphasis on the

active aspect of the human individual and of human cognition (man as an active subject), and the view of man as both subject and object. To these should be added Mead's view of the emergent theory of evolution according to which in the course of evolution the new qualities and forms appear by means of leaps or emergents. Finally, John Dewey was influenced by Hegel's dialectic and Darwin's evolutionism.⁹

However, below these seeming similarities lie much more important dissimilarities between the Marxian dialectic and pragmatism. Most of them are pretty obvious to anyone knowledgeable in the two respective areas, while among those which tend to be misleading the following ones should be mentioned.

1. That practice as human activity is understood as a source and a criterion of thinking was pointed out already by Marx. Nevertheless, the pragmatists' notion of practice is not the same as Marx's "praxis." As stated earlier, to Marx, "praxis" is universal self-creative activity through which man changes and creates his world and by this also himself. On the other hand, the "practice" of W. James is too narrowly conceived as an individual activity with consequences which have in the first place individual meaning. While for Marx the practice is the starting point and the basis of knowing, as well as the criterion of truth, the same cannot be said for pragmatists. On the contrary, they were searching for the subjective consequences of ideas and theories, and neglecting the objectivity of truth on which Marxism insists. This has naturally led to the pluralism of truths, nowadays widely spread in the sociology of knowledge. As one recent author has put it, "For Marxism truth is discovered in practice, for Pragmatism it is created in practice" (Ropers, 1973: 48).

2. "Dialectical materialism recognizes the existence of an objective material world whose existence is independent of sensuous beings," says Ropers (ibid.), while for pragmatists it is not the case.

3. Pragmatists separate the theory and the practice and do not conceive of changing a real objective world.

4. As a doctrine of radical empiricism, pragmatism denies the distinction between appearances and the hidden substratum of reality, which characterizes the dialectic as a philosophical method.

With reference to G. H. Mead, whose dialectical conceptions are often mentioned, it is perhaps worth keeping in mind that despite his overwhelming emphasis on social conditioning and the origin of gestures, language, and consciousness, as a pragmatist, he neglects the crucial role of human labour, which looms so large in Marx's explanation of the genesis of human nature and consciousness. Thus when G. Zaječaranović says that the praxis of the pragmatists conceived as success, lacks historical, human and social dimension (1969: 115), he is close to the recent comments by Ropers, who also notes Mead's "ahistorical understanding of social control" (1973: 47).

In view of the fact that G. H. Mead was a known pragmatist and the chief architect of symbolic interactionism, it is of vital importance to be aware of the latter's philosophical background. The basic problem of pragmatism, the meaning of things, objects or ideas, is incorporated in modern symbolic interactionism in the form of what seems to be its basic postulate. Namely, the meaning of a thing is derived from, or arises out of the social interaction. As H. Blumer, the contemporary protagonist of this approach says, "The meaning of a thing for a person grows out of the

ways in which other persons act toward the person with regard to the thing" (1969: 4). Both mind and self are regarded in this conception, not as biologically given, but as social emergents (Meltzer, 1970: 23). It is the symbolic interaction that chiefly characterizes society. "Mind" and "self" are viewed as in constant interaction with society, and, as Meltzer says, ". . . society both precedes the rise of individual selves and minds, and is maintained by the rise of individual selves and minds" (ibid, 19).

In conclusion, on a very general level one could say that although modern symbolic interactionism adopts from dialectic certain conceptions such as the idea of emergence of new qualities in historical development, as well as the notion of dialectical reciprocity and interrelatedness, the common objections addressed to pragmatism from the point of the critical stand of dialectic, also hold good for modern symbolic interactionism.

Thus despite some apparent similarities, this modern symbolic interactionism lacks some of the very essential elements of the dialectic. In the first place it lacks the view of totality and the dialectical category of contradiction in the meaning of actively engaged forces whose conflict leads to qualitative and relatively rapid social change. The Marxian Aufhebung, as a qualitative and revolutionary supersession of the old social order is strikingly missing both from pragmatism and from symbolic interactionism.

One of the most pronounced characteristics of the dialectical method is in its treatment of all objects as developing processes (evolutionism), - the point where it could be compared to pragmatism and its derivative symbolic interactionism. It must be stressed, however, that the differentia

specifica of the dialectical method is in its tendency to look for opposing and even contradictory constituent elements in the studied objects. In the process of dialectical synthesis the dialectical method seeks to establish the real continuity and unity of seemingly unreconcilable opposites (Marković, 1971: 22-23). On these two points the dialectic and the symbolic interactionism certainly do not converge.¹⁰

Finally, what this thesis hopes to have shown is the following:

1. That contemporary dialectic has deep historical roots, and has been continuously present in some degree in western sociology.
2. That Marx's theory of alienation owes its power to the dialectical quality of his thought.
3. That both dialectical categories of totality and of contradiction are essential and inseparable from each other for any proper dialectical approach or analysis.
4. That the dialectical category of totality, and the sociological holism, are two different things, and definitely not the same.
5. That the structure of Simmel's thought was more dialectical than has been commonly emphasized.
6. That Gurvitch's sociology represents a unique treatment of heuristic dialectic.
7. That the elements of dialectic via Simmel's influence, were present even in one of the major schools of American sociology - sociology at Chicago in the 1920's and 1930's.
8. That despite the general absence of dialectic from the dominating orientation of structural-functionalism in the 1950's and 1960's in North American sociology, the dialectic has been present in a peripherally

located historical sociology of P. A. Sorokin and B. Moore, Jr.

9. That when viewed historically, the path of dialectic, from Hegel and Marx to present-day sociology in the West, has been one of progressive attrition.

10. That the method of participant observation can be viewed as a dialectical process.

11. That the growing interest in the dialectical paradigm in Canada and the United States during the past decade is related to the recently existing anomaly and crisis in western social science, and indeed - primarily - in western capitalism itself.

To what extent we have succeeded, it is up to the readers to judge.

E P I L O G U E

At the beginning of this research into the nature of dialectic, the present writer was prone to consider only the epistemological aspects of dialectic (the dialectical thought or "subject dialectic"), with no intention of tackling the difficult question of the ontological nature of dialectic (the dialectic of reality or "object dialectic").

However, a more profound study points to the conclusion that one can safely speak of the dialectics of human reality, or of dialectic as an objective process.

It suffices to recall that almost all master dialecticians have espoused this position. Heraclitus, Hegel, Marx, Gurvitch, Sorokin, are only the most notable among many others.

To illustrate the point, we shall restrict the examples to only one real and very relevant problem of modern humanity.

Following Marx and Jean Piaget, Lucien Goldmann says: "Human thought in general, and therefore scientific thought, which is a particular aspect of it, are closely related to human conduct and to the effects man has on the surrounding world" (Goldmann, 1969: 26).

From this thought of a renowned French scholar, we come to the fundamental problem of philosophical anthropology - the problem of the position and the role of man in the contemporary world, in the world which is his own world and partially his own creation. In other words, it is the problem of man-nature relationships, of which we have all become painfully aware only recently through drastic deterioration of the earth's ecological system. And this major problem facing humanity can only be, we may safely say, understood dialectically.

As a biological species, man is a product of nature. As a species, he is an active creator, "the being of praxis" (Marx), but still he remains tied to nature as a living species dependent on it for his survival. By his creative activity (work) man modifies nature in accordance with his natural and artificial needs, and this activity of man produces the artificial world of cultural objects and relationships, along with the destruction of the natural eco-system.

Discussing the role of capital as a revolutionary and civilizing force, more than a hundred years ago, Marx says in his manuscripts known nowadays as Grundrisse:

Nature becomes for the first time simply an object for mankind, purely a matter of utility; it ceases to be recognized as a power in its own right; and the theoretical knowledge of its independent laws appears only as a strategem designed to subdue it to human requirements, whether as the object of consumption or as the means of production (Marx, 1971: 94).

The opposition between man and nature develops clearly, and the solution to the imminent conflict is still uncertain. Man may cause his own extinction, or may seriously modify his own existence as a species, in order to survive. And nature, regardless of man's destiny, will most likely continue its existence although seriously modified by the impact of man on this planet.

A possible conclusion that can be drawn from the above is: Once man becomes aware of his impact on the world and nature, and in particular becomes conscious of the reciprocal impact of that world on himself, he begins to think dialectically. Therefore, the modern ecological problem can be conceived only in dialectical terms.

A moral can be formulated:

The dialectic must be related to human history and to man's destiny. That is to say, it must be linked meaningfully to the contemporary dilemma resulting from the contradiction between man and nature, and to the ecological problem, which man has yet to solve.

FOOTNOTES (Chapter VIII)

1. In this respect the dialectic never achieved a respectable place in academic sociology. A more complete explanation would require the sociology of knowledge approach, where the fluctuations of the dialectical method would be related to the changing political conditions in America. This, of course, would require another volume, and another thesis.
2. The above typology of dialectic pertains only to specific schools in sociology, and is consequently of limited range. A more comprehensive typology would need to include as separate types the dialectic of the Frankfurt School, the existentialist dialectic, and perhaps the dialectic of radical sociology, among contemporary types.
3. Both dialectics and functionalism emphasize mutual interconnection and interdependence of phenomena within a larger whole conceived often in functionalism as a system. We would even say that both orientations are characterized by ideological and teleological tinges. The adherents of both orientations tend to view their approach as general-theoretical and methodological frameworks for research. Finally, almost all functionalists claim that social institutions cannot be understood in isolation from their social milieu, and this is also a dialectical position.

Pragmatism too shares with dialectic certain ontological assumptions such as the assumption that everything is in permanent and ceaseless change and process (the processuality of the world), and the assumption of the unfinished quality of the world. It also stresses the principle of continuity (Dewey), while dialectic, and in particular the Marxian one, emphasizes continuity within discontinuity.

4. Individual scholars are here not considered as such, but only as members of certain schools or trends. So this level of analysis has in mind primarily the existing schools.
5. Herbert Marcuse, for example, is not a sociologist, neither is Paul Sweezy, and Canadian sociology is not here examined. As for highly respected scholars such as Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton, and Lewis Coser, the present writer is convinced that they are definitely not dialecticians. Their primary orientation is structural functionalism, and this theoretical and methodological orientation overlaps with the dialectic only in its periphery. On the other hand, as an order theory and an ahistorical approach, structural functionalism is directly antithetical to dialectic.
6. Another work, placed in the framework of the sociology of knowledge is needed in order to account for the presence and absence of dialectical perspective in American intellectual milieu. Situated in such a perspective, the above five facets of the problem would gain full meaning and momentum.

7. Charles Peirce, Collected Papers, Vol. V, paragraph 9, as quoted in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6, New York: The Macmillan Company and Free Press, 1967, p. 432.
8. See Gligoriје Zaječaranović, Dijalektika ljudskog sveta (The Dialectics of Human World), Novi Sad: Centar za Političke Studije, 1969, pp. 69-97.
9. See Mihajlo Marković, Dijalektička teorija značenja (The Dialectical Theory of Meaning), 2nd edition, Beograd: Nolit, 1971, p. 81.
10. The above discussion of dialectic in relation to pragmatism and symbolic interactionism is not meant to be conclusive. On the contrary it is only cursory and points to the need for further study.

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